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Abstract 
 
The United Nations and the Question of Palestine: A Study in International Legal 
Subalternity 
 
Ardi Imseis 
 
As one of the longest running disputes on the United Nations agenda, the conventional wisdom 
holds that the UN’s position offers the only normative basis of a just and lasting peace between 
Israelis and Palestinians grounded in international law. Contrary to this position, this 
dissertation argues that there has been a continuing though vacillating gulf between the 
requirements of international law and the position of the UN, which has inevitably frustrated 
rather than facilitated the search for a just and lasting peace. To this end, the research examines 
a number of areas in which the UN has assumed a leading role in the question of Palestine since 
1947. It critically explores the tensions that exist between the positions adopted by the 
Organization on the one hand, and various requirements of prevailing international law on the 
other. If the UN has failed to respect the normative framework of international law in its 
management of the question of Palestine, what forms has this taken? How long has it persisted? 
What are the implications, not only on the Palestinian people – whose contemporary leadership 
has long had faith in the UN as the forum within which their international legal entitlements 
must be pressed – but also on the Organization itself? By addressing these questions, the 
research critically interrogates the received wisdom regarding the UN’s fealty to the 
international rule of law, in favour of what more accurately might be described as an 
international rule by law. It demonstrates that through the actions of the Organization, Palestine 
and its people have been committed to a state of what the author calls International Legal 
Subalternity, according to which the promise of justice through international law has been 
repeatedly proffered under a cloak of political legitimacy furnished by the international 
community, but its realization interminably withheld. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
1. The Research Question 
 
Owing to its unprecedented representative scope, what the United Nations (UN) says and 
does globally is widely perceived to be accompanied by an unparalleled moral and political 
legitimacy directly linked to its status as the principal guardian of the international legal order. 
But what happens when the acts or omissions of the UN do not accord with international law, 
but are rather the result of political expediency, great power politics or bureaucratic inertia? In 
such circumstances, what is to be made of the UN’s solemn Charter obligation to maintain 
international peace and security “in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law”?1 What impact does this have on the UN’s legitimacy, particularly from the standpoint of 
the global south, where most UN operations and the majority of the world’s population are 
located? As part of the growing critique of the UN, there is a general consensus that its value 
in the 21st century will increasingly rest upon its ability to respect and ensure respect for 
international law in the discharge of its functions, and thereby enhance the legitimacy of its 
actions.2 While the UN has successfully done this in a variety of spheres, doubt remains as to 
whether its handling of the question of Palestine has been one of them.  
 
Since its founding in 1945, no other geopolitical conflict has occupied as much time 
within the UN system as the question of Palestine.3  As one of the longest-running disputes on 
the UN’s agenda, now in its eighth decade, the conventional wisdom holds that the UN’s 
position on the question of Palestine offers the only normative basis of a just and lasting peace 
between Israelis and Palestinians grounded in international law. Contrary to this position, this 
dissertation argues that there has been a continuing though vacillating gulf between the 
requirements of international law and the position of the UN on the question of Palestine, which 
has inevitably helped to frustrate rather than facilitate the search for a just and lasting peace. To 
this end, the research will examine a number of areas in which the UN has assumed a leading 
role in the question of Palestine since 1947. It will critically explore the tensions that exist 
between the positions adopted by the Organization on the one hand, and various requirements 
of prevailing international law on the other. If the UN has failed to respect the normative 
                                                 
1 UN Charter, art. 1(1). 
2 Thakur (2010), 4. 
3 E.g., the work of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, especially 
the Division for Palestinian Rights. 
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framework of international law in its management of the question of Palestine, what forms has 
this failure taken? How long has it persisted? What are the implications, not only for the 
Palestinian people – whose contemporary leadership has long had faith in the UN as the forum 
within which their international legal entitlements must be pressed – but also for the 
Organization itself? By addressing these questions, the research will critically interrogate the 
received wisdom regarding the UN’s fealty to the international rule of law in its work. It will 
demonstrate that through the actions of the Organization, Palestine and its people have been 
committed to a state of what I shall call international legal subalternity (ILS), according to 
which the promise of justice through international law has been repeatedly proffered under a 
cloak of political legitimacy furnished by the international community, but its realization 
interminably withheld.  
 
The choice of Palestine as a case study is valuable for at least two reasons. First, owing 
to its prolonged and festering nature, the question of Palestine offers a window into the role of 
international law in UN action over virtually the entirety of the Organization’s existence. 
Temporally, this window is broad enough to cover the major paradigmatic shifts and political 
divides in the international system that have marked the UN’s evolution from its very origins; 
i.e. late-empire/colonies, East/West, North/South. Second, it is striking that despite the copious 
international legal literature that exists on the Palestine problem on the one hand, and the very 
rich experience of the UN in dealing with its many aspects on the other, there has yet to be 
written an independent and critical scholarly study that attempts to bring these two strands 
together in any meaningful way. To be sure, no critical scholarly volume on the UN and the 
question of Palestine exists, as such. The closest one comes to any publicly available general 
treatment of the UN and the question of Palestine is found in a series of public information 
pamphlets produced by the UN and the Arab League, a few monographs that fleetingly cover 
aspects of the Palestine problem within the UN (mostly dated from the 1970s and 80s), and a 
number of edited volumes that offer histories of the UN’s coverage of the question of Palestine 
through the narrow prism of partially reproduced UN documents.4  
 
While this dissertation cannot reasonably cover every aspect of the UN’s handling of the 
question of Palestine, by critically examining key moments of the Organization’s engagement 
                                                 
4 The Question of Palestine and the United Nations (UN, 2008); The United Nations and the Palestine Question 
(Arab League); Nuseibeh (1981); Tomeh, The Palestine Case; Forsythe (1972); Hawley (1975); Hadawi, The 
Palestine Problem (1966); Hadawi, United Nations (1966); Quigley (2016); The United Nations and the Question 
of Palestine (Wolf, 2009). The Nuseibeh monograph is particularly conspicuous in that, despite its title, it offers 
very little by way of examination of the UN’s position on the question of Palestine. 
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with it over an extended period of time through the prism of international law, an attempt will 
be made to provide a picture that has yet to be offered. While previous legal analyses of some 
of these moments have been undertaken extensively, and others have not, they have not 
collectively been interpreted with reference to the subaltern theoretical approach adopted here, 
which draws and builds upon on the critical international legal theory associated with the Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) school of thought.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework & Literature Review 
 
2.1 Epistemological Foundations: Subalternity in the International System 
A useful point of departure is to make two separate but related observations about the 
epistemological framework of this study, each of which is rooted in a subaltern perspective of 
the nature of the international system. Before setting them out, however, we must first ask who 
or what is the “subaltern”? The origins of the term can be traced to Antonio Gramsci, who 
understood it to mean that which is in a positional opposite to a “dominant”, “elite” or 
hegemonic position of power. 5  To Gramsci, it was the interaction between dominant and 
subaltern communities that formed the essence of human history.6 Today, subaltern studies 
scholars use the term broadly, to connote all those subordinated in global society, whether 
according to traditional categories such as race, class, gender and religion, or more recently 
acknowledged categories such as age, sexual orientation, physical ability, etc.7 Viewed in the 
positivist context of modern international law and institutions, where the state is the principal 
actor on the system, individuals, non-self-governing peoples, and, in many respects, developing 
states, are among those that constitute the subaltern. This includes Palestine and the Palestinian 
people. 
 
The first observation concerns a point that may seem self-evident, given the subject matter 
of this study, but one that cannot be taken for granted owing to prevailing skewed and at times 
anti-Palestinian sentiment in some mainstream circles, particularly in the West:8 any study 
devoted to examining Palestine, including before the UN, requires us to take the place and its 
people seriously. One might balk at this proposition, given the inordinate amount of time and 
energy the UN has devoted to the question of Palestine over the past seven decades. It may also 
                                                 
5 Said, E.W. “Foreword” in Guha & Spivak (1988), v-vi.  
6 Hoare & Smith (1996), 52-55. See also id., vi. 
7 Guha & Spivak (1988). 
8 Of note was Edward Said’s lamentation of the fact that one staple of the “common discourse of enlightened 
American liberal democracy” was what he identified as “the complete hegemonic coalescence between the liberal 
Western view of things and the Zionist-Israeli view” when it came to Palestine and the Palestinians; Said (1980) 
at 37. See generally, Chomsky, Fateful Triangle (1999); Said & Hitchens (2001); Philo & Berry (2004). 
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seem inconsistent with the oft-recited mantra (regularly, though not exclusively, expressed 
within UN circles) that good faith engagement requires ‘balance’ and ‘neutrality’ between 
competing claims in Palestine.9 But that would miss the point. By taking Palestine seriously, I 
refer to the imperative that the lived reality of the Palestinian people over the course of its 
modern history from the late-nineteenth century onward – colonized, dispossessed, forcibly 
exiled, occupied, discriminated against – must remain at the forefront of any study of it; not as 
an object to be ignored, casually dismissed, or represented for, but as a subject with a sustained 
history, presence, and agency of its own. This was well demonstrated by Edward Said, who 
urged us to view the matter of Palestinian subalternity as an “issue involving representation”, 
in order to counter the “blocking operation by which the Palestinian cannot be heard from (or 
represent himself) directly on the world stage”.10 The result has been to misrepresent or efface 
(figuratively and literally) the lived reality of Palestine and its people in order for power to 
justify its engagement with Palestine, whether for geo-strategic purposes (as in the case of Great 
Britain and the United States (US)) or in order to transform it into a settler-colonial state (as in 
the case of political Zionism and, eventually, Israel). 11 By taking Palestine seriously, it is 
therefore vital to adopt an approach that critically interrogates how and at what points in 
Palestine’s modern history its position in the international system was superseded and 
compromised in legal terms. This will allow for a better understanding of the UN’s engagement 
with it beyond the realm of the political, humanitarian and developmental spheres. The 
character of contemporary Palestine as a place of unfulfilled promise whose people continue to 
be denied their internationally sanctioned legal rights, and stubbornly refuse to submit 
themselves to such fate, is a useful window through which ILS can be explained and 
understood. Therefore, while this study will necessarily take account of competing hegemonic 
claims and interests in Palestine, it will take a decidedly subaltern view of things, rejecting the 
all too common tendency of power to disregard the lived reality of the indigenous people of 
that land.  
 
The second observation concerns the nature of international law, not only as a series of 
rules upon which the international state system is based in the classical positivist sense, but also 
as a legal narrative organically connected to the European imperial setting in which it was 
constituted and then replicated, to varying degrees, in the international institutions created in 
                                                 
9 Simona Sharoni has decried this as the “trap of false-symmetry”, which requires the scholar to submit herself to 
the Pavlovian condition of affirming a purported moral, legal, and political equivalence between hegemonic Israel 
and its western sponsors and the infinitesimally weaker Palestinians, in order to be received as intellectually 
worthy, honest or fair. Sharoni (1995), 5. 
10 Said (1980), 39. 
11 Herzl (1896). 
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the first half of the twentieth century.12 Critically understanding this pedigree and evolution of 
modern international law will allow us to shed light on the role of international law in the 
actions of the UN in Palestine, most particularly in the defining period immediately following 
World War II (WWII). Central to the argument is the work of the TWAIL network of scholars.13 
In particular, Antony Anghie has focused on the imperial and colonial origins of international 
law “to show how these origins create a set of structures that continually repeat themselves at 
various stages in the history of international law.”14 According to him, “colonialism was central 
to the constitution of international law” in that many of its “basic doctrines” going back to the 
sixteenth century “were forged out of” Europe’s “attempt to create a legal system that could 
account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial 
confrontation.”15 The “essential point”, according to Anghie, is that international law “did not 
precede and thereby effortlessly resolve” European/non-European relations; rather, 
international law was created by imperial Europe in its encounter with its colonial Other.16 
Examples of this hegemonic/subaltern binary, and the process by which the former 
reconceptualized and/or created new law to regulate the latter, abound in the annals of public 
international law and institutions.17 One of the goals of this dissertation is to demonstrate how 
this process – what I shall call rule by law – has played itself out at key stages of the UN’s 
engagement with the question of Palestine. What makes this rule by law process intriguing, is 
that it has unfolded at a time when the organizing principle of the post-WWII international 
community has ostensibly been based upon an international rule of law framework, the defining 
feature of which has been the universal application of international law without regard to the 
power or station of the subjects in question. 
  
Structurally, there appears to be three crosscutting themes that animate subalternity in the 
international system and, by extension, the ILS condition. To the extent that these themes are 
related and overlap with one another, they will inform the episodes examined by this research. 
First, is the theme of the Eurocentricity of the modern international legal order as rooted in 
                                                 
12 Imseis (2009), 1.  
13 See Anghie (2005); Anghie (2002); Anghie (1999); Anghie (1996) at 322; Anghie, et al. (2003); Chimni (2007); 
Fakhri (2008); Gathii, “Alternative” (2000); Gathii, “Neoliberalism” (2000); Mutua (2000); Okafor (2010); 
Rajagopal (2000). 
14 Anghie (2005), 3. 
15 Id. 
16 Anghie (1996), 322. 
17 For instance, in the 17th-19th centuries European colonial powers commonly granted forms of quasi-sovereign 
authority over non-European peoples to private European entities in order to better serve their imperial interests 
abroad; Anghie (2005), 68-69. Likewise, the dissociation of Latin America from Europe expressed in the 1823 
Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally proclaimed by the United States (US) against European intervention in the Western 
hemisphere, served as the legal basis for numerous military interventions by the US in Latin America; Moore 
(2013); Chomsky, Year 501 (1999), 157-158. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 6 
Europe’s imperial and colonial past. In this respect, an important problematic for TWAIL 
theorists is the notion of la mission civilisatrice; the idea that “justified colonialism as a means 
of redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, underdeveloped people of the non-
European world by incorporating them into the universal civilization of Europe”.18 In juridical 
terms, this manifested itself in the social-Darwinistic standard of “civilization”, the prime legal 
determinant for membership and standing in the international system in the imperial age.19 
Although reaching its zenith in the second half of the nineteenth century, use of this standard 
persisted through the turn of the twentieth century, featuring prominently in the League of 
Nations mandate system. Second, is the theme of the circumscribed nature of Third World 
sovereignty and international legal personality in the post-decolonization era UN. The end of 
WWII ushered in a new world order in which classic forms of European empire ostensibly gave 
way to more liberal principles set out in the UN Charter. This included the principles of 
sovereign equality of states, suppression of acts of aggression, equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. 20  Yet for all the promise of the UN, particularly following 
decolonization, a continued tension between the old imperial rule by law structure and these 
new liberal rule of law ideals remained.21 Third, is the theme of neo-imperial power and the 
role it has played in perpetuating the contingency and marginalization of the global subaltern. 
In the post-WWII era, the victorious allied powers have sometimes used international law to 
further their own national interests at the expense of the international rule of law. In this respect, 
and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the US has played the most significant role 
under cover of a purported commitment to a progressive, democratic and rights-based 
international order.  
 
Notably, the above crosscutting themes span the history of modern international law and 
institutions, including as embodied in the UN from 1945 to the present. Here, Anghie’s analysis 
of a basic paradox in the evolution of international law and institutions is instructive in helping 
us understand the hegemonic/subaltern binary in the system itself. A critical reading of the 
history of international law and institutions reveals that the mechanisms, doctrines and 
technologies created as a means of achieving a liberal rights based global order have at times 
shown themselves to be the very tools through which that order has been frustrated or 
undermined to the detriment of subaltern classes. This is “inherently problematic”, Anghie 
                                                 
18 Anghie (2005), 3. 
19 Wheaton (1866), 17-18; Oppenheim (1928), 36-37; and Koskenniemi (2008), 127.  
20 UN Charter, art. 1. 
21 The composition and procedural rules of the Security Council and the codification of “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law in the ICJ Statute are two examples; UN Charter, 
ch. V; ICJ Statute, art. 38(1). 
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argues, “because it is sometimes precisely the international system and institutions that 
exacerbate, if not create, the problem they ostensibly seek to resolve.”22 
 
This dissertation will attempt to show that, perhaps more than any single case study, the 
UN’s engagement with the question of Palestine stands out as an obvious example of the 
phenomenon described above. Through the acts of some of its principal and subsidiary organs, 
the UN has presided over both the unmaking of Palestine (i.e. its attempted partition, military 
conquest, depopulation and political effacement between 1947 and 1967) and its qualified 
reemergence, at least in truncated, fragmented and subjugated form (i.e. in the occupied 
Palestinian territory (OPT) post-1967) over time. Throughout this prolonged episode, the 
failure of the UN to abide by the full range of prevailing international legal norms in its 
management of the question of Palestine has been demonstrative of a larger failure by the 
Organization to take Palestine and its people seriously. This has ultimately resulted in the 
Organization perpetually conceiving of them and their putative membership in the system as 
subordinate and contingent, thereby reifying, maintaining and perpetuating their condition of 
ILS over time.  
 
2.2 The Great Paradox: TWAIL and the Counter-Hegemonic Potential of International Law 
and Institutions  
TWAIL scholarship has become an important part of the critical discourse on modern 
international law and institutions in recent decades. Nevertheless, its proponents have for the 
most part resisted succumbing to a nihilistic view of the discipline. Foremost among them, 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal has argued that there remains a counter-hegemonic potential that the 
Third World can bring through its use of international law and institutions.23 Thus, while the 
state-centric nature of international law is what reinforces the hegemonic/subaltern binary 
inherent in its evolution, lending international law a quality of being nothing more than “a mask 
for power relationships” and a tool for the maintenance of the established international order,24 
leading TWAIL theorists have taken a more accommodating view. Many recognize that in the 
interdependent UN Charter era, where a multiplicity of actors increasingly engage with one 
another in infinite ways, international law has come to represent something potentially more 
than a politics of domination by other means. For subaltern groups, negotiating the state-centric 
international order has sometimes entailed using the very legal principles that underpin it to 
challenge that order on its own terms. The great paradox, therefore, is that beyond its role in 
                                                 
22 Anghie (2005), 192. 
23 Rajagopal (1998), 3. 
24 Brunnée & Toope (2010), 3.  
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the evolution and maintenance of a hegemonic international order, in so far as international law 
now claims and has the potential to serve as an authentically universal standard for all peoples, 
it contains what Dianne Otto calls the “seeds of resistance” for those that remain unable to fully 
benefit from its promise.25 Put another way, despite its inequitable origins, elements of which 
clearly linger on in the contemporary period, international law remains the only means by which 
to measure, in legal terms, the acts of subjects of the international system.  
 
This critical duality of international law is a proposition that runs throughout this 
dissertation. Indeed, all law inherently possesses a duality of this sort. On the one hand, law is 
the product of the exercise of political power by subjects who wish to impose on society some 
form of normative order consistent with their interests and weltanschauung. On the other hand, 
once created, law acts as the embodiment of such normative order under a claim that it stands 
apart from the very political power and interests of the subjects that created it and whom it now 
binds. Throughout this process, law operates as both an expression of the values and interests 
of political authority, and as a check and balance on that very same authority. In the context of 
international law, Martti Koskenniemi identified this tension as giving rise to law as both an 
apology for power and a harbinger of a utopia.26 Always in discord with one another, never 
definitively cancelling each other out, the law as apology/utopia dialectic has become a fixed 
feature of the international system. This is particularly so when viewed from the vantage point 
of weaker nations and peoples.  
 
Instances of this tension appear everywhere in international law and inform the 
hegemonic/subaltern binary identified above. For example, from ancient times slavery was 
considered a natural element of the Roman jus gentium. It was the very legality of the holding 
of property in other human beings that allowed the trans-Atlantic trade in Africans to flourish 
as the economic backbone of the settler-colonies of the so-called New World. As Great Britain’s 
engagement with the slave-trade became unprofitable and post-Enlightenment philanthropic 
and populist sentiment eschewed the practice as uncivilized, there emerged sufficient moral 
resolve to bring it to an end through gradual changes in the law based on both naturalist and 
positivist schools of legal thought. This was embodied in British abolitionist positions at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, American abolitionism following the American Civil War in 1865, 
and the eventual universal proscription of slavery in a series of international instruments 
concluded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, culminating in the Slavery 
                                                 
25 Otto (1996), 343.  
26 Koskenniemi (2005). 
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Convention of 1926.27 A more contemporary example concerns the status of indigenous peoples 
in international law. While decolonization in the 1960’s “promoted the emancipation of colonial 
territories” modeled along a distinctly Westphalian standard according to which independence 
was granted the new territorial states under the principle of uti possidetis, it “simultaneously 
promoted the assimilation of members of culturally distinctive indigenous groups into the 
dominant political and social orders that engulfed them.” 28  In response, a rights-based 
international movement emerged in the 1970’s arguing for the increased recognition of the 
human and people’s rights of indigenous groups. Led by a host of non-governmental indigenous 
people’s organizations and independent experts, and facilitated by the UN, this effort has made 
some incremental gains in the realm of lex ferenda. Thus, the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) affirms that indigenous peoples “are equal to all other 
peoples” and therefore enjoy the right to “self-determination”, a recognition that has allowed 
for the expansion of self-government in a number of states.29 This evolution in the rights of 
indigenous peoples would not have been possible but for the active reliance on evolving 
concepts of prevailing human rights law by indigenous rights activists themselves. These two 
examples demonstrate international law’s duality as both a force for the maintenance of a 
hegemonic order and one in which those subaltern classes who are overlooked or ill-served by 
such order may challenge it on its own terms. In both, criticism of prevailing law by and for 
subaltern groups was rooted in a critical application of that law against evolving social mores 
and sensibilities. This in turn produced fresh claims of fairness, ultimately resulting in some 
form of progressive development of the law.  
 
2.3 TWAIL’s Blind Spot: International Legal Subalternity as both a Category and a 
Perpetual Condition 
Does the counter-hegemonic potential of international law and institutions mean that the 
hegemonic/subaltern binary at their root can be eliminated? Despite its decentralized, 
heterogeneous and polycentric nature, 30  TWAIL literature broadly seems to suggest so. 
According to Anghie and Bupinder Chimni, Third World jurists of the decolonization period to 
whom the TWAIL moniker has been affixed post hoc (TWAIL I) – e.g. Georges Abi-Saab, 
Francisco Garcia-Amador, R.P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and Taslim Elias – tempered 
their critique of classical European international law and institutions by adopting a “non-
                                                 
27 Slavery Convention. Allain (2013), 59-60, 64ff; Drescher, “From Consensus to Consensus” in Allain (2012), 
316-355. 
28 Anaya (2004), 55. Also Hohmann & Weller (2018). 
29 UNDRIP, preamble, arts. 2, 3. 
30 Gathii (2011), 34. 
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rejectionist stance”.31 According to this position, “the contents of international law could be 
transformed to take into account the needs and aspirations” of the colonized and newly 
independent Third World states.32 This transformation was to be achieved primarily through 
the UN, and key doctrines of modern international law were to be employed in leveling the 
playing field between Europe and its former colonies. Foremost of these were the principles of 
sovereign equality of states and non-intervention.33  
 
From the mid-1990s, contemporary TWAIL theorists (TWAIL II) – e.g. James Gathii, 
Obiora Okafor, Makau wa Matua, Rajagopal, Otto, Anghie, Chimni, etc. – have critiqued this 
view. At issue has been TWAIL I’s apparent deference to the Third World post-colonial state 
as a site in which modern international law and institutions have been employed not to 
emancipate Third World peoples from the yolk of European colonialism, but to entrench 
authoritarian and corrupt native elite rule over them. TWAIL II writers have taken issue with 
their predecessors’ failure to see beyond the sovereignty of the Third World state as an 
emancipatory end in itself, rather than regard it as a tool through which Third World citizens 
would realize true freedom and equality vis á vis their former European masters. TWAIL II 
writers have accordingly offered deeper theoretical critiques of international law and 
institutions, focusing on their colonial and imperial origins, to demonstrate a continuing 
structural bias in the international legal system far more difficult to dislodge than was 
previously understood.34  
 
Yet, despite their more critical approach, TWAIL II scholars appear to take the view that 
the prospect of dislodging international law’s structural bias – its hegemonic/subaltern binary 
– remains possible. Thus, to the views of Otto and Rajagopal regarding the counter-hegemonic 
potential of international law and institutions, Matua has added that TWAIL “present[s] an 
alternative normative legal edifice for international governance” distinct from the contemporary 
international legal system. 35  Likewise, through its “empowering radical epistemology that 
liberates international law” from its “colonial and elitist shackles”, Richard Falk argues that 
TWAIL “validates the transformative and liberationist potential of international law”. 36 
Adopting a Marxist approach, Chimni argues that despite international law’s “imperialist” 
pedigree, “the idea of international rule of law continues to make sense” for what he calls the 
                                                 
31 Anghie & Chimni (2003), 81. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id., 82-86; Imseis (2009), 2-3. 
35 Mutua (2000). 
36 Falk (2016), 1944.  
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Transnational Oppressed Class, which must rely on various “foundational principles of 
international law (e.g. the principle of non-use of force)” to overcome its subaltern status.37 For 
him, “the challenge is to use CIL [contemporary international law] and institutions to the 
advantage of the subaltern classes… [L]egal nihilism is not the appropriate counter. What is 
called for is a creative and imaginative use of existing international laws and institutions to 
further the interests of the ‘wretched of the earth’.”38 Finally, David Fidler argues that along 
with its critique of “the use of international law for creating and perpetuating Western 
hegemony”, TWAIL’s raison d’etre is necessarily to “construct the bases for a post-hegemonic 
global order.”39  
 
It is unclear whether this optimistic, liberationist view of international law and institutions 
is fully warranted, leading to the possibility that TWAIL literature may suffer from a blind spot 
of sorts. This arises through what appears to be a failure to account for international law and 
institutions as social phenomena, which by their nature are in constant flux and evolution. 
Because international law, institutions and society are ever changing, it follows that the law-
making/challenging process described above can theoretically never end so long as humanity 
continues to exist and organize itself internationally with reference to any form of rule of law: 
ibi societas ibi jus. That is to say, there is no legal threshold beyond which all subaltern groups 
will achieve the full range of international legal personality and rights, thereby putting an end 
to the hegemonic/subaltern binary once and for all. As law is challenged by the subaltern, and 
changes are thereby introduced to law over time, the interests served by that law produce either 
partially assuaged or wholly new subaltern classes who in turn challenge prevailing law. In 
many ways, therefore, the hegemonic/subaltern rule by law binary operates within a cycle that, 
it would appear, cannot be broken.  
 
An implied acknowledgement of this is found in Gathii’s observation that “a central 
component of TWAIL is to challenge the hegemony of the dominant narratives of international 
law…by teasing out encounters of difference along many axes – race, class, gender, sex, 
ethnicity, economics, trade etc”.40 For him, this teasing “create[s] fruitful tensions or new 
conceptual spaces for richer, subtler and more nuanced renditions of international law.”41 Far 
from vitiating these axes of human interaction, critical examination of international law and 
                                                 
37 Chimni (2010), 75-76. 
38 Chimni, “An Outline” in Marks (2008), 90-91. 
39 Fidler (2003), 31.  
40 Gathii (2011), 37. 
41 Id., 40. 
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institutions reveals how such axes are reaffirmed, restructured, or regenerated in similar or new 
forms. This ultimately allows for fresh intellectual terrain to open up for a more fulsome 
understanding of the hegemonic/subaltern binary inherent in the discipline. In this sense, ILS 
emerges as a distinct category within the international legal and institutional framework, and 
one that, subject to the maintenance of an international society based upon some form of legal 
order, must exist in perpetuity. 
 
Two points should be made at this stage. First, it is of note that TWAIL scholarship has 
yet to clearly identify such a distinct category for the subaltern half of what I have called the 
hegemonic/subaltern binary. To be sure, the notion of hegemony in international law and 
organization has been well traversed in both mainstream and critical international legal 
literature, obviating the need to do so here.42 Yet, only a small minority of TWAIL scholars 
have used the term “subaltern” in relation to the various classes of groups they have found 
subjected to the hegemonic effect of the international legal and institutional order.43  Even then, 
these authors have curiously failed to find the predicament and features shared by those classes 
pronounced enough to warrant an acknowledgement that they have given rise to a common 
condition that must be appropriately named and identified.44 The closest one comes to what this 
research identifies as ILS is found in the sociological writings of Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
and César Rodríguez-Garavito. 45  They posit a sociolegal idea they term “subaltern 
cosmopolitan legality”. The aim of this idea is to “challenge our sociological and legal 
imagination and belie the fatalistic ideology that ‘there is no alternative’ to neoliberal 
institutions.”46 The authors make clear that their notion is not descriptive (i.e. of a class or group 
sharing a common condition), but rather prescriptive (i.e. of an idea and approach to be 
employed metaphysically). In addition, they affirm that it is not focused on the international 
legal and institutional order as much as it is on law in the transnational and domestic perspective 
vis á vis the forces of “hegemonic, neoliberal globalization”. It therefore seems clear that 
subaltern cosmopolitan legality is not synonymous with what I have called ILS.47  
 
Second, the permanency of ILS as a condition should not be taken to suggest that it is 
immutable and fixed on one or more specific groups. The permanency of ILS as a condition 
                                                 
42 E.g., Vagts (2001); Alvarez (2003); Gathii (1998). 
43 E.g., Otto (1996); Rajagopal (2000); Chimni (2010). 
44 In discussing international law’s “Others”, Marks (2008), 16, indicates that scholars use a number of terms 
including “subaltern classes”, “subordinate groups” and “oppressed classes”, or otherwise imply the existence of 
such groups, in reference to “those seeking emancipatory change”.  
45 De Sousa Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito (2005). 
46 Id., 1. 
47 Id., 11. 
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rests not in the fact that given subaltern groups cannot utilize the counter-hegemonic potential 
of international law and institutions to challenge and, at some point, break free from their 
inequitable circumstances. Rather, it is to suggest that even as such groups register successes 
in pushing back from time to time, the overall condition of ILS as a structural component of the 
international system cannot fundamentally be eradicated. Organically, as international law and 
organizations are challenged and new law is made within and by that structure, the condition 
of ILS may morph in respect of one or more subaltern group, or otherwise shift from one or 
more of them to other, likely new, subaltern groups as part of the law-making/challenging cycle.  
 
Returning to our earlier examples, it is of note that despite the abolition of slavery in 
international law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the racism embedded 
within the domestic legal structures of former slave-holding states (the paragon being the US) 
that enabled and sustained slavery in the first place was morphed but not eradicated. For 
formerly enslaved persons, this structural racism remained basically untouched from an 
international legal standpoint, given the collective operation of doctrines of non-intervention, 
the standard of civilization and state-centrism that placed them beyond international legal 
scrutiny.48 Likewise, although indigenous peoples are said to enjoy a right of self-determination 
under the 2007 UNDRIP, this purported right remains limited for two reasons. First, it is limited 
through an express provision of UNDRIP that constricts the exercise of that self-determination 
to the realm of internal or local affairs within the territorial sphere of existing sovereign and 
independent states. 49  Second, it is limited by the doctrinal prescription that deprives 
declarations like UNDRIP of any binding legal force as a matter of positive international law.  
 
The above are examples where the subalternity of the underclass has essentially remained 
in place under international law, despite some measure of change introduced within that law. 
Examples where wholly new categories of subaltern classes have been created through changes 
in international law include the emergence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and economic 
migrants, both of which evolved as recognized groups in need of protection only after 
international law had recognized refugees as a distinct subject of persons with legally binding 
rights in relation to states.50 In a sense, the crystallization of refugee rights under international 
                                                 
48 Alexander (2010).  
49 UNDRIP, preamble, arts. 3, 4, 46. 
50 Contrast the Refugee Convention, a treaty codifying customary legal obligations on states, with the 1998 Deng 
Principles and the New York Declaration, both of which represent non-binding soft law in so far as they deal with 
IDPs and migrants, respectively. 
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law opened up space for the emergence, in legal terms, of IDPs and migrants, to whom a greater 
measure of the burden of subalternity has shifted.  
 
What each of these examples illustrate is that whatever value exists in the counter-
hegemonic use of international law and institutions, the limits of that value are to be found in 
the unbroken cycle of the hegemonic/subaltern binary at the root of the international legal order, 
a key manifestation of which is ILS. The research will show that the UN’s management of the 
question of Palestine is a good example of this cycle and the ILS condition. Over time, the 
international law and order created or affirmed by the UN on the question of Palestine has 
compelled the Palestinian leadership to adjust its position in order to assert the rights of its 
people, often times in a curtailed measure. This has only resulted in the Organization shifting 
the legal goalposts in a manner that has frustrated those purported rights in some fashion or 
another while simultaneously holding itself out as the guarantor of those very rights.   
 
2.4 TWAIL and the Question of Palestine 
Given the raft of potential issues at play, it is surprising that TWAIL literature on the 
question of Palestine has only appeared over the past decade or so. While this literature has 
broken important ground, at least three shortcomings stand out.  
 
First, to the extent it focuses its critique on the field of international law, as such, as being 
complicit in the unmaking of Palestine, the literature misses the mark by neglecting to account 
for the catalytic role of hegemonic actors in the equation. As a metaphysical phenomenon, 
international law is not self-executing. That function is left to the states that create it, almost 
always in concert with one another. In the context of the question of Palestine, the key 
international legal institutional protagonists have been the League of Nations and the United 
Nations, the latter to a much greater extent than the former. It is therefore striking to find that 
the current TWAIL literature on Palestine tends to highlight the complicity of international law 
almost as an actor suo motu, over the actions and omissions of those actually responsible for 
creating and giving it effect. Thus, in her otherwise insightful analysis of Palestinian “quasi-
sovereignty”, Laura Ribeiro repeatedly indicts “international law”, as such, for simultaneously 
having “colonized” and “liberated” in Palestine while paying insufficient attention to the acts 
and omissions of the international institutional actors that made it so. 51  Likewise, in her 
examination of humanitarianism and Palestine, Michele Burgess laments the “role of 
international law in the subjugation of the European World”, although giving slightly more 
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attention to how that law was “used as a tool” in the effort, implying that some form of 
hegemonic agency was pivotal in the endeavor. Notably, Burgess confines her examination of 
the role of the UN in this to merely one paragraph.52  
 
Second, the literature has largely tended to focus its sights on only two areas of analysis 
– namely, criticism of international law as manifested through the League of Nations Mandate 
for Palestine and the subsequent application and operation of international humanitarian and 
criminal law in the OPT.53 This work has been vital in helping us critically understand how 
international law has been used in these moments to push the Palestinian people as a subaltern 
class to the edges of the international system. Yet one result of its relatively narrow focus has 
been to neglect the important role of the UN as not merely a forum within which much of this 
has taken place, but also as an actor responsible for this outcome in a variety of other areas from 
1947 to the present.54  
 
Third, an increasing volume of TWAIL literature on Palestine has engaged in important, 
though arguably esoteric, sociolegal analyses of how international law is articulated by its 
protagonists in “narratives” and “discursive techniques”, rather than how it is created and 
employed by international institutions for unjust ends. Burgess has been the most prominent 
voice in this respect and her ethnographic work on the narratives of statehood as employed by 
Palestinian legal practitioners in the field, although novel, is a good example of this.55  
 
By utilizing a TWAIL sensibility and theoretical approach to assessing how the UN has 
managed the question of Palestine over key periods of its engagement with the issue, this 
dissertation hopes to both build upon and add to the body of scholarship currently evolving in 
this area. 
 
2.5 A Word on the Nature of the UN: Independent, Sum of its Parts or Both? 
The UN is today “the only truly global institution of a general purpose which 
approximates universality”.56 From an original membership of 51 states in 1945, the body 
                                                 
52 Burgess (2009), 49, 53. 
53 Ribeiro (2009); Burgess, id.; Burgis, “Discourses of Division” (2008); Sayed (2014); Reynolds & Xavier (2016).  
54  Although Strawson (2004-05) and Kattan (2009) have examined some of these moments, they have not 
identified themselves as TWAIL scholars nor utilized critical methods typically associated with TWAIL 
scholarship, instead favouring strictly positivist doctrinal methodologies. 
55 Burgis-Kasthala (2014). See also, Burgis, “Discourses of Division” (2008); and Burgis “The Promise of Solid 
Ground” (2008). 
56 Thakur (2010), 4. 
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currently boasts 193 Member States, with two non-Member Observer States, one of which is 
the State of Palestine.57 The organization is comprised of six principal organs, each with its 
own powers and mandate: the General Assembly, Security Council, International Court of 
Justice, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council and Secretariat. In addition, there 
are a host of other bodies subsidiary to one or another of the principal organs, each mandated 
to perform specific functions on behalf of the Organization.  
 
Because the constituent members of each of the principal organs and the subsidiary bodies 
are either made up of representatives of Member States, UN personnel or a combination of 
both, and because each of these organs or bodies are empowered to perform widely divergent 
functions, the nature and extent to which they operate independently of state interest and power 
differs. This gives rise to questions as to whether the UN can be spoken of in homogenous 
terms, or if it is more appropriate to address it in heterogeneous ones. Put in another way, is the 
UN independent or merely the sum of its parts? And how does that help us understand 
hegemonic/subaltern binary inherent in the work of the Organization?  
 
Simon Chesterman has noted that there are “divergent views as to whether the UN should 
be a forum for intergovernmental cooperation or an independent actor that can lead on issues 
of global import”.58 Within both international law and international relations literature these 
views find expression in the theoretical debate between what Veijo Heiskanen identifies as the 
realist (or reductionist) and idealist (or institutionalist) schools of thought.59  
 
For realists, “international organizations have no independent role or function in 
international affairs, but are simply extensions of instruments of state power”. 60  As such, 
international organizations are merely the handmaidens of the states that create and use them 
to do in concert that which would be more difficult to do unilaterally. Within this statist 
framework, the only political will of consequence is that which resides within and among states, 
with international organizations merely serving as fora where international laws are collectively 
dictated in the Gramscian sense, not independently created.61 “Consequently, in the realists’ 
view, an excessive focus on formal international organizations and their internal structure is 
                                                 
57 The other is the Holy See. 
58 Chesterman (2006), 61. 
59 Coicaud & Heiskanen (2001), 5. 
60 Id. 
61 “[L]egality is determined by the interests of the class which holds power in any society”; Gramsci (1994), 230. 
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mistaken, as it diverts attention from the real subject matter of international relations: the 
relationships among states and governments”.62  
 
For idealists, the situation is radically different. Although they acknowledge the role of 
states in their creation, they hold that “international organizations play a role in international 
affairs that is somewhat independent of states and governments”. 63  They point to various 
technical legal and political functions exercised by international organizations – such as the 
capacity to sue and be sued, or the political independence of officials of the organizations in 
exercising their functions – as evidence of the fact that these organizations possess an autonomy 
that separates them from the states responsible for their creation and financial upkeep. As a 
result, idealists are of the view that “international organizations have to be understood as players 
that not only have to be taken into account, but also have to be made accountable”.64  
 
Despite the juxtaposition of these two schools of thought, however, what the literature 
does not appear to contemplate is that the UN actually embodies a mix of both. An implicit 
explanation of this is offered by Jan Klabbers who, in discussing the relationship between 
international organizations and their members, emphasizes that it is more than merely symbiotic 
in so far as the two “tend, eventually, to fade into each other so as to become 
indistinguishable.”65 This derives from the fact that “[w]hatever volonté distincte international 
organizations may possess, it derives, eventually, from a volonté not their own; and however 
much states may wish to control organizations, their very creation involves a loss of control.”66 
  
Support for this double-sided predisposition of the UN system is found in the highly 
varied memberships, powers and functions of the UN’s principal organs, the terms of which are 
set out in the Charter itself and therefore legislated within the corpus of international law. For 
example, the General Assembly and Security Council embody, to varying degrees, 
intergovernmental cooperation under chapters IV and V of the Charter. Likewise, the 
Secretariat, and by extension the Secretary-General and the staff, are bound to exercise their 
functions in an independent manner under article 100. However, even the most cursory 
examination of UN practice reveals the hegemonic/subaltern binary as a common thread that 
winds its way throughout the Organization in these respects. Thus, as the plenary of all 193 
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64 Klabbers, in Coicaud & Heiskanen (2001), 225. 
65 Id., 227. 
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Member States, the intergovernmental representativeness of the General Assembly lends it a 
political legitimacy that no other organ enjoys, but owing to the generally non-binding character 
of its resolutions relegates it to a subaltern status vis á vis the Security Council. Likewise, the 
15-member Security Council is solely empowered to render decisions that legally bind all other 
Member States in relation to threats to international peace and security, despite the lack of 
political legitimacy such decisions can sometimes be perceived as having owing to the 
Council’s limited membership and its dominance by the five hegemonic permanent veto-
wielding powers. Finally, although the Secretary-General and the staff must not seek or receive 
instructions from any governments, and Member States undertake not to influence them in the 
discharge of their functions, the long-standing practice of allocating senior UN posts to various 
of the hegemonic global powers calls these legal requirements into question.  
 
The hegemonic/subaltern binary is therefore manifest in much of the work of the UN. In 
deference to this, the thesis will take account of the nuanced and multifaceted nature of the 
organization and the varying roles, functions, and powers of its constituent parts. At the same 
time, it will assess the UN against the single standard of international law whereby it is, at once, 
neither the “captive of its own interests” as an independent actor and “more than the sum of its 
parts” as an intergovernmental forum. 67  By thematically juxtaposing certain rule by law 
practices and features of the UN against its ostensible rule of law organizing principle, it is 
hoped that new critical understandings of how the Organization has managed long-term conflict 
in line with international law and justice can be developed. 
 
3. Overview and Sources  
Organized along an international rule of law/rule by law thematic axis, this dissertation 
argues that the gulf between international law and UN action in its management of key moments 
of the question of Palestine forms part of an arc of history that runs, to varying degrees, from 
1947 to the present. Examined through a subaltern theoretical lens, this arc of history 
demonstrates that far from being a consistent standard-bearer of international law when it comes 
to the question of Palestine, the UN has demonstrated a less than principled approach to the 
matter. At times the UN has adopted positions that overtly run contrary to prevailing 
international law, at others it has sidestepped the full range of international law’s stipulations 
for what appear to be reasons of political expediency. Despite claims to the contrary, the result 
has been to commit Palestine and its people to a seemingly perpetual state of legal subordination 
in the international system, where the promise of justice and international law is repeatedly 
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proffered under a cloak of political legitimacy furnished by the international community, but 
its realization interminably withheld. This has fostered a condition of ILS, which has served to 
both underscore and illustrate the international rule by law that lays at the heart of much of the 
work of the UN and the paradoxical nature of the Organization as the occasional author of the 
global problems it is mandated to resolve in accordance with – not in spite of – principles of 
justice and international law.  
 
Building on the theoretical foundation presented in this introduction, chapter 2 begins the 
study by offering a short historical survey of the origins of Palestine’s ILS condition. Rather 
than within the UN system itself, these origins are to be found in British secret treaty-making 
and diplomacy between 1915 and 1947, particularly as institutionalized within the League of 
Nations system. While the literature on the history of Palestine in this period tends to focus on 
political, cultural and socio-economic themes that emerge through British action at this time, 
this chapter examines this period through the lens of international law’s then prevailing rule by 
law ethic and the cross-cutting theme of the Eurocentricity of international law and 
organization. It is set against the backdrop of the global paradigm shift then occurring in the 
international system, from one based on the norms and values of the late-imperial age through 
an international rule by law, to one based on those of an emerging liberal western rights-based 
discourse ostensibly based on an international rule of law. The main thematic issue that emerges 
at this time for Palestine from an international law perspective is its contingent and subaltern 
legal status in the modern international legal order, a status that was eventually placed before 
the UN in 1947. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses how the UN managed this inheritance through an examination of UN 
General Assembly resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 recommending the partition of 
Palestine. In particular, it undertakes an international legal analysis of resolution 181(II) with 
specific reference to the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) whose report to the General Assembly in September 1947 formed the basis of the 
resolution. Contrary to the traditional international legal historiography, this chapter posits that 
the resolution was neither procedurally ultra vires the General Assembly, as argued by some 
pro-Palestinian legal scholars, nor was it substantively consistent in its terms with prevailing 
international law as regards self-determination of peoples, as argued by some pro-Israeli legal 
scholars. Set against the larger context of the international legal status of Palestine from WWI 
to the end of the British Mandate, this chapter argues that resolution 181(II) was, in a sense, the 
opening act in the reification of Palestine’s ILS within the newly minted UN system. In this 
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regard, the chapter offers a “reinterpretation of an already interpreted domain.”68 It does this by 
demonstrating that the resolution was not only an embodiment, in legal terms, of the lingering 
tension between the rule by law diktats of late-European empire (derived as they were from the 
continuing Eurocentricity of the system) and post-WWII rights-based rule of law liberalism that 
marked the founding of the UN, but that it also set the stage for a series of other questionable 
and hitherto sparsely investigated legal moments in the UN’s subsequent dealings with the 
question of Palestine.  
 
 Chapter 4 turns to 1967 for one such moment, examining the issue of the UN’s position 
on the legal status of Israel’s prolonged occupation of the OPT. International law posits that 
occupation of enemy territory is meant to be temporary and that the occupying power may not, 
by virtue of its occupation, rightfully claim sovereignty over such territory. Despite this, since 
1967 Israel has systematically altered the status of the OPT with the aim of annexing, de jure 
or de facto, most or all of that territory to itself. During this time, while the UN has focused on 
documenting the legality of a range of individual violations of international law by the 
occupying power, scant attention has been paid by the Organization to the legality of the 
occupation regime as a whole. Emphasis has instead been placed on encouraging the parties to 
bring the occupation to an end through continued, though widely discredited, bilateral 
negotiations. This chapter asks by what rationale can it be said that Israel's prolonged 
occupation of the OPT remains either legal or legitimate in the absence of good faith on its part 
in negotiating the occupation’s end? What accounts for the UN’s failure to definitively identify 
the occupation as illegal as such in line with its rule of law organizing principle, and how can 
its end reasonably be made contingent on negotiations between occupier and occupied? This 
chapter is set against the reemergence and relative gains made by the Palestinian people within 
the UN during the decolonization period resulting, inter alia, in the UN’s acknowledgement of 
its “permanent responsibility” for the question of Palestine until it “is resolved in all its aspects 
in accordance with international law”,69 including an express recognition of the right erga 
omnes of the Palestinian people to self-determination in the OPT. The conventional wisdom 
presents this shift as emblematic of the UN’s commitment to upholding the international rule 
of law in Palestine following the ostensible empowerment of the Third World through 
decolonization. In contrast, this chapter argues that the UN’s failure to take a more principled 
position on the very legality of Israel’s half-century ‘temporary’ occupation of the self-
determination unit of the Palestinian people is demonstrative of the maintenance of Palestine’s 
                                                 
68 Rangwala (2002). 
69 A/RES/70/15, 24 November 2015. 
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ILS in the UN system, an expression of the structural limitations of Third World quasi-
sovereignty, and the continuation of the international rule by law, under a different guise.  
 
Moving to the present day, chapter 5 examines the issue of Palestine’s admission to the 
UN as a Member State. Following the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) historic 
acceptance of resolution 181(II) in 1988, and the commencement of over two decades of state-
building undertaken as a consequence of the Madrid and Oslo peace processes, Palestine made 
considerable legal advances on the road to being universally recognized as a state, the sine qua 
non for UN membership. By 2011, this included Palestine’s recognition by over 130 other 
states, membership in a number of international intergovernmental entities, among them the 
UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and endorsements of 
statehood by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Ad Hoc Liaison 
Committee for the Coordination of International Assistance to the Palestinians (AHLC). Set 
against this backdrop, this chapter critically examines Palestine’s unsuccessful bid for 
membership in the UN of September-November 2011. In particular, it undertakes an 
international law assessment of the report of the UN Committee on the Admission of New 
Members, which concluded under the certainty of a US veto that it could not unanimously 
recommend Palestine’s membership in the UN to the Security Council after having examined 
whether Palestine satisfied the criteria for membership as set out in article 4(1) of the UN 
Charter. Propelled by this unsuccessful bid, Palestine turned to the General Assembly which 
upgraded its observer status (initially achieved by the PLO in 1974) to that of a non-Member 
Observer State on 29 November 2012. While the legal consequences of this upgrade have been 
considerable, including allowing the State of Palestine to accede to a host of international 
treaties and multilateral organizations, its juxtaposition against the refusal of the Committee on 
the Admission of New Members to recommend membership to the Security Council in 
accordance with the international rule of law is demonstrative, yet again, of the international 
rule by law principle at work. Owing to the position of the US government, this episode 
highlights the third cross-cutting theme informing the ILS condition, namely its dependence on 
the exercise of neo-imperial power masked as liberal, democratic and rights-based. Almost 70 
years after the UN’s initial foray into the question of Palestine, this chapter will demonstrate 
that while the Organization has allowed for a gradual and qualified recognition of some 
Palestinian legal subjectivity and rights, under the influence of the neo-imperial power of one 
of the permanent members of the Security Council it continues to fail to provide the full range 
of legal and political foundations upon which those rights may actually be realized, thereby 
continuing to disenfranchise Palestine and perpetuate its ILS in the system.  
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Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by summarizing the findings set out in the preceding 
chapters and situating them in in the larger context of the research question. It will show that, 
rather than the international rule of law ordering principle, it is the international rule by law 
principle that finds express and sustained illustration in the UN’s management of the question 
of Palestine. This phenomenon is rooted in the clash between hegemonic and subaltern interests 
that produce and reproduce situations in which the promise of international law is repeatedly 
presented as the basis of international legitimacy and peaceful coexistence among a citizenry 
of formally equal nation-states, but which relegates non-self-governing peoples and other 
subaltern societies to partial and qualified access in the system.70 The result is the presence of 
ILS as a long-range condition, a fixed feature of the international order. 
 
 Before proceeding further, a brief word regarding sources is in order. This is a joint 
international law/international relations study, employing a qualitative methodological 
approach with almost exclusive emphasis on analysis of international legal text as a means of 
assessing the legal position of the UN in relation to the single case study of the question of 
Palestine. As such, primary source material upon which this dissertation relies consists of 
resolutions, judicial opinions, reports, declarations and statements of the UN and its principal 
and subsidiary organs. These include resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly 
and various subsidiary organs, judicial opinions of the International Court of Justice, and 
reports, statements and other public records of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General. In 
addition, primary source materials of other relevant international organizations will be relied 
on to the extent they shed light on the UN’s legal position on the question of Palestine (e.g. 
League of Nations, Permanent Court of International Justice, International Criminal Court, 
etc.). Furthermore, the regular array of sources of international law will be relied upon, as 
conventionally understood, including: international treaties, international custom, general 
principles of law, judicial decisions and the writings of highly qualified publicists of 
international law.71 All primary UN documentation utilized is available in the English language 
through the Cambridge University Library, which is a United Nations Depository Library, the 
UN Library at Geneva, and the UN Information System on the Question of Palestine, 
administered by the UN Division for Palestinian Rights.72 In addition, a supplementary source 
of information has been culled through the personal interview of 31 officials of the UN, and the 
                                                 
70 Otto (1996), 337-338, 351. 
71 ICJ Statute, art. 38(1). 
72 UN Information System on the Question of Palestine, http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/home.htm. 
   Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 23 
States of Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Senegal, the latter in the interviewee’s 
capacity as present Chair of the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People (UNCEIRPP). Lastly, as with all legal scholarship, facts examined will be 
gathered from contemporary and historical documents, including those available in the UN and 
other pertinent publicly available records. However, because this dissertation is not a history as 
such, reliance on secondary historical source material, as opposed to primary archival historical 
sources, will be resorted to as a general rule.
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Historical Context: International Law in the Interwar Period and the 
Origins of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity 
 
 
1. Introduction  
This dissertation argues that the United Nations (UN) treatment of Palestine demonstrates 
a gap between its conduct and the requirements of the international rule of law, and is therefore 
in some measure responsible for the maintenance of Palestine’s international legal subalternity 
(ILS). It does not claim, however, that this ILS condition originated with the UN itself. No 
phenomenon arises in a vacuum. This chapter offers a short historical survey of the origins of 
Palestine’s ILS, setting the stage for the issues explored in subsequent chapters. It does this 
through a subaltern reading of the nature of international law and organization during the 
interwar period with specific reference to Palestine’s treatment thereunder. It argues that despite 
important political shifts in the international order at this time, epitomized by the formation of 
the League of Nations and the Wilsonian anti-imperial ideals that ostensibly fueled it, the 
ordering legal principle of the international community remained thematically rooted in the 
Eurocentricity of international law and organization through which imperial Europe continued 
to produce and rely upon law to rule over its subjects. It was through the operation of the rule 
by law principle that Palestine and its people were wholly disenfranchised under the 
international legal order then prevailing, with effects that have lasted to the present day.  
 
2. The Interwar Years and the Institutionalization of the International Rule by Law  
 The time between 1914 and 1945 was an era in which considerable developments in the 
international legal order took place. These changes were marked by a tension resulting from 
the global paradigmatic shift from the age of late-empire to the post-World War II (WWII) 
ascendancy of enlightened liberal values. The classical imperial age of the 16th-19th centuries 
was one in which international law had been utilized as a tool by European imperial powers to 
manage their bilateral relations with the non-Europeans whose lands and resources they 
coveted. But international law in the late-imperial age of the early 20th century took a slightly 
different form. This difference lay in the institutionalization of the international legal order 
through the creation of the League of Nations.  
 
 Set against the devastation of World War I (WWI), the League was formed at the behest 
of US President Woodrow Wilson under an effective plea for the introduction of a modicum of 
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international rule of law. In his Fourteen Points of January 1918, he declared “the day of 
conquest and aggrandizement” of the imperial powers over, denounced the practice of secret 
treaties and diplomacy as a principal cause of the war, and called for the establishment of a 
“general association of nations” in order to establish “guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike”.1 Accordingly, the Covenant of the League 
imposed hitherto unrecognized limits on the use of force (while not outlawing it altogether). It 
also required all international treaties concluded by its Members to be registered and published.2  
  
 With the creation of the League, for the first time in modern history a measure of 
institutional multilateralism challenged European great power rivalry as the organizing 
framework of the international community. This was in measure only, because key international 
powers remained outside the League for much or all of its 26-year existence, with Germany 
only admitted in 1926 (dropping out in 1933), Turkey in 1932, the Soviet Union in 1934 
(expelled in 1939), and the United States never joining despite Wilson’s pivotal role. Needless 
to say, none of the millions of colonial subjects of Europe were members of the League. This 
meant that the League remained a college of allied imperial Europe to a very large extent and 
was therefore predisposed to a continuation of imperial rule by law.  
 
 Mainstream literature on the history of the League has typically overlooked what the 
implications of this shortcoming were for subaltern classes of the day. Instead, the focus has 
largely been centered around Europe’s great power rivalry and critiques of the League for its 
institutionalization of the Carthaginian peace concluded at Versailles in 1919, widely 
interpreted as having hastened the Organization’s demise.3 Recent literature has highlighted the 
view from below, as it were, including from the TWAIL and other critical perspectives.4 Not 
surprisingly, the focus of these analyses has been the Mandate system.  
 
 The Mandate system was a means adopted by the victorious allied powers to divide and 
administer the former colonial possessions of Germany and the Ottoman Empire post-bellum. 
Although this system was influenced by Wilson’s principles of non-annexation and self-
determination,5 its architect, South African statesman and racial segregation advocate, Jan 
                                                 
1 Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. 
2 League of Nations Covenant, arts. 10-13, 18. 
3 Crawford (2012), 13. 
4 Anghie (2005); Pedersen (2015). 
5 Wright (1968), 24-25. 
 Chapter 2 – Historical Context 
 27 
Christiaan Smuts,6 incorporated the imperial standard of civilization into it.7 Thus Article 22 of 
the League of Nations Covenant resolved that “the well-being and development” of the former 
possessions of the Central Powers, “which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”, formed “a sacred trust of 
civilization”. To that end, “the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nations”, namely the victorious imperial powers. Article 22 further resolved that the 
communities formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire (designated “class A” mandates), 
including Palestine, had “reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.” It accordingly 
affirmed that “[t]he wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the 
selection of the Mandatory.”8  
 
 For TWAIL writers, the Mandate system was an embodiment of Europe’s unwillingness 
to cede its imperial interests in any fundamental way, high-sounding Wilsonian rhetoric 
notwithstanding.9 In the most recent history of the Mandate system, Susan Pedersen tends to 
adopt this view, but nevertheless argues that the Mandate system had a redeeming feature. To 
her, while “League oversight could not force the mandatory powers to govern mandated 
territories differently” than their more conventional colonies, “it obliged them to say they were 
governing them differently.”10 Obligatory reporting to the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC) in Geneva introduced a “level of international diplomacy, publicity, and ‘talk’ that” had 
the unintended consequence of checking imperial power, at least at the discursive level. The 
mandates system was therefore a vehicle for what Pedersen calls “internationalization”, i.e. “the 
process by which certain political issues and functions are displaced from the national or 
imperial, and into the international, realm.”11 
 
 The occurrence of internationalization through the League is hard to dispute. But I believe 
Pedersen overstates its overall impact in helping to bring about a global order based upon 
universal application of the international rule of law. Despite the League’s ostensibly 
revolutionary principles aimed at non-annexation and self-determination of colonial territories, 
a critical subaltern reading suggests something equally if not more plausible. Namely, that 
                                                 
6 Mandela (2002), xviii; Wilson & Thompson (1978), 340-343; Meredith (1988), 3-9. 
7 Wright (1968), 32; Anghie (2005), 119. 
8 League of Nations Covenant, art. 22. 
9 Anghie (2005), 115-195. 
10 Pedersen (2015), 4. 
11 Id., 4-5. 
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League machinery institutionalized an international rule by law, through which imperial rule 
over the globe was to be facilitated under an internationalist cloak.  
 
 From a subaltern perspective, this is evident in the actual terms of the League of Nations 
Covenant, cited above, based as they are on the imperial standard of civilization. Moreover, it 
is evident in the manner in which the sacred trust of civilization was actually discharged under 
the League’s supervision by so-called “advanced” mandatory powers. Far from facilitating 
independence of former colonies of the Central powers, the legal framework introduced by the 
League codified the hegemonic/subaltern binary in international law. Mandatory powers were 
enabled to comfortably administer their sacred trust in line with their own hegemonic interests, 
while mandatory subjects struggled to break free, not only in material terms but also in 
normative ones. This accentuated the legal subalternity that colonized peoples the world over 
had been relegated to in bilateral engagement with individual imperial powers in the preceding 
three hundred years. In addition, for the first time in modern history this ultimately allowed for 
the internationalization of the legal subalternity of the colonies, whose disenfranchised and 
contingent legal status was formalized at the global level through the conventional international 
legal framework underpinning the League. The emergence of an international rule by law 
during the interwar years, with its consequent production of ILS, was the novel and inevitable 
result. The impact of this is readily apparent when examining the status of Palestine at this time.  
 
3. Palestine and the International Rule by Law in the Interwar Years  
In locating the origins of Palestine’s ILS in the interwar years, of particular import is the 
role of British imperial secret treaty-making and diplomacy at the time and the international 
legal codification of its patronage of European Jewish nationalism in the form of the Zionist 
movement. In broad terms, the relevant moments are five-fold: (1) the 1915-1916 Hussein-
McMahon correspondence; (2) the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement; (3) the 1917 Balfour 
Declaration; (4) the 1920 Covenant of the League of Nations; and (5) the 1922-47 Mandate for 
Palestine. 
 
Historians of the modern Middle East will readily identify these moments for the pivotal 
impact they had on the geopolitical evolution of the region in the contemporary period. Yet, for 
the most part, the literature tends to examine them more from political and socio-economic 
perspectives than from the standpoint of international law. Although few in number, those 
studies that have addressed these phenomena through the lens of international law tend to do 
so from a strictly positivist standpoint, merely highlighting rights and wrongs as measured 
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against prevailing legal norms.12 As a result, historiographically this segment of the literature 
on Palestine largely fails to identify relevant thematic issues that emerge through these events 
from an international law perspective. Foremost of these is the evolution of Palestine’s ILS 
condition as a product of the Eurocentricity of the international legal order of the day.  
 
3.1 Zionism, Colonialism and the Civilizing Mission as a Legal Technology in Palestine 
Because of the increasing desire of non-self-governing peoples to assume an equal place 
within the international order in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the legal standard of 
civilization required that European modes of public administration and political organization 
be emulated by them. This resulted in the spread/adoption of European forms of nationalism 
and the nation-state. In respect of Palestine, two distinct nationalisms arose at roughly the same 
time in this period, one indigenous the other European. With respect to the former, it was among 
the educated urban classes that Arab nationalism first emerged among Palestinians in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Spurred on by a growing independent Arabic language press, 
increased exposure to European intellectual and political thought, and a palpable decline in Pax 
Ottomana, increasing calls for pan-Arab independence from what came to be regarded as 
foreign and imperial rule from Istanbul gained currency.13 These calls soon gave way to the 
development of a distinctly Palestinian national identity in the years just prior to the outbreak 
of WWI.14 In so far as indigenous Palestinian Arab nationalism developed within an Ottoman 
and Islamic context, it was not the product of the social-Darwinism then prevalent in European 
legal and political thought. In contrast, the Zionist movement was a direct result of a politics of 
those racialized social hierarchies and their projection globally through European empire and 
legal discourse.15  
 
Zionism’s adherents argued that the enduring attempts of European Jews to coexist and 
assimilate with their Gentile counterparts had proved futile and required urgent redress. As the 
Jew was the European continent’s perennial subaltern underclass, anti-Semitism was “the 
archetypal Western prejudice” 16  and was therefore the driving force behind the so-called 
‘Jewish question’, according to which the place of the Jew in 19th century Europe was openly 
impugned in the public sphere. 17  In answer to this question, Theodor Herzl posited the 
                                                 
12 See e.g., Grief (2010); Kattan (2009); Mazzawi (1997); and Stone (1981). 
13 Khalidi (1997), 64-65. But see Pappe, A History (2006), 46-47, who argues that although Arab nationalism 
emerged as early as 1875 in Greater Syria and Egypt, it remained “on the margins” in Palestine until 1908. 
14 Khalidi, id., 149-151. 
15 Taylor, “Vision and Intent” in Abu-Lughod (1987), 14 ff.  
16 Beit-Hallahmi (1993), 9. 
17 Herzl (1896), 85-97. Kattan (2009), 9-10. 
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establishment of an independent Jewish national existence outside of Europe. Although a 
similar call had been made by Leo Pinsker in 1882,18 Herzl’s 1896 monograph, Der Judenstaat, 
galvanized the movement.19  
 
 In so far as it fashioned itself in accordance with then prevailing European notions of 
ethnic or tribal nationalism 20  and successfully aligned itself with European colonial and 
imperial ideals, methods and power, the Zionist movement situated itself within the paradigm 
of late-European empire then colliding with emerging liberal rights-based values. Because the 
political zeitgeist of imperial Europe exalted colonialism, and because the Zionists lacked any 
territorial base in which to give effect to their program in Europe, the colonial nature of Zionism 
and its role in la mission civilisatrice was openly propagated by its leaders. Thus Pinsker wrote 
that “the auto-emancipation of the Jewish people as a nation” would be realized through “the 
foundation of a colonial community belonging to the Jews, which is some day to become our 
inalienable home, our fatherland.”21 Likewise, Herzl spoke of Zionism as a “colonial idea”,22 
and presented Zionist settlement of Palestine as “form[ing] a portion of the rampart of Europe 
against Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism.”23 In addressing the fourth Zionist 
Congress in 1900, Herzl said it was in “the interest of the civilized nations and of civilization 
in general that a cultural station be established on the shortest road to Asia. Palestine is this 
station and we Jews are the bearers of culture who are ready to give our property and our lives 
to bring about its creation.”24 Between the establishment of the first Zionist colony in 1882 and 
1914, the Jewish population in Palestine is estimated to have accounted for approximately 
60,000, or 7.6 percent of the total population, of whom two thirds were European settlers.25 
Altogether, they owned no more than 2 percent of the land.26  
 
Zionism’s structural reliance on European colonialism and imperialism is of particular 
relevance to understanding the evolution of Palestine’s ILS in this period. It would be incorrect 
to understand the movement’s asseverations to colonialism and European civilization in strictly 
                                                 
18 Pinsker (1975), 74. 
19 Herzl (1896).  
20  According to Hannah Arendt (1966), 227, “tribal nationalism [was] the driving force behind continental 
imperialism” of the period, resulting in the pan-Slavic and pan-Germanic nationalisms that would morph into 
totalitarian regimes in the 20th century. Importantly, Arendt (2007), 382, observed that “Herzl thought in terms of 
nationalism from German sources”. 
21 Pinsker (1975), 104. 
22 Schliefer (1972), 23. 
23 Herzl (1896), 96. 
24 The Congress Addresses (1917), 24. 
25 Strawson (2010), 26-27. 
26 Id., 27. 
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political and socio-cultural terms, as most of the literature on this period tends to do. As noted 
in chapter 1, at the time these ideas were articulated they were also key components of the 
content and structure of public international law, as it was then composed. The expansion of 
European empire, undertaken as of right by colonial and self-styled ‘civilized’ powers, was not 
only legal at the time, but its legality was a derivative of the very colonial and civilizational 
attributes of the European imperialists themselves. Thus, according to his 1866 treatise, 
American jurist Henry Wheaton opined that “[t]he public law, with slight exceptions, has 
always been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of 
European origin.”27 Likewise, in 1894 John Westlake, Whewell chair in international law at 
Cambridge, explained that “[i]nternational law has to treat natives as uncivilized. It regulates, 
for the mutual benefit of the civilized states, the claims which they make to sovereignty over 
the region and leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience of the state to which 
sovereignty is awarded.”28 To pursue and present its goals in those terms was therefore a 
conscious and strategic choice by Zionism’s founders to furnish their movement with a measure 
of legal legitimacy among its European adherents and benefactors beyond any historical, 
cultural or political imperative.  
 
It was in this context that the first Zionist Congress in 1897 affirmed that “[t]he aim of 
Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law” [emphasis 
added].29 In the interwar period this strategy would be directed at obtaining international legal 
recognition of the Jewish people as a nation, establishing a legal nexus between that people and 
Palestine, and obtaining international legal recognition for the Zionist Organization (founded 
at the 1897 Congress) as the official representative of the Jewish people.30 Would that it were 
simply a matter of exclusive concern for the legal rights of the Jewish people alone, the question 
of Palestine would never have arisen. The point is, that while Zionism rightly presented itself 
to its hopeful recruits as an emancipatory movement vis-à-vis European anti-Semitism, in so 
far as it sought to give effect to that emancipation by adopting and utilizing, inter alia, late-19th 
century legal technologies and discourses of civilizing and colonizing an already inhabited non-
European land through the patronage of a European imperial power, it helped set the 
cornerstone for Palestine’s long-term ILS condition. Key to the endeavor was the use to which 
that imperial power, Great Britain, made of secret treaties in laying the foundation of the 
international rule by law in Palestine. 
                                                 
27 Wheaton (1866), 17-18. See also Walker (1899), 138, 331; Oppenheim (1928), 36-37. 
28 Westlake (1894), 143, as quoted in Koskenniemi (2008), 127. 
29 Kattan (2009), 21. 
30 Strawson (2010), 15-16. 
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3.2 1915-16 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence 
 The first historical moment relevant to the evolution of Palestine’s ILS is the Hussein-
McMahon correspondence. In seeking to consolidate its position against the Central Powers 
during WWI, Britain enlisted Arab support against the Ottoman Empire. This came in the form 
of an exchange of letters between Hussein ibn Ali, the Hashemite Sherif of Mecca and a leader 
of the Arab nationalist movement, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in 
Cairo.31  In exchange for Arab military support against the Ottomans, Hussein demanded that 
the British recognize post-war Arab independence in the Middle East, comprised of the whole 
of the Arabian peninsula (with the exception of Aden), Syria and what would later become 
Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan. Following a number of detailed exchanges, 
McMahon indicated Britain was prepared to recognize and support Arab independence in the 
region with some slight exceptions, including those “portions of Syria laying to the west of the 
districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.”32  
 
 Acting in reliance upon this assurance, the Arabs were successful in assisting the Allies 
in ousting the Ottomans from their lands. At the end of the war, however, a dispute arose about 
whether Palestine had actually been excluded from the region within which the British had 
agreed to recognize and support Arab independence. Despite lying clearly to the south-west of 
the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, the British now took the public position 
that Palestine fell within the area excluded under the correspondence. While much of the 
literature has generally treated this as a disagreement of equal merit, the available evidence 
suggests that the Arabs were correct in their understanding that post-war Arab independence 
included Palestine, a conclusion that British archival materials now show the United Kingdom 
agreed with in private.33 Nevertheless, controversy arose as the British had been engaging in 
double-dealing on Palestine with third parties, the full details of which were deliberately kept 
from the Arabs in an early British affirmation of their subalternity.   
 
3.3 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement 
 On 16 May 1916, seven months after the conclusion of the Hussein-McMahon 
correspondence, Britain entered into a secret treaty with France (with the assent of Tsarist 
Russia) that contradicted the terms of the correspondence.34 Under the Sykes-Picot agreement, 
                                                 
31 Pappe, A History (2006), 64-65; Kattan (2009), 39-40, 98-107. 
32 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, as quoted in Ingrams (John Murray), 2. 
33 Kattan (2009), 98; See also Smith (1992), 42-47; Pappe, The Making (2006), 5. 
34 Cocks (1918), 43-48. 
 Chapter 2 – Historical Context 
 33 
so named after its principal negotiators,35 the Anglo-French Entente agreed, inter alia, that upon 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire in WWI they would be “prepared to recognize and protect an 
independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States…under the suzerainty of an Arab 
chief” in areas now comprising large portions of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Yet they also 
agreed to allow themselves the right “to establish such direct or indirect administration or 
control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or confederation 
of Arab States.” As for Palestine, the Entente agreed that “there shall be established an 
international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with 
Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the 
Shereef of Mecca”.36  
 
 It would appear, therefore, that the pledge made by the British in the Hussein-McMahon 
correspondence as to post-war Arab independence in the Middle East, most especially in 
Palestine, had been violated. Nowhere in the correspondence was any reference made to a 
qualified independence under an arrangement in the nature of a suzerainty, as provided for in 
the Sykes-Picot agreement. Nor was it suggested that Palestine would be denied Arab 
independence in favour of being handed over to some form of international administration. In 
short, this was a classic case of late-European imperial power dictating terms, and in a manner 
that had international legal effect without the input or knowledge of the non-European 
population primarily affected. As one of the many secret treaties between the great powers, the 
Sykes-Picot agreement carried weight under prevailing international law.37 Although some 
authors have argued that the Hussein-McMahon correspondence was also a form of secret 
treaty, questions remain on this point.38 What is clear, however, is that Sykes-Picot was a 
manifestation of a rule by law dynamic that undermined the international legal position of the 
indigenous people of Palestine, as elsewhere in the non-European world. It was not until the 
Bolsheviks disclosed the existence of the secret treaties on 23 November 1917 as evidence of 
the “world wide plans of annexation” of the imperial powers that the Palestinian Arab 
leadership became aware of the Sykes-Picot agreement.39 Unbeknownst to them matters would 
only get worse, as in that same month the British made yet another secret undertaking regarding 
Palestine, this time to the Zionists. 
                                                 
35 Sir Mark Sykes (1879-1919) and Francois Georges-Picot (1870-1951). 
36 Kattan (2009), 40-41. 
37 Cocks (1918), 43-48. 
38 Kattan (2009), 98; Grosek (2007), 269. Even if the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence was a secret treaty, it is 
unclear whether it would have taken legal precedence over Sykes-Picot, the latter being a treaty later in time and 
between two imperial and ‘civilized’ states, the former involving a non-self-governing non-European people. 
39 Cocks (1918), 11. 
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3.4 1917 Balfour Declaration 
 On 2 November 1917, the British Cabinet issued a public declaration in the form of a 
letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, a 
prominent Zionist, indicating, in relevant part, that:  
 
“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”40 
 
The Balfour Declaration was the result of lengthy negotiations between the British government 
and members of the Zionist Organization led by Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow.41 For 
the Zionists, securing support from the British was both natural and vital; natural, because of 
the imperial and colonial legal technologies they adopted to further the movement, vital because 
the British were poised to take control of Palestine following WWI.42 For the British, offering 
support to the Zionists represented an attempt to shore up pressing geostrategic interests, 
primarily ensuring greater levels of Russian and American support in the waning war effort. 
Encouraged by Weizmann and others, the British believed that support for Zionism would 
garner the purported influence of Russian and American Jewry to pressure Petrograd and 
Washington to further commit to the war.43 In addition, the Declaration was motivated by 
Britain’s goal of resolving Europe’s vexing Jewish question, as well as by the Christian Zionist 
fervor of some members within the British government, including then Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George, Mark Sykes, and Balfour himself.44  
 
 From a subaltern perspective, the Balfour Declaration stands out for three reasons. First, 
harkening back to Said’s critique of hegemonic representations of the Palestinian covered in 
chapter 1, although the Declaration concerned the political and legal future of Palestine, its 
drafters failed to refer to the indigenous Palestinian Arab population by name, choosing instead 
to designate them dismissively as the “existing non-Jewish communities”. By adopting this 
frame of reference in relation to a place whose population was then 92 percent Palestinian Arab, 
the Declaration effectively erased Palestinian Arab existence from the record. 45  Second, 
                                                 
40 The Balfour Declaration, as quoted in Smith (1992), 54. 
41 Mallison (1986), 24. 
42 Kattan (2009), 26. 
43 Pappe, A History (2006), 67-68. This has led some to suggest that British support for Zionism was tainted with 
anti-Semitism, including the mythical “clandestine power” of the Jews. Segev (2000), 5; Stein, The Balfour 
Declaration (1961), 163-164, as quoted in Mallison (1986), 26. 
44 Smith (1992), 55. 
45 One is reminded of Said’s observation that language is “a highly organized and encoded system which employs 
many devices” to express “not ‘truth’ but representations,” ultimately informed by the “culture, institutions, and 
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although the Declaration contained an important safeguard “that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights” of the Palestinian majority, its failure to safeguard 
their political rights underscored British intent to prioritize those of the Jewish people in 
Palestine, despite earlier British pledges of support for Arab independence. Third, at the time 
the Declaration was issued, neither the British nor the Zionists actually had physical possession 
or legal title to Palestine. Yet, in promising Palestine to the Zionists without so much as 
consulting the Palestinian population, British decision-making seems to have been informed 
primarily by European imperial fiat, with its negative assumptions regarding the contingency 
of non-European legal rights. Although prevailing international law included a general principle 
that one could not give what one did not possess (nemo dat quod non habet), it is doubtful that 
this principle applied to the property of colonial peoples at the time.46 Perhaps one mitigating 
factor was that in supporting the Jewish national home project in Palestine the British were 
running up against the then emerging right of self-determination according to which the 
legitimacy of post-war rule was understood as deriving from the consent of the governed. The 
extent to which London was contemptuous of this emerging norm was made clear, however, 
when they formally incorporated the Balfour Declaration into the terms of the League of 
Nations Mandate for Palestine. Being a treaty of binding force for members of the international 
community represented at the League and deriving its authority from the Covenant, it 
constituted the most vital element of the rule by law paradigm then shaping Palestine’s ILS 
condition in the interwar period.  
 
3.5 1920 Covenant of the League of Nations 
 The sacred trust of civilization codified in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant 
was premised on the idea that colonial peoples in class A mandates enjoyed a recognized legal 
right to political independence based on the principle of the consent of the governed and 
majority rule. Subject to the discharge by a Mandatory power of this sacred trust, such mandated 
territories were to eventually enjoy full self-determination. To be sure, self-determination was 
as yet not a part of the corpus of positive international law. That development would have to 
await the promulgation of the UN Charter in 1945 and subsequent practice.47 Nevertheless, as 
noted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1971 Namibia advisory opinion, there is 
                                                 
political ambience of the representer;” Said (1979), 21, 272. 
46 Deriving from Roman law and established in English law since at least the sixteenth century (Capel’s Case 
(1581), Jenk. Cent. 250), the nemo dat principle was recognized under international law as applying to states at 
the time the Balfour Declaration was issued. See Island of Palmas, 842.  
47 Cassese (1995), 27, 43.  
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“little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and 
independence of the peoples concerned”.48  
 
 As it happens, the people concerned in Palestine – namely its overwhelming indigenous 
majority – made it clear that they preferred the United States to be selected as the Mandatory 
power in line with Article 22 of the Covenant. This followed the findings of the King-Crane 
Commission, an American committee created at President Wilson’s request to assess the post-
war wishes of the inhabitants of Syria, including Palestine. In August 1919, the Commission – 
which admitted that it began its “study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favour” – 
recommended, inter alia, the “serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine 
of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish 
State”.49 It noted the that “‘a national home for the Jewish people’ is not equivalent to making 
Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished 
without the gravest trespass upon the ‘civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine.’”50 In light of the Wilsonian principle that post-WWI territorial 
settlements needed to be based upon the “free acceptance of that settlement by the people 
immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other 
nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior 
influence or mastery”, the Commission observed that the wishes of Palestine's population, 90 
percent of whom were against the Zionist program, had to prevail.51  
 
This conclusion of the King-Crane Commission was particularly important for its 
exaltation of the principle of democratic and majoritarian rule at a time when the hegemonic 
prerogatives of late-European empire, though on the wane, were still prevalent and given force 
in international legal instruments. Because of the US commitment to these principles, and the 
sheer fact of an approximately 90 percent majority Arab population, the Zionists were 
adamantly against the US from becoming the Mandatory and in favour of the British doing so. 
In the event, despite the sober findings of the King-Crane Commission, the British were named 
as Mandatory against the express wishes of the indigenous population paving the way for the 
crystallization of Palestine’s ILS condition into prevailing international law.52 
 
                                                 
48 Namibia, para. 53. 
49 King-Crane Commission Report. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Quigley (2016), 24-25. 
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3.6  1922-1947 Mandate for Palestine 
Despite the use of the standard of civilization to codify the contingency of subaltern 
communities in the League of Nations Covenant, the mandate system did eventually facilitate 
the emergence of a number of sovereign independent states based on majoritarian rule and the 
consent of the governed (i.e. Lebanon, Nauru, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, etc.).53 In Palestine, however, 
the mandate system singularly had the result of undermining – in legal terms – indigenous 
independence and majority rule, ostensibly the very object and purpose of the system itself. In 
this respect, the Palestine mandate was a sui generis arrangement whose rule by law character 
was more complete and barefaced than in other mandates.  
 
More than anything, this was evident in the text of the Mandate for Palestine, which was 
negotiated between the Zionist Organization and the British in 1920 without the participation 
of the Palestinian Arabs. Unsurprisingly, its terms were openly committed to the Zionist 
program at the expense of the indigenous population. Following its adoption by the Supreme 
Council of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo on 24 April 1920,54 the Balfour Declaration 
was expressly incorporated into the preamble of the Mandate for Palestine indicating that 
“recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection to the Jewish people with 
Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.”55 To this 
end, the Mandatory was to be furnished with “full powers of legislation and of 
administration”,56 without needing to come to agreement with the indigenous authorities or take 
into account their rights, interests and wishes as was provided for in other mandates, for instance 
the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon.57 Instead, the Palestine Mandate provided that the 
“Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home.”58 To 
this end, it indicated that “an appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body 
for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such 
economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national 
home,” and named the Zionist Organization as that body.59 Finally, the Mandate provided that 
                                                 
53 Anghie (2005), 190-191. 
54 Grief (2010), 18. 
55 British Mandate for Palestine, preamble. 
56 Id., art. 1. 
57 French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, art. 1. 
58 British Mandate for Palestine, art. 2. 
59 Id., art. 4. On the colonizing role of the Jewish Agency, see UNSCOP, Report to the General Assembly, 2nd 
Sess, Vol. III, Annex A, Oral Evidence Presented at Public Meetings, A/364 Add. 2, at 75-76, 9 September 1947, 
where Chaim Weizmann, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, stated before UNSCOP on 8 July 1947 that: “Other 
peoples have colonized great countries, rich countries. They found when they entered there backward 
populations… In olden times, such backward countries were built up by charter companies. All of you will 
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the Administration of Palestine “shall facilitate Jewish immigration” and “shall encourage, in 
co-operation with the Jewish Agency...close settlement by Jews on the land.”60 
 
In contrast, nowhere in all of its 2,757 words does the term “Arab” appear, preferring 
instead the jaundiced “existing non-Jewish communities” (one reference) or “other sections of 
the population” (one reference).61 Likewise, the word “Palestinian” appears only once, though 
in relation to the Mandatory’s obligation to “facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship 
by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine”.62 Being an international treaty, 
signed, registered and published under the auspices of the League of Nations, the rights, duties 
and obligations enshrined within the Mandate were of a qualitatively different international 
legal character than those previously agreed or represented in the bilateral and secret treaties 
described above. While authors have debated the international legal character of those 
arrangements extensively,63 there is little question that with one stroke of the pen the Mandate 
for Palestine provided the Zionists with something that had hitherto eluded them. This was 
nothing other than the international legal recognition of: (1) the Jewish people; (2) its historical 
connection with the land of Palestine; (3) its political representative in the form of the Zionist 
Organization; and (4) its right to a “national home” in Palestine. In this way, the Mandate not 
only fulfilled the key strategic goal of the first Zionist Congress of 1897, namely “to create for 
the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law”,64 but it also helped mitigate the 
subalternity of European Jewry vis á vis their imperial benefactors.   
 
All of this was done when the approximately 90 percent Palestinian Arab majority 
population made no secret of its opposition to foreign control of their country, including through 
Zionist colonization, and their expectation that Arab independence would be realized as per 
British wartime pledges and Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.65 Notwithstanding 
the clear contradiction between these pledges, the terms of Article 22 and the terms of the 
                                                 
remember the East Indian Charter Company. But charter companies were hard to fashion in 1918, the first quarter 
of the twentieth century. The Wilsonian conception of the world certainly would not have allowed a charter 
company. Therefore, we had to create a substitute. This substitute was the Jewish Agency which had the function 
of a charter company, which had the function of a body which would conduct the colonization, immigration, 
improvement of the land, and do all the work which a government usually does, without really being a government. 
We had all the difficulties of a government and none of its advantages. The Jewish Agency was given a special 
position in the Mandate. It was not much of a privilege; it was a great burden.” 
60 British Mandate for Palestine, art. 6. 
61 Id., preamble, art. 6. 
62 Id., art. 7. 
63 E.g., Mallison (1986), 18-78; Cattan (2000), 10-16; Kattan (2009), 58-59, 98-116; Strawson (2010), 36-37; 
Quigley (2016), 10-15.  
64 Kattan (2009), 21. 
65 Id., 43-44. 
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Mandate for Palestine, the latter was made to prevail through sheer force of British arms and 
the suppression of indigenous forms of political representation and governance. As noted by 
Rashid Khalidi, “[i]t could not have been otherwise, since no indigenous majority would have 
voluntarily ceded its country to a settler minority.”66 In this light, the Mandate for Palestine 
stands out as yet another example of the misrepresentation and effacement of the lived reality 
of Palestine and its people, this time embedded in an international legal instrument that openly 
violated the principles of self-determination, rule by consent, and the democratic idea of 
majoritarian rule. It was for these reasons that the British House of Lords symbolically voted 
to reject the terms of the Mandate for Palestine on 21 June 1922 in a non-binding motion.67 
Tellingly, it was also something not lost on those responsible for imposing this international 
rule by law on Palestine. In a memorandum written to Prime Minister Lloyd George on 19 
February 1919, Balfour himself admitted that: 
 
“[t]he weak point in our position, of course, is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly 
decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would 
unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as 
being absolutely exceptional.”68 
 
In a subsequent memorandum to Lord Curzon dated 11 August 1919, Balfour noted that: 
 
“[t]he contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant 
in the case of the ‘independent nation’ of Palestine than in the ‘independent nation’ of Syria. For in 
Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants 
of the country… The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good 
or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the 
desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land”.69 
 
It is precisely this disregard and contempt for Palestine’s indigenous people that enabled 
Britain to legislate Palestine’s ILS into international law through the Mandate. Positivist 
international legal historiography of Israel/Palestine uncritically employs this moment as its 
starting point, unwitting testament to the hegemonic use of international law in suppressing the 
presence, history and agency of Palestine’s indigenous population. By virtue of the Mandate, 
Palestinians are said to have possessed no more than a right to be a “protected minority” with 
“only civil and religious rights” within a Jewish state.70 Some even argue that it was the Jewish 
people that was designated the ultimate “national beneficiary” of the sacred trust of Article 22 
                                                 
66 Khalidi (2007), 40. 
67 Id., 75. See also Cattan (2000), 16. 
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despite comprising only approximately 10 percent of the population. 71  In this regard, the 
Mandate privileged, in legal terms, the political rights of a people the vast majority of whom 
had never set foot in the country, over that of the country’s indigenous inhabitants. The effect 
was “that an almost indeterminate number of dispersed people had a legal presence in Mandate 
Palestine before they had a physical one.”72  At the same time, the indigenous population of the 
country had, at best, a rarified legal presence as an unrecognized group with no national or 
political rights whatsoever. As noted in 1925 by Leopoldo Palacios, the Spanish member of the 
PMC, with the passage of the Mandate “Zionism had the law entirely in its favour.”73 Viewed 
through a subaltern lens, this was the epitome of international rule by law as the ILS condition 
was effectively shifted from one previously disenfranchised group (European Jews) to a newly 
disenfranchised group (the Palestinian people). 
 
Over the course of the Mandate’s twenty-five-year duration, the British would carry out 
the task of facilitating the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine in furtherance 
of the international rule by law inherent its provisions. All the while, the indigenous Palestinians 
refused to recognize the Mandate’s legitimacy, arguing in front of both the Council of the 
League and the PMC that it violated the terms of Britain’s war-time pledges and its sacred trust 
under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.74 The new international law introduced 
through the Mandate could not be legitimate, they said, as it did not emerge from the will of the 
people. If self-determination in Palestine was envisioned in Wilson’s new post-imperial order, 
that right must surely have resided with the indigenous majority. These arguments ultimately 
proved to be in vain as late-European empire would prevail over Wilsonian principles.  
 
During this time, a Jewish imperium in imperio was formed under the tutelage of Britain. 
As noted by Tom Segev, between 1922 and 1948, the British facilitated the growth of the Jewish 
population of Palestine more than tenfold, and promoted independent Zionist land purchase, 
agricultural development and the establishment of industries and banks. Hundreds of new 
colonial settlements were established, including a number of towns. An independent Jewish 
labour organization, school system and military was developed. This was in addition to the 
development of in-country Zionist political leadership and elected institutions, all of which 
were actively invited to coordinate and work within the British Administration to further 
                                                 
71  Grief (2010), 35, argues that “[t]he dual or joint application of the Balfour Declaration with Article 22 
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72 Wheatley (2015), 215. 
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develop the Jewish national home. 75  Indeed, Zionists held the highest posts in the 
Administration, beginning with Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner.76 None of this 
could have happened without the operation of the international rule by law codified in the 
British Mandate for Palestine. 
 
Given the variables at play, tumult was inevitable. Arab-Jewish riots rooted in Palestinian 
Arab frustration with ongoing Zionist colonization in 1920, ’21, ’29 and ’36 erupted. This was 
followed by the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, violently suppressed by the British resulting 
in the killing, wounding, imprisonment or exile of over 10 percent of the Palestinian Arab male 
population and the decimation of the Palestinian political elite heading into WWII. By the end 
of the war, as news emerged of the horrors of the Holocaust in Europe, tensions between British 
and armed reactionary Zionists who demanded an immediate end to the Mandate and 
unrestricted Jewish immigration emerged. To this was added increased acts of inter-communal 
violence that compounded the situation. Against the exhaustion of the war, and the quickening 
retreat of the Empire globally, Britain chose to quit the mandate and hand the matter over to the 
newly formed UN.77   
 
4. Conclusion 
From the above, it is possible to locate the origins of Palestine’s ILS in British secret 
treaty-making and diplomacy between 1915 and 1947, with particular emphasis on the Mandate 
period. This condition was a product of a rule by law which not only remained the ordering 
principle of the world at a time when European imperial powers were ostensibly on the decline, 
but was actually institutionalized and internationalized in the conventional law of the League 
of Nations by those selfsame powers. By legally privileging the Zionist movement’s Jewish 
national home project over the previously assured political rights of the majority Arab 
population, Palestine’s ILS became embedded in the interwar international legal order through 
the terms of the British Mandate for Palestine. The result was that Palestine’s indigenous Arab 
population had become disenfranchised through the operation of prevailing Eurocentric 
international law as the ILS condition shifted from European Jewry to them. Indeed, this was a 
double-disenfranchisement of sorts, in the sense that the mandate codified the existence of 
Palestine as a territorial unit in the effective nature of a colony, while at the same time denying 
                                                 
75 Segev (2000), 5. 
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its indigenous people the principal benefit of the political rights and status that would normally 
attach to being a colonial people as such (i.e. eventual self-determination).  
 
As this dissertation epistemologically proceeds from a subaltern view of international law 
and order rooted in imperial Europe’s employment of international law to regulate its encounter 
with the colonial world, one is able to better understand the international rule by law nature that 
characterized Palestine’s ordeal in interwar period. Indeed, the international rule by law was 
both a description of what was happening to the Palestinian people at the time, but also a 
prognostication of what was to come. Although the 1945 establishment of the UN has been 
represented in much of the literature as a break from the European imperial past through the 
emergence of true universal international rule of law, its management of the question of 
Palestine as inherited from the British demonstrates that it was heavily influenced by the old 
order from the start. As will be seen, this manifested itself through the reification of Palestine’s 
ILS within the UN, beginning with General Assembly resolution 181(II).  
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3 
 
1947: The United Nations Plan of Partition for Palestine and the Reification 
of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 This Chapter focuses on United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 181(II) of 29 
November 1947, through which the UN recommended the partition of Mandate Palestine into 
a Jewish State and an Arab State. The main claim, broadly made, is that the resolution was more 
an expression of a continued international rule by law inherited from the interwar period, than 
an espousal of the Charter mandated international rule of law, and as such helped reify 
Palestine’s international legal subalternity (ILS) in the newly formed UN system. To this end, 
it undertakes an international legal analysis of resolution 181(II) with specific reference to the 
verbatim and summary records of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) whose report to the General Assembly in September 1947 formed the basis of both 
the resolution’s text and its underlying rationale. Contrary to the traditional international legal 
historiography, this chapter posits that the resolution was neither procedurally ultra vires the 
General Assembly, nor was it substantively consistent in its terms with prevailing international 
law as regards self-determination of peoples. Rather than being governed by the objective 
application of substantive international law, the resolution was driven by distinctly European 
political goals and condescending attitudes that privileged European interests, including the 
desire to resolve the Jewish question, over the normative requirements of international law as 
they then applied to Palestine. The result was to legislate into UN law the two-state framework 
as the legal cornerstone of the Organization’s position on Palestine against the wishes of the 
country’s indigenous majority. Through this episode, the structural reliance and content of the 
ILS condition on the Eurocentricity of international law and institutions is exposed. For 
Palestine, this ultimately produced resolution 181(II) as the opening act of disenfranchisement 
and contingency in the UN that would continue for years to come.  
 
 In order to explore this, the remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. Part 2 
briefly sets out the role of the UN as the ostensible standard-bearer of the international rule of 
law in the post-World War II (WWII) period. Part 3 juxtaposes this against the UN as a site of 
the continued international rule by law, demonstrated through an international legal 
examination of resolution 181(II). Part 4 delves into the UNSCOP records and report to uncover 
the factors that went into the production of the rule by law legislated in resolution 181(II). Part 
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5 then discusses the practical consequences of the resolution through a subaltern Palestinian 
lens.  
 
2. The United Nations as the Standard-Bearer of the International Rule of Law 
 In the aftermath of WWII, the framers of the UN drew many lessons from the failures of 
the League of Nations. Among the most important was the need to ensure the universality of 
the new organization. This manifested itself in two significant and related ways, both ultimately 
facilitating the emergence of the UN as the apparent standard-bearer of the international rule of 
law in the contemporary period.  
 
 First, was the introduction of the principle of universality in the UN’s membership. Both 
the League and the UN were founded by victorious great/imperial powers following a world 
war. Both thereby excluded from original membership a majority of the colonized world and 
the defeated powers. Yet the UN’s conditions for acquired membership were made to be far 
less stringent than the League’s. Indeed, with the exception of the period between 1946 and 
1955, these conditions have largely been a procedural formality as a matter of practice.1  With 
the exception of a handful of cases, including the membership of Palestine (see chapter 5), this 
more liberal approach to joining the UN has resulted in the emergence of the Organization as 
the most globalized intergovernmental and multilateral institution, without parallel in human 
history.  
 
 Second, building on the universality of its membership, the UN’s commitment to develop 
and adhere to international law assumed a more global level of importance than ever existed 
within the framework of the League. While the League of Nations Covenant indicated that “the 
firm establishment of the understandings of international law” was to be a means through which 
international peace and security was to be achieved, its drafters buried this lofty aspiration in 
its preamble.2 In contrast, the maintenance of international peace and security “in conformity” 
with international law was codified as an explicit purpose of the UN under its Charter.3 
Accordingly, the commitment of the UN to international law and its progressive development 
was, on its face, made to be far more robust, clear and sustained. This is demonstrated by 
various other operative provisions of the UN Charter and related practice.  
                                                 
1 Ginther, “Membership: Article 4” in Simma (2002), 180. 
2 League of Nations Covenant, preamble. 
3 UN Charter, art. 1(1). Despite the different degrees to which delegates at the San Francisco Conference felt 
“international law” needed to shape the purposes of the Organization, reference to “principles of justice and 
international law” was inserted all the same. Simma (2002), 113-114. 
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 For example, the regime governing the use of force is far more restrictive under the UN 
Charter than it was under the League of Nations Covenant, with the Charter imposing a general 
prohibition on its “threat or use” with two relatively specific exceptions, while the Covenant 
imposed unclear general limits on war without any comparable proscription of it.4 Likewise, 
the principle of the sovereign equality of states finds express recognition in both the Charter 
and relevant binding resolutions of its political organs, while the Covenant was wholly silent 
on the issue.5 Moreover, the regime governing conflicts of law is far more restrictive under the 
Charter than it was under the Covenant, with the Charter assuming quasi-constitutional status 
in the international sphere.6 Finally, the role of the UN in the affirmation and development of 
customary international law through its principal organs is unprecedented. For instance, the 
resolutions of the 193-member strong General Assembly can offer unique evidence of a 
widespread practice accompanied by sufficient opinio juris. 7  Likewise, through the 
International Law Commission, the Assembly has encouraged “the progressive development of 
international law and its codification”.8 This, of course, is in addition to the authority of the 
Security Council to issue legally binding decisions on Members in accordance with the 
Charter,9 and the mandate of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to exercise compulsory 
and advisory jurisdiction on legal questions brought before it.10 
 
 In a very real and substantial manner, therefore, the UN can lay rightful claim to being 
the guardian of the primacy of the international rule of law in the post-WWII order in ways that 
contrast significantly with the League’s role in perpetuating an international rule by law in the 
interwar period. Yet when one examines this proposition from a subaltern perspective, is it 
possible to arrive at a different conclusion? Might there be a continuity in the maintenance of 
the international rule by law as an organizing principle from the interwar through the post-war 
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6 Whereas the Charter simply provides that it “shall prevail” in the event of a conflict between it and the obligations 
of Members under any other international agreement and, arguably, other sources of international law, the 
Covenant only provided that: (1) its conclusion automatically annulled any “obligations or understandings” 
between members of the League that conflicted with its terms; and (2) called upon members to release themselves 
from any other prior obligation in conflict with the Covenant. In any event, these provisions would not affect what 
the Covenant nebulously termed “international engagements” designed “to secure the maintenance of peace.” UN 
Charter, art. 103; League of Nations Covenant, art. 20. On the prevailing view interpreting article 103 of the UN 
Charter as including sources of international law other than treaties, see Leiæ & Paulus, “Miscellaneous 
Provisions: Article 103” in Simma (2002), 2110-2113.   
7 Higgins (1963), 1-10. 
8 UN Charter, art. 13(1)(a). 
9 Id., art. 25. 
10 ICJ Statute, art. 38(1). 
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years, now manifest in the work of the UN? To the extent that the UN Charter codified 
inequitable distributions of power as between the permanent five and the rest of the membership 
of the Organization, for example, there is little question that an element of international rule by 
law had survived. But has the UN been complicit in the maintenance of the international rule 
by law in even greater measure than that? And if so, how might its proposed partition of 
Palestine in 1947, with its resultant reification of Palestine’s ILS, help us increase our 
understanding of this? 
 
3. Resolution 181(II) and the United Nations as a Site for the Continuation of the 
International Rule by Law 
In order to assess the questions above, this section will undertake four tasks. First, it will 
assess what prevailing international law required of the UN when the question of Palestine was 
put before it in 1947. Second, it will examine the terms of resolution 181(II). Third, it will 
assess resolution 181(II) under that international law. Fourth, it will discuss whether resolution 
181(II) can be best understood as embodying a continuation of an international rule by law, 
ultimately reifying Palestine’s ILS condition in the UN.    
 
3.1 Requirements of the International Rule of Law: The UN Charter, Self-Determination and 
the Role of the UN in the Mandate for Palestine  
Legal texts reflect the values of the time in which they are produced.11 The UN Charter 
is no different. In line with the Organization’s ostensible commitment to international rule of 
law, this included a commitment to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of self-determination of peoples.12  
 
During the inter-war period, self-determination was not a part of the corpus of positive 
international law, but was rather a political principle rooted in Wilsonian precepts for an anti-
imperial new world order. 13  Though not expressly referred to in the League of Nations 
Covenant, it would be a strain to suggest that Wilsonian conceptions of self-determination did 
not inform the sacred trust of civilization that underpinned the Mandate system, despite its 
Eurocentric and rule by law nature.14 By 1945, self-determination of peoples had developed 
                                                 
11 Strawson (2010), 5. 
12 UN Charter, art. 1(2). 
13 Indeed, one of the four ends for which Wilson asserted the Allies fought World War I (WWI) – namely, that 
“[t]he settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political 
relations” should be built “upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately 
concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may 
desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery” –  offered a prescient articulation 
of the self-determination principle in embryonic form at the time; UNSCOP Report, Vol. II, at 24. 
14 Cassese (1995), 43. 
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sufficiently to be expressly included in the UN Charter as both a purpose of the Organization 
and a principle that would guide its action.15 Nevertheless, owing to the continued influence of 
the European imperial powers in the system, self-determination remained undefined in the text 
of the Charter. It wasn’t until decolonization in the 1960s that Member States were able to 
arrive at a commonly agreed definition of the right, codified in common article 1 of the 1966 
international human rights covenants.16 Because of the lack of a clear definition of the content 
and meaning of self-determination in 1945, a debate exists as to whether a de jure right to self-
determination of peoples had emerged by that time. Thus, Hurst Hannum argues that “whatever 
its political significance, the principle of self-determination did not rise to the level of a rule of 
international law at the time the UN Charter was drafted”.17 More substantively, Marc Weller 
adds that it was only through state practice during the decolonization era in the late 1950s and 
1960s that the right was established, as such.18 On the other hand, Karl Doehring asserts that 
“the legally binding nature” of self-determination of peoples “is undoubtedly clear”, since it is 
a purpose of the Organization whose legal protection is expressly provided for in article 2(4) of 
the Charter.19 Likewise, Antonio Cassese opines that the inclusion of self-determination of 
peoples in the constitutive international legal instrument in the post-WWII era “marks an 
important turning point,” in so far as it signaled “the maturing of the political postulate of self-
determination into a legal standard of behavior” in 1945.20  
 
Irrespective of where one stands in the debate on whether self-determination of peoples, 
per se, was crystalized under positive international law in 1945, by 1947 – the year the General 
Assembly recommended partition of Palestine – the general contours of self-determination of 
peoples were sufficiently established under international law as regards class A mandated 
territories. On this basis, the principle required the immediate, or at the very least, promptly 
realized, political independence of such territories based on the precepts of consent of the 
governed and majority rule. This follows from the fact that the political independence of class 
A mandates was provisionally recognized as far back as 1920 by the League of Nations, subject 
only to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory under a “sacred 
trust” until such time as these nations were “able to stand alone”. According to the ICJ, the 
ultimate objective of this sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the 
                                                 
15 UN Charter, arts. 1(2), 55. 
16 ICCPR, art. 1; ICESCR, art. 1.  
17 Hannum (1990), 33. 
18 Weller & Metzger (2008), 44.  
19 Doehring, K. “Self-Determination” in Simma (2002), 49. 
20 Cassese (1995), 43. 
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peoples concerned. 21  As a matter of state practice, by 1947 all class A mandates, except 
Palestine, had achieved full independence (Iraq, 1932; Lebanon, 1943; Syria, 1945; 
Transjordan, 1946). Finally, and as will be explored further below, in 1947 UNSCOP itself 
determined that because “the peoples of Palestine are sufficiently advanced to govern 
themselves independently,” political “independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest 
practicable date.” 22  Of note, this recommendation was unanimous among UNSCOP’s 
membership, including both the majority who recommended partition and the minority who 
preferred a unitary federal state.  
 
If self-determination of peoples required the political independence of Palestine as a class 
A mandate based on the principles of consent of the governed and majority rule, the question 
arises, what actions were required of the UN in respect of this independence under prevailing 
international law in 1947? Answering this is important, as it sets the parameters of what the 
international rule of law prescribed at the time allowing us to test whether the terms of 
resolution 181(II) were consistent with it and, if not, why that resolution amounted to a 
continuation of the international rule by law. In short, a review of the text of both the League 
of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter, as well as relevant state practice, suggests that 
prevailing international law admitted of only two possibilities for Palestine in 1947: (1) 
immediate independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of Palestine’s 
inhabitants, whatever its eventual constitutional structure; or (2) temporary delay of 
independence through conversion into a UN trusteeship under the Charter.23  
 
As to the first possibility – immediate independence – it will be recalled that, dismissive 
of Palestinian Arab rights though it may have been, the terms of the Mandate for Palestine only 
required the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home, not a Jewish state. According 
to a 1939 White Paper, the UK itself acknowledged that the Jewish national home had been 
established in Palestine by that time. This would suggest that it had discharged its obligation 
under the terms of the Mandate vis-á-vis the Zionists and could proceed with granting the 
country full independence in accord with Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. The 
problem was that the minority Zionists insisted on transforming all of Palestine into a Jewish 
                                                 
21 Namibia, para. 53.    
22 UNSCOP Report, Vol. I, 43. While UNSCOP’s use of the plural (i.e. “peoples”) may be read as suggesting that 
both the Jewish people and the Arab people of Palestine possessed the legal right be granted independence in 
separate states, it must not be forgotten that a minority of UNSCOP members also recommended the establishment 
of a unitary federal state as a means through which Palestine’s “peoples” could exercise self-determination. See 
text accompanying infra notes 167-170. 
23 Quigley (2010), 88.  
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state against the wishes of the indigenous Palestinian majority who had long argued for a 
unitary, democratic and non-denominational state. This is, in part, what lead the British to 
conclude that the mandate was unworkable and should be handed over to the UN. In a very 
practical sense, the issue before the UN was how to deal with the impediment that Palestinian 
demography placed in the way of the establishment of what the Zionists intended to be a Jewish 
state.  
 
Short of immediate independence in a unitary democratic State in accord with the wishes 
of Palestine’s inhabitants the only other option was the second possibility: conversion of 
Palestine into a UN trusteeship. Under Chapter XII of the Charter, the International Trusteeship 
System was established for the administration and supervision, inter alia, of mandated 
territories that had yet to achieve independence.24 Under Article 76, one of the basic objectives 
of the trusteeship system was “to promote” the “progressive development toward self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned” [emphasis 
added]. 25  As between self-government and independence, Palestine’s status as a class A 
mandate rendered the former nugatory and latter obligatory. Indeed, as a matter of state practice, 
it was only class B and C mandates – neither of which enjoyed a provisionally recognized right 
of independence under the League of Nations Covenant – that were transformed into trust 
territories under the Charter.26 Neither was the fact that the League of Nations was now defunct 
a bar to the requirement and inevitability of independence. On the contrary, the final resolution 
of the League of Nations of 18 April 1946 recognized “that, on the termination of the League’s 
existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but notes 
that chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles 
corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League.”27 It further noted 
“the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under 
mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples 
concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other 
arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory 
Powers.”28  
 
                                                 
24 UN Charter, art. 77(1)(a). 
25 Id., art. 76(b). 
26 Rauschning, “International Trusteeship” in Simma (2002), 1104-1105. 
27 1946 Mandates Resolutions, 278.  
28 Id., 279. 
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According to Hersch Lauterpacht, this was understood as having the effect of maintaining 
“the general principles and the regime of the Mandatory system”, pending conclusion of new 
arrangements under the UN Charter.29 As subsequently affirmed by the ICJ in Namibia, “[t]o 
the question whether the continuance of a mandate was inseparably linked with the existence 
of the League, the answer must be that an institution established for the fulfillment of a sacred 
trust cannot be presumed to lapse before the achievement of its purpose.”30 As a matter of 
positive UN law, this was ensured by the safeguarding clause in article 80 of the Charter. That 
provided, in relevant part, that “nothing shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner 
the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international 
instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.” 31 This 
meant that Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant along with the terms of the Mandate 
remained in effect. As noted by the ICJ in Namibia, a “striking feature” of article 80 of the 
Charter was “the stipulation in favour of the preservation of the rights of ‘any peoples’, thus 
clearly including the inhabitants of the mandated territories and, in particular, their indigenous 
populations” [emphasis added].32 Thus, with the Jewish national home having been established 
in 1939, the only international legal obligation that remained unfulfilled was the realization of 
the political independence of the territory of Palestine in accordance with the wishes of its 
majority indigenous population. 
 
In sum, the Charter regime included a commitment to the principle of ‘consent of the 
governed’ that underpinned Wilson’s world-vision. On the one hand, if self-determination of 
peoples was sufficiently established in 1947 to justify application to the Palestinian people, the 
country would have to follow the other class A mandates by having its independence recognized 
and being admitted to membership in the UN if it so wished. On the other hand, if self-
determination of peoples lacked sufficient legal force under the Charter to give immediate 
effect to Palestinian independence, that problem was alleviated by the fact that eventual 
realization of independence was already established under a sacred trust that survived the 
League through the trusteeship system. In either case, as a matter of prevailing international 
rule of law the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned were to be determinative.  
 
Given that Palestine’s indigenous population was both in the majority and adamantly 
against partition, political independence invariably meant the establishment of the country as a 
                                                 
29 Lauterpacht (1977), 509. 
30 Namibia, para. 55. 
31 UN Charter, art. 80(1). 
32 Namibia, para. 59. 
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unitary democratic state, the Jewish national home having already been established within it. 
As will be demonstrated, all of this ran up against prevailing European political winds. This 
included the imperative presented by a predominately western and European bloc of states for 
the need to find a durable solution to Europe’s vexing Jewish question, epitomized at the time 
by the plight of Jewish displaced persons in post-war Europe and revelations of the horrors of 
the Holocaust. By recommending partition, UN General Assembly resolution 181(II) 
introduced a rupture in the purportedly new international legal order and challenged the primacy 
of the international rule of law as affirmed in its own Charter. As will be demonstrated, this 
rupture reified Palestine’s ILS condition in the UN system. By going beyond the terms of what 
prevailing international law required by recommending the establishment of a Jewish state 
through partition of the country, the international legal and political goalposts would be 
fundamentally shifted for the indigenous subaltern majority, ultimately marking the question 
of Palestine under international law to this very day.  
 
3.2 Resolution 181(II): Its Terms 
On 3 September 1947, UNSCOP submitted its report to the General Assembly, in which 
the majority of the special committee voted in favour of a plan of partition with economic union, 
while a minority voted in favour of a plan for a unitary federal state.33 The UNSCOP report was 
debated in the Assembly between 25 September and 29 November 1947, first by an ad hoc 
committee of all members of the Assembly (“ad hoc committee”) which set up two sub-
committees to study a slightly adjusted majority plan and a unitary state plan respectively, and 
then in full plenary session. This resulted in the passage by the Assembly of resolution 181(II) 
on 29 November 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions.34 
 
The terms of Resolution 181(II) provided for the partition of Palestine into an Arab State 
and a Jewish State in economic union, with the city of Jerusalem and its environs constituted 
as a corpus separatum under the administering authority of the UN Trusteeship Council (see 
Map I). Under the plan, both states were required to adopt democratic constitutions, establish 
government on the basis of universal suffrage and guarantee to all persons equality before the 
law. Aside from the act of partition itself, the extent to which the resolution reified Palestinian 
ILS in the UN system is best illustrated in the specific details of the plan as regards the related 
                                                 
33 The majority comprised: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay. 
The minority comprised: India, Iran and Yugoslavia; UNSCOP Report, Vol. I, 47-64. Australia abstained from 
voting on the respective plans; UNSCOP Report, Vol. II, 23. 
34 A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947. 
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issues of both the territorial boundaries and the demographic composition of each of the 
proposed states.  
 
As to territorial boundaries, under the plan the Jewish State was allotted approximately 
57 percent of the total area of Palestine35 even though the Jewish population comprised only 33 
percent of the country (see Maps I & II).36 In addition, according to British records relied upon 
by the ad hoc committee, the Jewish population possessed registered ownership of only 5.6 
percent of Palestine, 37  and was eclipsed by the Arabs in land-ownership in every one of 
Palestine’s 16 sub-districts (see Map III).38 Moreover, the quality of the land granted to the 
proposed Jewish state was highly skewed in its favour. UNSCOP reported that under its 
majority plan “[t]he Jews will have the more economically developed part of the country 
embracing practically the whole of the citrus-producing area”,39 – Palestine’s staple export crop 
– even though approximately half of the citrus-bearing land was owned by the Arabs.40 In 
addition, according to updated British records submitted to the ad hoc committee’s two sub-
committees, “of the irrigated, cultivable areas” of the country, “84 per cent would be in the 
Jewish State and 16 per cent would be in the Arab State”.41  
 
As to demographic composition, the UNSCOP report indicated that while the proposed 
Arab State would include a clear majority of approximately 725,000 Arabs to 10,000 Jews, the 
proposed Jewish State would include approximately 498,000 Jews to 407,000 Arabs. Curiously, 
UNSCOP acknowledged that “[i]n addition, there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 
Bedouins”, providing virtual parity in the ethnic composition of the proposed Jewish State, with 
498,000 Jews to 497,000 Arabs. 42  This was further compounded by the findings of sub-
committee 2 of the ad hoc committee, which reported to the General Assembly that UNSCOP’s 
estimated figures had to be corrected in light of the updated information furnished to it by the 
British. That information indicated that there would be 105,000 Bedouin in the Jewish State, 
not 90,000. As noted by the sub-committee, this meant that “the proposed Jewish State will 
                                                 
35 Kattan (2009), 152. 
36 According to UNSCOP, the total “settled population” of Palestine was 1,846,000 of which 1,203,000 were Arabs 
and 608,000 were Jews; UNSCOP Report, Vol. I, 11. 
37 In 1945, of the 26,323,023 million dunam land-mass of Palestine, the Jews owned only 1,491,699 million 
dunams to the Arab’s 12,574,774 dunams (48 percent), the remainder being publicly owned. UN Ad Hoc 
Committee, Report of Sub-Committee 2, 292-293, Appendix VI. 
38 In eight of Palestine’s 16 sub-districts, Jewish land ownership did not exceed 5 percent and in no case did it 
exceed 39 percent. Id. 
39 Citrus was the principal export of Palestine at the time; UNSCOP Report, Vol. I, 48. 
40 UN Ad Hoc Committee, Report of Sub-Committee 2, 293, Appendix VI. 
41  Statement of Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan), UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 126th Plen. Mtg. at 1374, 
A/PV.126, 28 November 1947. 
42 UNSCOP report, Vol. I, 54. 
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contain a total population of 1,080,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other 
words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State” [emphasis 
added].43  
 
Although the Zionists had coveted the whole of Palestine, the Jewish Agency leadership 
pragmatically, if grudgingly, accepted Resolution 181(II).44 Although they were of the view 
that the Jewish national home promised in the Mandate was equivalent to a Jewish state, they 
well understood that such a claim could not be maintained under prevailing international law. 
In this way, UN recognition of the Jewish state in resolution 181(II) represented a fundamental 
shifting of the international legal goalposts. Based on its own terms, it is impossible to escape 
the conclusion that the partition plan privileged European colonial interests over those of 
Palestine’s indigenous people and, as such, was an embodiment of the Eurocentricity of the 
international system that was allegedly a thing of the past. For this reason, the Arabs took a 
more principled position in line with prevailing international law, rejecting partition outright.45 
This rejection has disingenuously been presented in some of the literature as indicative of 
political intransigence,46 and even hostility towards the Jews as Jews.47 Yet an examination of 
the terms of the resolution as above offers an explanation rooted in what is appropriately 
characterized as a rejection of the hegemonic dictates imposed on the subaltern people of 
Palestine by the General Assembly and the ILS condition it wrought for them within the UN 
system. Far from an opportunity to establish their right to political independence and self-
determination in their homeland in line with the international rule of law, resolution 181(II) 
represented an abuse of UN legal authority to undermine indigenous rights in Palestine in 
favour of European interest, and was therefore an embodiment of the international rule by law.   
 
3.3 Resolution 181(II): Assessment Under International Law 
 
The international legality of resolution 181(II) has long been a matter of some debate. 
Among the key protagonists, Israel has historically relied on the resolution as one of the legal 
bases of its juridical right to exist. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel 
of 14 May 1948 expressly provides that the “recognition by the United Nations of the right of 
the Jewish people to establish their state” contained in resolution 181(II) “is irrevocable”, and 
                                                 
43 UN Ad Hoc Committee, Report of Sub-Committee 2, 291. 
44 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 4th Mtg. at 16-17, 2 October 1947. 
45 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 3rd Mtg. at 11, 29 September 1947. 
46 E.g., Strawson (2010), 101-102.  
47 Grief (2010), 166-167. 
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that the state was established “on the strength” of this resolution.48 For its part, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) regarded resolution 181(II) as illegal until it accepted it in 1988 
as the basis of entering into diplomatic talks in accordance with a two-state settlement.49 The 
international legality of resolution 181(II) has also been well traversed in the literature. 
Positions adopted by pro-Israel legal scholars have treated the resolution as illegal for violating 
a purported right of the Zionists to the whole of Palestine. 50  Others have considered it 
‘conditionally legal’ on the basis that it would have bound both Israel and the Arab States if the 
latter had accepted it. 51  Not surprisingly, a similar variance can be seen among positions 
adopted by pro-Palestinian legal scholars. Some have treated the resolution as illegal for being 
wholly ultra vires the General Assembly 52  or in violation of the UN Charter and self-
determination of peoples.53 Still others have regarded it as legal based on acceptance of it by an 
overwhelming majority of states within the General Assembly, both at the time of its passage 
and subsequently through sponsorship of the two-state framework.54  
 
Despite the difference of opinion that exists on the international legality of resolution 
181(II), one common thread that runs throughout much of it is the tendency to collapse the 
separate issues of the General Assembly’s procedural powers with its substantive powers, thus 
giving rise to some confusion. The diplomatic record reveals that this was an issue for some 
delegations in the debate over the terms of the resolution.55 One example drawn from the 
secondary literature is found in the following view of James Crawford:  
 
“It is doubtful if the UN has a capacity to convey title, in part because it cannot assume the role of territorial 
sovereign: in spite of the principle of implied powers, the UN is not a state and the General Assembly only 
has a power of recommendation. On this basis it can be argued that GA Resolution 181(II) of 29 November 
                                                 
48 Declaration of Establishment of Israel (1948).  
49 See infra text accompanying note 88 and Chapter 4. 
50 Grief (2010), 156-157. 
51 Stone (1981), 62. 
52 Cattan (2000), 38. 
53 Id., 39; Crawford (2012), 246. 
54 Mallison (1986), 171-173. 
55 See Statement of Semen K. Tsarapkin (USSR), Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary 
Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 30th Mtg. at 184, 24 November 
1947 (“Such doubts [i.e. about the legal competence of the GA to deal with the Palestinian problem] as were being 
expressed in the Ad Hoc Committee were completely unjustified, because Article 10 of the Charter gave the 
General Assembly the right and the duty to discuss the Palestinian question. It was in complete accordance with 
the provisions of Article 10 that the special session had been called, the Special Committee established and the 
Palestinian question considered by the General Assembly. Any recommendations which the Assembly made would 
have sound juridical foundations” [emphasis added]). But see, in response, statement of Sir Zafrullah Khan 
(Pakistan), Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 
November 1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 30th Mtg. at 189, 24 November 1947 (“Article 10 of the Charter certainly 
authorized the General Assembly to consider the question of Palestine and to make recommendations, but the 
solution which the General Assembly proposed must be within the scope of the Charter”). 
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1947, approving a partition plan for Palestine, was if not ultra vires at any rate not binding on Member 
States.”56 
 
It is apparent that the legal capacity of the General Assembly to convey title is a matter of 
substantive power, while its legal capacity to make recommendations to Member States is a 
matter of procedural power. Questioning the authority of the Assembly to impose a territorial 
partition in Palestine, however accurate, cannot be fully justified by referencing the limits of its 
power to bind Member States procedurally. The better approach to assess the overall legality 
of resolution 181(II) would seem to call for a two-pronged test that severs the procedural and 
substantive authority of the General Assembly, as follows: (1) does the Assembly have the 
procedural power to issue recommendations under the Charter? (2) If so, what are the 
substantive limitations on the Assembly in the exercise of that power, if any?  
 
As to the first prong, there is little question that the General Assembly possesses the 
procedural authority to issue recommendations under the Charter. Under article 10 of the 
Charter, the Assembly “may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or 
to the Security Council or to both…”.57 Based on the ordinary meaning of these terms, the 
Assembly is thus vested with the procedural competence to issue recommendations to members 
of the UN and/or to the Security Council under the Charter. But that takes us to the second 
prong, namely whether there are substantive limits on the Assembly in exercising this 
procedural authority. The answer is yes. Article 10 provides, in relevant part, that the Assembly 
may make recommendations, as above, but only on “any questions or any matters within the 
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for 
in the present Charter…”.58  
 
An argument can therefore be advanced that it is incorrect to assert that resolution 181(II) 
was ultra vires the General Assembly insofar as the resolution is understood to have imposed a 
political solution for “the future government of Palestine” on the people of Palestine.59 Nothing 
in the text of the resolution suggests that the Assembly went beyond its limited powers of 
making a recommendation. To be sure, the resolution’s terms expressly provide that the 
Assembly “[r]ecommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and 
                                                 
56 Crawford (2012), 246. 
57 UN Charter, art. 10. 
58 Id., art. 10. This is with the exception of those powers under article 12 of the Charter, concerning the Security 
Council’s primary competence over the maintenance of international peace and security. 
59 Although resolution 181(II) is entitled “Future government of Palestine”, and the partition plan was presented 
as a recommendation in respect of same, the terms of reference of UNSCOP’s majority report which served as the 
basis of the partition plan were not as narrow, but examined “all questions and issues relevant to the problem of 
Palestine.” See GA Res. 181(II) and section 4.1 of this chapter.  
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to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation” of a certain 
course of action relevant to the future government of Palestine. At the time it was issued, 
therefore, the resolution constituted nothing more than a recommendation that was, as a matter 
of procedure, properly made by the Assembly and which, as a rule, would not normally be 
binding under international law.60  
 
At the same time, however, in exercising its procedural power to make a recommendation 
on the future government of Palestine, the Assembly was bound, in substantive terms, by the 
scope of the Charter, including its provisions relating to the powers and functions of any organs 
provided for in it. By definition, this must have been delimited by what we might call for our 
purposes “the sacred trust principles” deriving from the continuation of the mandate regime 
following the demise of the League of Nations – viz. self-determination of peoples in the context 
of class A mandates, article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the Mandate for Palestine, 
and Chapter XII of the Charter concerning the International Trusteeship System. As noted 
above, given the satisfaction of the establishment of the Jewish national home under the terms 
of the Mandate, and the fact that the indigenous majority of the population of the country was 
against partition, this meant that the substantive scope of the General Assembly’s power to 
make any recommendation on Palestine must have been limited to either one of two results: 
immediate independence of the country or delayed independence through transformation of the 
country into a UN trusteeship. In either case, partition would not be legal without the freely 
expressed consent of the governed.  
 
Various arguments have been proffered over the years that differ with this conclusion. 
One of the earliest was advanced by Lauterpacht who, in October 1947, was asked by the Jewish 
Agency to advise “on the best legal grounds for refuting the suggestion that the General 
Assembly has no legal competence to partition Palestine.”61 He opined that because Great 
Britain exercised effective “sovereignty over Palestine” and it had requested the UN “to 
pronounce a finding upon the question of Palestine and its political future in all its aspects”, the 
Assembly was within its power to recommend partition. 62  Likewise, he affirmed that the 
General Assembly possessed “unrestricted powers…to recommend the solution of the problem 
of Palestine.”63 These views suffer from a number of defects. First, the British request of the 
UN was not directed toward the broad end of “the question of Palestine and its political future 
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in all its aspects” but rather only toward the much more limited end of “the future government 
of Palestine”.64  As discussed below, this implies that the territorial unity of the country would 
remain in-tact, save where the freely expressed wishes of the population determined otherwise. 
Second, it is clear from the terms of article 10 of the Charter – which Lauterpacht curiously 
failed to cite in his advice – that the procedural power of the Assembly to make 
recommendations to members of the UN and/or the Security Council is not unrestricted. To the 
contrary, it is expressly limited by the scope of the Charter, which includes the sacred trust 
principles and the continuing mandates regime. In view of the object and purpose of these 
principles and regime, the heart of which was the need to make inquiry of and respect the freely 
expressed wishes of the inhabitants of mandated territories, there would not seem to be any 
substantive scope for the General Assembly to suggest partition in exercising its procedural 
power of recommendation under article 10 of the Charter. After all, partition had been 
consistently rejected by the great majority of the people of Palestine.  
 
Another, more recent example of a differing view is a detailed opinion advanced by 
Victor Kattan, who rightly points out that resolution 181(II) was merely a recommendation.65 
But in assessing the resolution’s legality he seems to have maintained the general tendency to 
collapse the procedural and substantive powers of the General Assembly, noted above. He states 
that there is “no basis in the UN Charter or in international law to argue that the General 
Assembly does not have the power to recommend to states that they adopt a plan partitioning a 
particular territory over which it has a special responsibility.”66 For support, he relies on the 
1950 advisory opinion of the ICJ in South-West Africa, where the Court unanimously concluded 
that “competence to determine and modify the international status of [the mandated territory 
of] South-West Africa rests with the Union of South Africa [as mandatory power] acting with 
the consent of the United Nations.” 67  On this basis, he concludes that “the UN General 
Assembly, acting with the consent of the mandatory, can modify the status of a mandated 
territory and that, in so doing, it is competent to decide on claims of self-determination put 
forward by communities living in the territory.” 68  Similar to problems encountered with 
Lauterpacht, this seems questionable for one key reason. Nowhere in South-West Africa did the 
ICJ indicate that the authority of the UN to modify the status of a mandated territory with the 
consent of the mandatory power was substantively unlimited. Indeed, the Court made it clear 
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that South-Africa remained the mandatory power in South-West Africa,69 that it was bound by 
the terms of article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant,70 that the General Assembly was 
“legally qualified to exercise the functions previously exercised by the League of Nations”,71 
and that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applied to the territory of South-West 
Africa “in a sense that they provide a means by which the territory may be brought under the 
trusteeship system.”72 Thus, as previously noted, the scope of the General Assembly’s authority 
to make recommendations under article 10 in respect of mandated territories must necessarily 
have been circumscribed by the sacred trust principles. These, in turn, were rooted in the 
principle of the consent of the governed.  
 
In both of the abovementioned opinions, what is missing is the fundamental importance 
of assessing the legality of resolution 181(II) through the prism of the primacy of the consent 
of the governed, a crucial frame of reference if subaltern interests are to be given their due. This 
primacy arises from the substantive limits on the exercise of the procedural right of the General 
Assembly to make recommendations under article 10 of the Charter. By the very terms of that 
article, these limits are in turn defined by the scope of the Charter, which, because of the 
continuation of the principles and regime of the mandate system, necessarily includes the sacred 
trust principles embodied in article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and self-
determination of peoples living within class A mandated territories. In the end, therefore, 
resolution 181(II) was illegal under international law, not because it purported to impose a 
decision that went beyond its powers of recommendation, but because its substantive content – 
namely, partition against the will of the subaltern people of Palestine – was ipso facto in 
violation of the Charter and the international rule of law.  
 
Admittedly, the legality of resolution 181(II) is a complex issue. It was doubtless for that 
reason that in October 1947 Egypt, Iraq and Syria proposed that an advisory opinion be sought 
from the ICJ on, inter alia, the competence of the General Assembly to recommend the partition 
of Palestine without the consent of its people.73  This effort was narrowly defeated in the ad hoc 
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committee of the General Assembly,74 giving rise to concern among some that the international 
rule of law was being sacrificed for other ends.75 The Colombian delegate opined that “[t]he 
legal competence of the General Assembly to set up two independent States in Palestine, 
without regard to the principle of self-determination” and without “the consent of the 
inhabitants of Palestine”, has “not been established to our satisfaction.”76  The Iraqi delegate 
stated that “if the General Assembly were to adopt this [partition] plan” without the benefit of 
first going to the ICJ, “the legality of the matter would still be seriously questioned.”77 Finally, 
the Cuban delegate noted that refusal to have resort to the ICJ “was a mistake”, not least because 
it “may well give the impression that the Assembly is avoiding solutions which conform to the 
law”.78  
At its heart then, the key problem with resolution 181(II) was that it recommended a 
purported solution to the question of Palestine on terms that manifestly ran counter to prevailing 
international law. If the Assembly’s goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine was viewed 
by it as a politically legitimate end, that end was arrived at the expense of the international rule 
of law as it existed at the time and the purported rights of the indigenous people of Palestine 
thereunder. How could partition be legal if the only possibility envisioned under the UN Charter 
was independence of the country, either immediately as with other Class A mandates, or at 
some point in the immediate future following temporary administration as a UN Trusteeship? 
What of the principle of self-determination of such mandated territories, rooted in the precepts 
of consent of the governed and majority rule? Even if the Jewish people possessed an 
internationally recognized right to a Jewish national home in Palestine by virtue of the Mandate, 
how did that legally justify the General Assembly’s recommendation to establish a Jewish state 
in Palestine? At any rate, how would the “Jewishness” of that state be secured, if the ratio of 
Arabs to Jews in it was virtually on par or the Jews were a minority in it from the start, and the 
plan required it to adopt a democratic constitution guaranteeing universal suffrage and equality 
before the law? As will be seen, following these lines of inquiry will assist us in better 
understanding the rule by law essence of resolution 181(II) and why it reified Palestine’s ILS 
condition. 
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3.4 Resolution 181(II) as an Embodiment of the International Rule by Law 
If the passage of resolution 181(II) violated the international rule of law, how should we 
understand it as an embodiment of the international rule by law? The partition plan may very 
well have amounted to a form of “rule by something”, but does this something amount to “law”?  
There seem to be two ways through which the rule by law nature of resolution 181(II) can be 
understood. The first is through the lens of positivist international law doctrine or hard law. The 
second is through the prism of discursive international norms or soft law. 
 
Doctrinally, the assertion that resolution 181(II) was declarative of law and therefore 
amounted to a form of rule by law may seem surprising. This is because the resolution was 
merely a recommendation of the General Assembly, and therefore not normally binding under 
international law. While this may have been true of the resolution when it was passed in 1947, 
an argument can be made that over time, through its express and implied acceptance by states 
and other subjects of the international community – most importantly, the Israeli and Palestinian 
protagonists with whom it is concerned – it has come to have binding legal force if not in toto, 
then in respect of its embodiment of the principle of the territorial division of mandate Palestine.   
 
 It is a general principle that law may arise from a long and consistent practice: ex factis 
oritur jus. 79  On the international plane, the formation of customary international law is 
understood as requiring “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”.80 This practice may 
be global or regional/local in nature.81 Accordingly, as noted by the ICJ in Nicaragua, settled 
practice accompanied by opinio juris sive necessitatis – the subjective belief that the practice 
engaged in is required as matter of law – qualifies as binding customary international law.82 
Here, the universality of the UN is of direct relevance. As noted by Rosalyn Higgins, the 
practice of the UN’s political organs – the General Assembly in particular – can provide a “rich 
source of evidence” of customary international law as the “[c]ollective acts of states, repeated 
by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with sufficient frequency, eventually attain the 
status of law.”83 This has been affirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, where it opined that General Assembly resolutions “can 
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provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris.”84  
 
 It is admittedly difficult to argue that the terms of resolution 181(II) would in toto qualify 
as customary international law on these bases. Support for this conclusion rests in the fact that 
key specific terms of the resolution – including the proposed territorial delimitations of the 
envisioned Jewish and Arab states, the proposed economic union, guarantees intended for the 
protection of civil and political rights of minorities, and the envisioned means of the resolution’s 
enforcement – were never in fact followed by the concerned states and had been overtaken by 
events on the ground during the 1948 war. Thus, as noted by Crawford, “both the Security 
Council and Britain refused to enforce the partition plan,” and the functions of the UN Palestine 
Commission (UNPC) – established in resolution 181(II) to administer the transfer of power 
from Britain to the two proposed states during a transitional period – were subsequently 
terminated by the General Assembly in resolution 186(S-2) of 14 May 1948, during the course 
of the war.85 Likewise, John Dugard argues that, rather than resolution 181(II), Israel owes its 
international legal existence to the operation of state secession.86  
 
 Nevertheless, in the intervening 70 years since the passage of resolution 181(II) a good 
case can be made that there has emerged enough state practice, including by both the States of 
Israel and Palestine, but also within the UN system, suggestive of the legally binding character 
of the resolution’s fundamental object and purpose: namely, the principle of a peaceful 
resolution of the dispute over mandate Palestine through its territorial division into two states. 
As noted, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel provides that “recognition 
by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their state” contained in 
resolution 181(II) “is irrevocable”, and that the state was established “on the strength” of the 
resolution.87 Likewise, since 1988, the PLO has recognized resolution 181(II) as one of the 
bases upon which the State of Palestine may be established, albeit within the smaller territorial 
confines of the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT).88 As for the attitude of the rest of the 
international community, the best evidence that a custom exists in this regard comes in the form 
of the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly over the years, usually adopted by a large 
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or overwhelming majority, in which resolution 181(II) is recalled or affirmed.89 Thus, for 
example, resolution 48/158D of 20 December 1993, passed following the commencement of 
the Oslo peace process and adopted by a vote of 92 to 5, with 51 abstentions, reaffirmed a 
number of principles “for the achievement of a final settlement and comprehensive peace” 
including “[g]uaranteeing arrangements for peace and security of all States in the region, 
including those named in resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947, within secure and 
internationally recognized boundaries.” 90  Likewise, in relation to the Madrid Peace 
Conference, the same principle was affirmed by the Assembly in its resolutions 44/42 of 6 
December 1989 (151 to 3, with 1 abstention), 45/68 of 6 December 1990 (144 to 2, with 0 
abstentions), and resolution 46/75 of 11 December 1991 (104 to 2, with 43 abstentions).91 In 
line with these resolutions, widespread state practice as reflected in bilateral and multilateral 
treaty, diplomatic, economic and political relations affirms that historical Palestine is today 
legally recognized by the vast majority of the international community as being shared by two 
distinct self-determination units, Israel and Palestine (see chapters 4 & 5). Thus, it is possible 
to argue that beyond its specific terms and mechanics which were rendered moot by the 1948 
war and subsequent events, the legal effect of the two-state principle that underpinned 
resolution 181 has arguably taken on a binding character through its treatment by states within 
the UN system. This has given the resolution its rule by law quality, which has, in turn, reified 
Palestine’s ILS condition within the UN. 
 
 Even if the two-state paradigm that underpins resolution 181(II) is not regarded as binding 
international law doctrinally, might it still possess a discursive/normative force that informs its 
rule by law character? In Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ noted that “General Assembly resolutions, 
even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value”.92 Based on the historical 
record subsequent to the passage of resolution 181(II), there is little question that the resolution 
produced a discursive/normative imagery that structured the way the UN as an organization has 
come to understand the conflict over Palestine and how it should be peacefully resolved in 
accordance with other relevant bodies of international law. As will be fleshed out in chapters 4 
and 5, this includes the law concerning acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force, 
the law of belligerent occupation, and the law on self-determination of peoples as crystalized 
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in the post-decolonization era. In so far as these bodies of law have been applied within and by 
the UN system to affirm the rights and obligations of the protagonists in the question of 
Palestine, the only confines within which they have legitimately been allowed to do so – those 
of the two-state paradigm – were set forth in principle in resolution 181(II). In addition, one 
can argue that through its passage of resolution 181(II) the UN effectively imposed a territorial 
regime for Palestine that was to be treated as an objective legal fact with almost international 
constitutional effect. In this sense, the General Assembly was the vehicle through which an 
illegal act would eventually provide a definite legal basis for the territorial transformation of 
Palestine into two distinct self-determination units. Thus, from a discursive/normative 
standpoint, resolution 181(II) provided what has become the fundamental architecture of the 
UN’s 70-year engagement with the question of Palestine: the two-state framework.93 This has 
also bolstered resolution’s rule by law quality, with its resulting reification of Palestine’s ILS 
within the Organization. 
 
In light of the above, when viewed from a subaltern perspective, resolution 181(II) stands 
out as the first example of the rule by law in operation in the UN’s work on the question of 
Palestine. As noted, the PLO would later be compelled to accept the legitimacy of the resolution 
as a price to be paid in return for a modicum of Palestine’s international legal rights being 
recognized and hopefully realized (see chapter 4). Yet, from the standpoint of the PLO’s 
constituents, the introduction of the two-state paradigm through resolution 181(II) represented 
a signal disaster at the time it was passed. At bottom, it was the clash between the interest of 
the hegemonic and European-dominated General Assembly in the juridical establishment of a 
Jewish State in Palestine, and the obstacle to doing so in the form of the very presence of a 
majority Muslim and Christian Arab population who persistently objected to it, that forms the 
essence of the rule by law character of the resolution and the subsequent reification of 
Palestine’s ILS inherent in its terms. In order to better understand the nature and genus of the 
ILS condition through this problem, it is useful for us to look deeper into the diplomatic record 
with a subaltern sensibility. To this end, we must give particular critical focus to the terms of 
UNSCOP’s report, the verbatim and summary records on which it was based, and the debates 
that subsequently took place in the ad hoc and plenary sessions of the General Assembly 
between 25 September and 29 November 1947. 
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4. What Produced the Rule by Law in Resolution 181(II)? The United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine and Subsequent General Assembly Debates 
UNSCOP was created by the General Assembly on 15 May 1947.94 It held sixteen public 
and thirty-six private meetings with a variety of stakeholders in Lake Success, Jerusalem, Beirut 
and Geneva between June and August 1947.95 In addition, it visited a range of Jewish displaced 
persons camps in Germany and Austria.96 As noted, UNSCOP proposed two plans for the future 
government of Palestine: a majority plan proposing partition with economic union, and a 
minority plan proposing a unitary federal state. It also unanimously adopted twelve 
recommendations, including that the Mandate “shall be terminated” and “independence shall 
be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date”, and that the new state or states to be 
formed in Palestine shall be constitutional democracies guaranteeing “full equality of all 
citizens with regard to political, civil and religious matters”.97 
 
An examination of UNSCOP records reveals at least three factors that point up a 
continuation of the international rule by law and the hegemonic/subaltern binary in its work. 
They were rooted in UNSCOP’s disregard for prevailing international law throughout the 
course of its deliberations, which was carried through to the General Assembly debates 
following the submission of its report on 3 September 1947, ultimately resulting in the passage 
of resolution 181(II). These factors were: (1) an apparent bias in UNSCOP’s composition and 
terms of reference directing it away from recommending the immediate independence of 
Palestine upon the dissolution of the Mandate, as per the normal course for class “A” mandates 
in under international law; (2) an unwillingness to sufficiently engage Palestinian Arab opinion 
in its deliberations; and (3) a contempt for democratic governance and the empirical reality of 
the indigenous Arab population in Palestine as the main problem to be overcome. As each of 
these are addressed below, the Eurocentricity of international law and institutions as a structural 
component of ILS will be readily apparent.   
 
4.1 Bias in UNSCOP’s Composition and Terms of Reference  
 
In 1947, the General Assembly was composed of only fifty-five Member States, forty of 
whom were either European or settler-colonial offshoots of Europe. The other sixteen were 
made up of newly independent Asian, African and Middle Eastern states, the majority of those 
regions remaining under some form of European imperial control at the time. Notwithstanding 
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this 5:2 ratio, of the eleven members of UNSCOP, nine were drawn from the European and 
settler-colonial group (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, 
Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia), whereas only two (India and Iran) were drawn from the 
non-European group. No Arab state was named to UNSCOP and only one member (Iran) was 
drawn from the Middle East. It is apparent, therefore, that UNSCOP’s membership empirically 
reflected a continuation of the “civilized” Eurocentricity of international law and institutions 
that had hitherto been a marked feature of the international system. As noted by John Quigley, 
UNSCOP was “friendly territory for the Jewish Agency from the cultural standpoint.”98 Set 
against the calamitous backdrop of WWII, the evidence further suggests this bias was also 
political, as a key feature of the work of UNSCOP was the desire of some of its members (and 
other states in the Assembly) to find a solution to Europe’s long-standing Jewish question. This 
was to be done through the juridical transformation and recognition of the Jewish national home 
into a Jewish state in Palestine, something that could only happen at the expense of the 
international rule of law and the rights of the Palestinian Arabs thereunder.  Despite one writer 
having recently rejected this claim as mere “myth”,99 such a position seems warranted on a 
close reading of the diplomatic record. 
 
The record suggests that these ends were enabled initially through UNSCOP’s unduly 
broad terms of reference.  When the United Kingdom referred the matter of Palestine to the UN 
on 2 April 1947, it asked the General Assembly “to make recommendations under Article 10 
of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine”. To this end, the UK requested 
the Assembly to constitute and instruct a special committee to help it consider this question.100 
Thus the envisioned special committee was asked to work within the relatively narrow confines 
of advising on Palestine’s future government within the scope of the Charter. It was not asked 
to entertain territorial dismemberment of the territory in favour of a European settler minority 
colonizing it against the will of the indigenous non-European majority. This was consistent 
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with Palestine’s status as a single administrative unit under international law whose 
independence had been provisionally recognized in 1920 and whose legal fate under the 
Charter was either to have its independence immediately recognized or be converted into a UN 
trust territory until such time as independence was recognized in accordance with the freely 
expressed wishes of its inhabitants.  
 
The First Committee of the General Assembly was tasked with composing UNSCOP’s 
terms of reference. During its deliberations, the scope of the terms originally referred by Britain 
were considerably broadened in a manner that directed the matter away from Palestine’s 
independence. This allowed for consideration of a number of factors more amenable to Zionist 
and associated post-war European goals of establishing a Jewish state. To begin with, Chile, 
Guatemala, and Uruguay succeeded in gaining approval for expanding the political scope of 
UNSCOP’s investigation by replacing reference to it having to report on “the future government 
of Palestine” to the more opaque “question of Palestine”. 101  This was justified by the 
Guatemalan and Uruguayan representatives – both of whom were members of UNSCOP – 
ostensibly as a measure to ensure against “directing”, “limiting” and “restricting” the 
committee’s task.102 The British representative realized that this skewed his government’s 
original intention in referring the matter to the General Assembly. He accordingly requested 
the removal of any reference to “the request of the Government of the United Kingdom” in the 
terms of reference.103 Furthermore, despite objections from Lebanon and Syria, the Guatemalan 
representative succeeded with assistance from Australia and South Africa to gain support for 
an expansion of the geographical scope of UNSCOP’s investigation. This scope was enlarged 
from merely “Palestine” to “Palestine and wherever it may deem useful” [emphasis added].104 
As stated by the Guatemalan representative, this was done with the specific purpose of 
empowering the committee to “obtain official knowledge of the wishes of the Jews in the 
European camps” regarding their possible future settlement in Palestine.105 Finally, various 
attempts to ensure UNSCOP’s terms of reference included “a proposal on the question of 
establishing without delay the independent democratic State of Palestine” were repeatedly 
defeated by the western European and settler-colonial bloc of states.106 In the end, UNSCOP’s 
final terms of reference were set out in General Assembly resolution 106 (S-1) of 15 May 1947, 
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mandating it to prepare “a report on the question of Palestine” and granting it “the widest 
powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the 
problem of Palestine.” To that end, UNSCOP was empowered to “conduct investigations in 
Palestine and wherever it may deem useful,” and to “receive and examine evidence” from “the 
mandatory Power, from representatives of the population of Palestine, from Governments and 
from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary”.107 No reference was made 
to Palestine’s independence, the UN Charter, or the League of Nations Covenant. 
 
Given UNSCOP’s wide mandate, Arab fears that Palestinian independence in line with 
the freely expressed wishes of its inhabitants, immediate or delayed, was being sacrificed for 
the broader political goals of partitioning the country do not seem to have been taken seriously 
by the Assembly. Indeed, the Dominican and Brazilian representatives each attempted to allay 
such concerns by suggesting that failure to mention independence in the terms of reference, for 
instance, would not necessarily exclude independence from being considered.108 These efforts 
were in vain. As pointed out by the Lebanese delegate – and as would later be testified to 
UNSCOP by Jewish Agency Chairman, David Ben Gurion109 – the Zionists had been open in 
their opposition “to the independence of Palestine until the Jews form a majority there. […] 
Consequently, this apparent shyness of the term ‘independence for Palestine’ on the part of 
many, when considered in conjunction with the declared and avowed intentions of the Jewish 
Agency, is exceedingly disquieting. […] The word ‘independence’ already exists in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, on which the mandate was based, and therefore, obviously, 
it is not the act of using an already used term which prejudges the issue, but precisely the act of 
omitting to use a term which was already in use thirty years ago” which does.110 Similar 
concerns were repeatedly and expressly articulated by each of the Egyptian,111 Iraqi112 and  
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spirit of the request of the of the British government as embodied in its letter of appeal to the United Nations for a 
settlement of this problem”; “the First Committee has exceeded its powers and was not within it rights when it 
decided to delete the sentence referring to ‘the future government of Palestine’ and replaced it by a vague and 
broad reference to ‘the question of Palestine’.”). 
112 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess, Vol. I, 77th Plen. Mtg. at 125-126, A/C.1/136, 14 May 1947 (“The First Committee, 
however, after three days of discussion and after drafting six alternative texts containing the term ‘independence’, 
has, by a magic move, deleted the word ‘independence’ from the terms of reference. […] The terms of reference 
have actually avoided ideas and concepts like freedom, independence, self-determination, democracy, the Charter, 
unity, harmony, peace and justice. The situation is strange not because these words are not included – and they are 
conspicuous by their absence – but because of the firmness of the opposition from certain quarters to the inclusion 
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Syrian113 delegations, again to no avail. The Lebanese delegate summed it up succinctly before 
the General Assembly on 13 May 1947:  
 
The ground of this concern is the fact that not only has any mention of independence for Palestine been 
severely suppressed from the terms of reference, but also, the basis on which this extraordinary session of 
the General Assembly was convened in the first place has finally shifted, in the course of the last two weeks 
from preparing to advise the United Kingdom Government on the future government of Palestine to 
preparing for the consideration of the so-called problem of Palestine in general, a phrase which by its very 
generality may mean anything and which is therefore unacceptable.”114 
 
And then again on 14 May 1947: 
 
“The phrase ‘future government of Palestine’ has now completely vanished. In its place we have the phrase 
‘the problem or question of Palestine’. This replacement has taken place without any previous adequate 
discussion of this problem, without even any proper indication as to what it really is. […] For instance, it 
has been taken for granted by many quarters that the problem of the [Jewish] refugees and displaced persons 
[of WWII] is somehow related to the problem of Palestine. The Jewish Agency affirmed that the two 
problems were one and the same, and the introduction of the phrase, ‘and wherever it may deem useful [in 
the terms of reference] was expressly intended by those who introduced and supported it to enable the 
committee to visit displaced persons’ camps and thus bring about a connexion, however strained and 
artificial, between these two problems.”115 
 
The chief concern of the Arab states, therefore, was that the General Assembly was 
furnishing UNSCOP with terms of reference that were biased in favour of what its majority 
European and settler-colonial bloc wished to impose on the natives of Palestine; namely the 
establishment of a Jewish state in their country and at their expense, in contravention of what 
prevailing international law required. This seems to have been a reasonable concern to have 
had at the time. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Danish delegate, in his capacity as 
Rapporteur of the First Committee, urged members of the committee to consider the “problem 
of Palestine” as “not a purely legal problem”.116 More to the point, after extensively recounting 
the devastation of the Holocaust on the Jews of Europe, the Soviet delegate stated: 
 
“As we know, the aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people are linked with the problem of 
Palestine and of its future administration. […] The time has come to help these people, not by word, but by 
deeds. It is essential to show concern for the urgent needs of a people which has undergone such great 
                                                 
of such words for fear of prejudicing the issue. As if the demand to investigate any people’s right to freedom and 
independence were an indication of partiality!”). 
113 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess, Vol. I, 78th Plen. Mtg. at 142, A/C.1/136, 14 May 1947 (“We have voted against the 
terms of reference of the special committee because no mention was made in the terms of reference to the word 
‘independence’. I am sorry some of the speakers in the [First] Committee avoided the word ‘independence’ as if 
it were something injurious or as if it were out of order, claiming that it would prejudge the action of the special 
committee. We said that it would not prejudge action. This is the essential and sole object of the mandate, that it 
be ended by independence, and by the termination of an unworkable mandate. It is the general principle of all 
mandates and trusteeships, that the end in view be independence. It is in the Charter and the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. Should we not then instruct the special committee to direct its studies toward realizing this 
end, which is the essential end? Would that be prejudging? I cannot see any way in which that would be prejudging. 
We ask that the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations be the basis for any solution to be found for Palestine, and nothing else”). 
114 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Vol. III, 57th Mtg. at 359, A/C.1/136, 13 May 1947.  
115 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess, Vol. I, 78th Plen. Mtg. at 155-156, A/C.1/136, 14 May 1947. 
116 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess, Vol. I, 77th Plen. Mtg. at 125, A/C.1/136, 14 May 1947. 
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suffering as a result of the war brought about by hitlerite Germany. This is a duty of the United Nations. 
[…] The fact that no western European State has been able to ensure the defence of the elementary rights 
of the Jewish people, and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners, explains the 
aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration 
and to deny the right of the Jewish people, to realize this aspiration. It would be unjustifiable to deny this 
right to the Jewish people, particularly in view of all it has undergone during the Second World War. 
Consequently, the study of this aspect of the problem and the preparation of relevant proposals must 
constitute an important task of the special committee.”117  
 
When UNSCOP issued its report, although it noted that “any solution for Palestine cannot 
be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general,”118 this didn’t mean that Palestine 
wasn’t to feature as a prominent part of a solution for the Jewish problem. Thus, when 
UNSCOP’s report was put before the ad hoc committee of the General Assembly just before 
the adoption of resolution 181(II), similar views as those expressed by the Soviet delegate above 
were expressed by the Netherlands, 119  Norway, 120  and Poland. 121  The Uruguayan delegate 
summed things up by stating that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would 
represent “a complete plan for a territorial solution of the Jewish problem.”122  
 
Thus, the desire to resolve Europe’s Jewish question took precedence in the minds of key 
members of the hegemonic European and settler-colonial bloc of states over the requirements 
of international law and the rights of the subaltern Palestinian Arabs thereunder. The concerns 
of bias of UNSCOP’s composition and terms of reference are certainly vindicated by the record. 
To be sure, concern for the Jewish refugees and of the historic injustice faced by European 
Jewry was shared by a number of the Asian and Middle Eastern States.123  Indeed, as a matter 
                                                 
117 Id., 131-132. 
118 UNSCOP Report, Vol. I, 89. 
119 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 19th Mtg. at 129, 21 October 1947 (“It was abundantly clear that there was a very close 
link between the solution of the Palestine problem and of the Jewish refugee problem”). 
120 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 16th Mtg. at 108, 16 October 1947 (“The delegation of Norway in a spirit of complete 
impartiality and of equal amity for the two peoples, had finally decided to vote for the majority plan [i.e. to partition 
Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish State]…because of the wrongs which the Jews had suffered at the hands 
of mankind.”). 
121 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 8th Mtg. at 42, 8 October 1947 (“…the problem of the distressed European Jews [needs 
to] be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency. The Polish delegation considered, however, that the problem 
could and ought to be solved primarily by Jewish immigration into Palestine”). 
122 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 6th Mtg. at 31, 6 October 1947. 
123 See Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 
November 1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 7th Mtg. at 36-37, 7 October 1947, where the Pakistani representative stated 
that “[t]he outbreak of anti-Semitism in Europe had introduced complications into the Palestinian question. The 
Pakistan delegation had every sympathy with those sufferings, but considered that the problem was one of 
humanitarian concern which should not affect the rights of the peoples of Palestine wand which should be dealt 
with as an international problem. With regard to the relief for the persecuted Jews, Palestine had done more than 
its share in settling more than 500,000 Jews in that country. […] [The Pakistani delegate] acknowledged the 
urgency of the matter, but considered that those displaced persons should be absorbed in other States where there 
was already a prosperous and appreciable Jewish population rather than wait for admission to Palestine.” 
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of empirical fact Palestine itself had done more than its fair share in serving as a refuge for 
hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Europe,124 while many western states refused 
to open their doors in any remotely comparable way.125 But because these non-European states 
had nothing to do with the persecution of European Jews, any talk of using the UN to partition 
Palestine in order to resolve Europe’s Jewish question contrary to prevailing international law 
– a result enabled by the bias inherent in UNSCOP’s composition and terms of reference – was 
proof of a lingering imperialism in the new world order and, alas, the international rule by law 
written into resolution 181(II) and the ILS it affirmed for the Arabs of Palestine. As the 
representative of Yemen succinctly submitted to the General Assembly: “If Jews were 
persecuted in Europe what have the people of Palestine to do with that?”126  
 
4.2  UNSCOP’s Unwillingness to Sufficiently Engage Palestinian Arab Opinion 
 
A second factor that informed the rule by law character of resolution 181(II) was 
UNSCOP’s unwillingness to sufficiently engage the opinion of the Palestinian Arab leadership 
during its deliberations. At first glance, this may appear to be a contentious claim given that the 
Arab Higher Committee for Palestine (AHC) took a specific decision to boycott UNSCOP. That 
decision, however, was motivated by an understandable and widely known frustration with the 
British and League of Nations role in constructing Palestine’s ILS in the interwar period, 
although not articulated in those terms. As the AHC representative to the ad hoc committee 
explained:  
                                                 
124 Id. See also UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 126th Plen. Mtg. at 1368, A/PV.126, 28 November 1947, where Sir Zafrullah 
Khan (Pakistan) stated: “What has Palestine done? What is its contribution toward the solution of the humanitarian 
question as it affects Jewish refugees and displaced persons? Since the end of the First World War, Palestine has 
taken over four hundred thousand Jewish immigrants. Since the start of the Jewish persecution in Nazi Germany, 
Palestine has taken almost three hundred thousand Jewish refugees. This does not include illegal immigrants who 
could not be counted. One has observed that those who talk of humanitarian principles, and can afford to do most, 
have done the least at their own expense to alleviate this problem. But they are ready – indeed, they are anxious – 
to be most generous at the expense of the Arab.” 
125 See Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 
November 1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 15th Mtg. at 94, 16 October 1947, where the Saudi representative stated that 
“[t]he intervention of the United States and its support of the Zionists was incomprehensible, especially since it 
would not open its own doors to the destitute refugees”, and Jewish “suffering should not be used as a weapon for 
encroaching on the rights of others. If the gates of the world had not been closed to the Jews, they would have 
been able to find shelter away from Europe.” 
126 UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 124th Plen. Mtg. at 1316, A/PV.124, 26 November 1947. See also, Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 1947, UN GAOR, 2nd 
Sess, 18th Mtg. at 120, 18 October 1947, where a representative of the Arab Higher Committee stated: “Nations 
which had initiated or permitted anti-Semitism had no right to ask tiny Arab Palestine to pay by the loss of its 
rights for the mistakes of others;” and UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 126th Plen. Mtg. at 1385, A/PV.126, 28 November 
1947, where Ernesto Dihigo (Cuba) stated: “With regard to the Jewish or non-Jewish refugees now in camps for 
displaced persons, a problem on which so much emphasis has been laid by those in favour of partition…it should 
be solved by good will on the part of all United Nations, each of which should receive a proportion of refugees in 
accordance with its ability to do so and in the particular conditions in each country. But we do not see why Palestine 
should be expected to solve the whole problem alone, especially as that country had no hand in determining the 
circumstances which originally caused the displacement of all these persons.” 
Chapter 3 – 1947 UN Plan of Partition 
 72 
 
“The Arabs of Palestine could not understand why their right to live in freedom and peace, and to develop 
their country in accordance with their traditions, should be questioned and constantly submitted to 
investigation. […] The rights and patrimony of the Arabs in Palestine had been the subject of no less than 
eighteen investigations within twenty-five years, and all to no purpose. Such commissions of inquiry had 
made recommendations that had either reduced the national and legal rights of the Palestine Arabs or 
glossed over them. The few recommendations favourable to the Arabs had been ignored by the Mandatory 
Power. It was hardly strange, therefore, that they should have been unwilling to take part in a nineteenth 
investigation.”127 
 
Be that as it may, the literature tends to treat the boycott and its negative consequences as an 
instance of “exceedingly inept diplomacy” 128  on the part of the Palestinian Arabs. This 
blaming-the-victim approach apportions any negative consequences wholly, if impliedly, on 
the subaltern class.129 It is likely because of this that little attention has been paid to the role 
UNSCOP may have had in neglecting to engage the understandably skeptical Arab leadership 
of Palestine. In a Wheatonian sense, UNSCOP’s attitude towards engaging the Palestinian 
leadership in this episode is reminiscent of the denial of international legal standing afforded 
the non-European thorough the operation of the standard of civilization in the classical era of 
the discipline. 
 
It is axiomatic that the work of high-stakes UN diplomacy requires a great deal of 
flexibility, creativity, tenacity and patience, all underscored with a belief in the universal 
vocation of the mandate of the Organization. These traits are the lifeblood of the UN which, in 
the words of Trygve Lie, first Secretary-General (1946-1952), “is dedicated to encouraging and 
facilitating effective cooperation in matters of mutual interest and to the peaceful adjustment of 
international differences”.130 It is surprising to find, therefore, that the record reveals a relative 
indifference, even nonchalance, of UNSCOP toward the boycott of the AHC. UNSCOP cannot 
reasonably be blamed for the AHC’s initial boycott decision. But questions arise in respect of 
its conspicuous unwillingness, in response, to sufficiently encourage or facilitate the AHC’s 
engagement in what appears to have been an abandonment of the usual tools of diplomacy. This 
is particularly so, given that at least five members of UNSCOP were leading judges or lawyers 
in their countries. They would therefore have been well versed in the need to ensure objectivity 
and fairness in their fact-finding mission, both in real terms and as a matter of public 
perception.131  
                                                 
127 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 3rd Mtg. at 6, 29 September 1947. 
128 E.g., Smith (1992), 135.  
129 E.g., Strawson (2010), 114; Kattan (2009), 147, 159.    
130 Lie (1954), 422. 
131 Emil Sandstrom, Chair (Sweden) was Chief Justice of Sweden, Ivan Rand (Canada) was a sitting justice of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Sir Abdur Rahman (India) was a judge in India, Nasrollah Entezam (Iran) was trained 
in law at the Sorbonne, and Jose Brilej (Yugoslavia) was a judge in Yugoslavia. See also UNSCOP, Summary 
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The neglect of the AHC in this respect actually began on 5 May 1947, when a plenary 
session of the General Assembly discussed the question of who its First Committee should hear 
from when considering UNSCOP’s composition and terms of reference. The Assembly had 
received requests to be heard from a number of Zionist non-governmental organizations, 
foremost of which was the Jewish Agency who indicted that if the Arab States were afforded 
the right to address the Assembly it should be able to as well. 132 In response, the Syrian 
representative indicated that the Palestinian Arabs were represented by the AHC and not by any 
Arab state. 133  Notwithstanding, the Assembly passed a resolution resolving that the First 
Committee shall hear only from the Jewish Agency, in addition to passing on to the First 
Committee, for its own decision, communications the Assembly had received from other NGOs 
who wished to be heard.134 It was only after several delegations pointed out that the AHC was 
not explicitly mentioned in the above noted resolution of the Assembly, that the First 
Committee took a decision the next day to expressly invite the AHC to participate.135 Thus, 
while the AHC was invited to be heard by the First Committee, the afterthought-like manner in 
which it happened – privileging European voices over non-European ones – set the stage for 
the attitude UNSCOP itself would later adopt. 
 
UNSCOP’s mission lasted from 26 May to 31 August 1947, a total of fourteen weeks. 
Even before committee members arrived in Palestine on 14 June 1947, the committee adopted 
a practice of receiving information from the Jewish Agency,136 as well as providing it with all 
UNSCOP documentation not classified as secret.137 At UNSCOP’s fifth meeting on 16 June, 
the committee was informed by cablegram from the Secretary-General that the AHC had 
decided to boycott UNSCOP.138  The summary record of that meeting indicates that upon 
receiving this news UNSCOP chairman, Justice Emil Sandstrom of Sweden, confined his 
response to simply expressing “the hope that contact might be made at a later date with Arab 
representatives,” without stipulating when, how or with whom such contact might be made.139 
                                                 
Record of the Second Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/PV.2, 2 June 1947, where Brilej stated that the Committee’s 
choice of a chairman must reflect “the greatest possible measure of impartiality”, and Rand stated “I am quite sure 
that we need as a Chairman someone who has had considerable experience in judicial administration”. 
132 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Vol. III, Annex 2, at 363, Letter dated 22 April 1947 from the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, A/C.1/139. 
133 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Vol. I, 75th Plen. Mtg. at 104, 5 May 1947. 
134 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Vol. I, 75th Plen. Mtg. at 114-115, 5 May 1947. 
135 UN GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Vol. III, 47th Mtg. at 78, Annex 6 at 367 A/C.1/151, 7 May 1947. 
136 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.4, 6 June 1947. 
137 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.7, 17 June 1947. 
138 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.5, 16 June 1947. 
139 Id.  
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In the meantime, Sandstrom satisfied himself by delivering a radio broadcast later that 
afternoon in English ostensibly informing the Palestinian public of UNSCOP’s mission, 
affirming its impartiality, and indicating that it “hopes for the full co-operation in its task from 
all elements in the population.” 140  The following day, at UNSCOP’s seventh meeting, an 
impassioned appeal was made by Jose Brilej, the Yugoslav representative, that UNSCOP 
address the AHC directly. Yet, the committee not only voted it down but it also approvingly 
voted “to defer further action for the time being” on the point.141  
 
In the meantime, UNSCOP continued its public hearings and investigation. Its itinerary 
was set on the basis of input invited only from the Jewish Agency and the British mandatory 
Government of Palestine. 142  It wasn’t until UNSCOP’s twenty-second and twenty-third 
meetings on 8 July 1947 – six weeks from the start of its work, three weeks since arriving in 
Palestine and one and a half weeks before departing Palestine – that UNSCOP took a decision 
to pen a letter to the AHC in an attempt to convince it to reverse its position on the boycott.143 
But the summary and verbatim records of UNSCOP’s private meetings leading up to that point 
indicate that even that decision hadn’t come as self-evident. In its twelfth meeting on 22 June 
1947, after extensively discussing a number of communications it received from jailed Jewish 
underground fighters seeking clemency through UNSCOP’s intervention with the Government, 
the Indian representative, Sir Abdur Rahman, expressed astonishment. He could not understand 
why the committee was entertaining such tangential requests from the Zionist side when it 
hadn’t even reached out to the AHC on the principal issues it was sent to Palestine to 
investigate.144 Likewise, at UNSCOP’s eighteenth meeting on 6 July 1947, an attempt by the 
Yugoslav representative to get the committee to re-open the question of AHC engagement that 
he raised at the seventh meeting was simply ignored.145 Finally, at the twentieth meeting on 7 
July 1947, although the Uruguayan representative, Enrique Rodriguez Fabrigat, expressed 
disappointment that “we will not be able to hear any testimony from the Arab side”, he failed 
to take up the Yugoslav representative’s repeated initiatives or suggest any other way of 
constructively dealing with the matter.146  
 
                                                 
140 UNSCOP Report, Vol. II, 5. 
141 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.7, 17 June 1947. 
142 UNSCOP Report, Vol. II, 4-5. 
143 Id.  
144 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Eleventh Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.11, 22 June 1947. 
145 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Eighteenth Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.18, 6 July 1947. 
146 UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting (Private), A/AC.13/SR.20, 7 July 1947. 
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In the event, the AHC maintained the boycott for the reasons set out above. 
Notwithstanding UNSCOP’s apparent apathy on the boycott, the hegemonic Eurocentric 
character of its approach was revealed subsequently. This was found in the manner in which 
the AHC was publicly singled out and lambasted in the debates before the ad hoc committee 
and plenary sessions of the General Assembly following the issuance of UNSCOP’s report. 
This was done by certain members of UNSCOP who, now sitting before the Assembly as 
representatives of their individual countries, shed all pretense of impartiality and took positions 
that clearly contradicted UNSCOP’s own documentary record. For instance, the Czech 
representative, Karel Lisicky, assailed “the uncompromising stand” of the AHC. 147  When 
UNSCOP was criticized for failing to bring the parties together, Lisicky curiously asserted that 
UNSCOP “had made every effort, in vain, both to secure a modification” of the AHC’s “attitude 
and to induce local Arab representatives to enter into political discussion of the Arab case.”148 
Even more revealing was the intervention of the Guatemalan representative, Jorge Garcia 
Granados. His statement to the plenary session of the Assembly was as revisionist as it was 
racist and colonial:  
 
“Our Chairman and the Committee as a whole sought many times to bring about a settlement between the 
Arabs and the Jews. Our efforts were frustrated by the intransigent attitude of the Arab Higher Committee, 
which would not give a hearing even to Judge Sandstrom, and which ordered all its affiliated organizations 
to refuse to collaborate with the Committee and to threaten and intimidate all Arabs who seemed to favour 
conciliation. Nothing daunted, UNSCOP made every possible approach to the Arabs, visiting their towns 
and villages and taking no notice of the hostile reception. Our representatives never failed to hold out the 
hand of friendship; but in vain, for no Arab would grasp it. […] Years of propaganda have filled the simple 
hearts of the Arabs with a rancor which makes all efforts at conciliation and the establishment of friendly 
relations seem useless today. […] [T]he creation of a Jewish State is a reparation owed by humanity to an 
innocent and defenseless people which has suffered humiliation and martyrdom for two thousand years. 
The Palestine Arabs must know that we who vote in favour of this resolution have no desire to harm their 
interests, and that the intransigent attitude of their leaders is the only obstacle to the attainment of liberty 
by both peoples and to the forging of ties of brotherhood between them” [emphasis added].149 
 
In short, whatever one’s views on the rationale and efficacy of the AHC’s decision to 
boycott UNSCOP, there is no escaping the fact that the verbatim and summary records of 
UNSCOP’s deliberations, as well as the subsequent General Assembly debates, reveal a level 
of apathy and disinterest in securing a reversal of this position surprisingly uncharacteristic of 
the modus operandi of UN diplomacy and investigation. Although testimony was eventually 
provided to UNSCOP by some Arab states toward the end of the mission,150 the committee 
                                                 
147 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 5th Mtg. at 19, 3 October 1947. 
148 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings 25 September – 25 November 
1947, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess, 15th Mtg. at 105-106, 16 October 1947. 
149 UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 126th Plen. Mtg. at 1380-1381, A/PV.126, 28 November 1947. 
150 At its 23rd meeting on 8 July 1947, UNSCOP took a decision for the first time to invite representatives of the 
Arab States to give evidence to it. UNSCOP, Summary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting (Private), 
A/AC.13/SR.23, 8 July 1947. 
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knew that these states did not represent the Palestinian Arab position as such. As noted by 
Quigley, there is little question that “[t]he scant participation on the Arab side left the Jewish 
Agency with a great advantage.”151 But to blame the Palestinian Arab leadership alone for this 
result, as some UNSCOP members subsequently did, is unfair if not disingenuous. On the 
contrary, UNSCOP’s unwillingness to actively ensure what was a central aspect of its mandate 
– i.e. to obtain direct evidence from both principal protagonists in Palestine – stands out as a 
product of the hegemonic and Eurocentric worldview of the majority of its membership. This 
ultimately enabled the violation of international law embodied in UNSCOP’s plan of partition, 
which in turn contributed to the rule by law character of resolution 181(II). 
 
4.3  UNSCOP’s Contempt for Democratic Government and the Empirical Reality of the 
Indigenous Arab Population  
 
A third factor that ran throughout UNSCOP’s work, and which heavily influenced the 
international rule by law nature of resolution 181(II) and the ILS condition it reified, was the 
general contempt held by UNSCOP’s majority for democratic government as it applied to the 
non-European population of the country and, concomitantly, the empirical reality of the 
indigenous Palestinian Arab population. This too is reminiscent of a classical Wheatonian 
disregard for non-European rights and standing in the 19th century and the extent to which 
similar values continued to prevail in the UN system. An examination of UNSCOP’s verbatim 
and summary records demonstrates that it claimed that its work was directed toward democratic 
ends through the establishment of two self-determination units in Palestine. Both of these states 
would be required to commit to democratic principles, including the protection of minorities 
within their territorial borders. Nevertheless, UNSCOP could only paradoxically arrive at this 
result by violating the democratic right of the indigenous majority to freely determine the whole 
of the territory’s fate as dictated by prevailing international law on class A mandates. The 
ostensibly liberal, rights-based order heralded by the UN meant that UNSCOP needed to find 
a clever way around the Palestinian Arab majority as a condition precedent to partition. A 
review of the diplomatic record demonstrates that among the arguments used to justify the 
legitimacy of partition, most were fraught with a curiously strained logic, at times accompanied 
by openly racist views, regarding the indigenous majority population and its right to self-
determination. Upon close examination, what they all shared was a general failure to take the 
very presence of the native Palestinian Arabs and their international legal rights seriously, an 
outgrowth of the continued imperial Eurocentricity of the international order at the UN. 
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On 8 July 1947, the Jewish Agency leadership gave evidence before UNSCOP. It was 
made apparent that the Zionists regarded the Jewish national home as equivalent to a Jewish 
state. The Zionists further clarified that such a state, although the right of the Jewish people, 
could not be established until the Jews were in a demographic majority in Palestine.152 When 
pressed on the seeming incongruence of the Zionists’ recognition of the principle of self-
determination of peoples, and their request that its exercise be delayed in the case of Palestine 
until such time as the Jews were in the majority, David Ben Gurion (who would become Israel’s 
first Prime Minister) offered the following cyclical reasoning, citing a purported “overriding 
right” of his constituents:  
 
“There are certain rights of self-determination, and when I say the right of the Jew to come back to his 
country [i.e. Palestine] and the right of our people to be here as equal partners in the world family, it is an 
over-riding right which applies to Palestine, and therefore no regime – not only an Arab State, should be 
created, even no trusteeship, no mandate should be created – which will make that right impossible of 
realization. This is why we oppose it [i.e. immediate application of self-determination in Palestine]… [i]t 
can be safeguarded only if there is independence and the Jews are in the majority.”153  
 
In its report to the General Assembly, this purported conundrum presented by Palestinian 
demography was well recognized, but surprisingly unquestioned, by UNSCOP. For instance, 
in its consideration of the issue of Palestinian self-determination and independence in a unitary 
democratic state, UNSCOP stated:  
“With regard to the principle of self-determination, although international recognition was extended to this 
principle at the end of the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, 
at the time of the creation of the ‘A’ Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the 
intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said 
that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle.”154 
 
Instead of taking issue with the sui generis nature of the mandate and its presumptive violation 
of the Charter principle of self-determination of peoples, as the liberal rights-based ethos of the 
day would require, UNSCOP adopted an approach evocative of the erasure of non-European 
legal subjectivity of the past. Thus, in considering how to reconcile the development of self-
governing institutions under the mandate regime with the demands of the Jewish national 
movement for a state, UNSCOP noted: 
 
“…if the country were to be placed under such political conditions as would secure the development of 
self-governing institutions, these same conditions would in fact destroy the Jewish National Home. […] 
Had self-governing institutions been created, the majority in the country, who never willingly accepted 
Jewish immigration, would in all probability have made its continuance impossible, causing thereby the 
negation of the Jewish National Home.”155  
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This recognition of the inimical nature of the mandate’s privileging of the rights of a European 
settler minority in Palestine over the development of self-governing institutions for the whole 
of its population in line with the sacred trust owed under the League of Nations Covenant and 
the principle of self-determination of peoples outlined in the Charter could not have been 
clearer. As an organ of the UN, duty bound to uphold the international rule of law, one would 
have expected this to give UNSCOP some pause. Instead, UNSCOP effectively adopted a 
position that maintained the international rule by law inherent in the mandate’s negation of the 
rights and presence of the Arab majority and the principle of consent of the governed. For 
instance, although UNSCOP understood the Arab position to be one of establishing a unitary 
democratic state based on proportional representation156 – the gold standard of democracy by 
any measure at the time – it curiously rejected this position as “extreme” because it would have 
left the Arabs substantially in control of the country.157 To be sure, UNSCOP also characterized 
full Jewish control over Palestine as “extreme”, but that would have been reasonable given the 
Jewish community’s status as a settler minority in the country. In drawing this false equivalence 
between majority indigenous rule and minority European settler rule, UNSCOP was effectively 
expressing its contempt for democratic government and in a manner consistent with the 
ostensibly antiquated international legal standard of civilization. 
 
This contempt was maintained in UNSCOP’s majority plan of partition. Whereas the 
Zionists’ way around the “problem” of Palestinian demography was to advocate for a delay of 
the application of the principle of self-determination until they surpassed their number, 
UNSCOP’s method was to advocate for its immediate application, but only through the creation 
of two racially gerrymandered states via partition. The first step in the process was to provide 
some legitimacy to the Zionist view that the right to a Jewish national home – which UNSCOP 
itself noted had already been declared established by the mandatory Power in 1939158 – was 
somehow equivalent to a right to a Jewish state. Accordingly, although it acknowledged that 
the notion of a “national home” had “no known legal connotation” under international law, and 
that both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine intentionally used “national 
home” in place of the less restrictive words “commonwealth” or “state”, UNSCOP curiously 
found that none of this “precluded the eventual creation of a Jewish state” in Palestine.159 The 
second step was to highlight the impediment posed in the way of the establishment of such a 
Jewish state by the fact that the Arabs were in a commanding majority of the population, that 
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they enjoyed a much higher birth rate and that the Jews therefore required immigration to offset 
this problem or otherwise accept partition to maintain what little majority they could achieve, 
if at all. UNSCOP wrote:  
 “…a Jewish State would have urgent need of Jewish immigrants in order to affect the present great numerical 
preponderance of Arabs over Jews in Palestine. The Jewish case frankly recognizes the difficulty involved in 
creating at the present time a Jewish State in all of Palestine in which Jews would, in fact, be only a minority, 
or in part of Palestine in which, at best, they would immediately have only a slight preponderance.”160 
 
Thus, stuck between the ‘extreme’ demands of the Arabs for a unitary democratic state based 
on proportional representation and recognition of Zionist independence in all of Palestine in 
which the Jews would be a minority, UNSCOP’s majority chose partition thereby violating the 
Charter and disenfranchising the indigenous population.161  
 
The reasoning offered in support of this decision highlights UNSCOP’s contempt for 
democratic government if the result of such democracy was to place government in non-
European hands. In noting that in the Jewish state envisioned under the majority plan “there 
will be a considerable minority of Arabs” – something UNSCOP tellingly identified as a 
“demerit” of the scheme – it reasoned that “such a minority is inevitable in any feasible plan 
which does not place the whole of Palestine under the present majority of the Arabs.”162 Further, 
UNSCOP appears to have remained oblivious to the paradox embedded in its unanimously 
endorsed recommendation VII, under which it affirmed the importance of “democratic 
principles and protection of minorities” in any plan the UN considered: 
 
“In view of the fact that independence is to be granted in Palestine on the recommendation and under the 
auspices of the United Nations, it is a proper and an important concern of the United Nations that the 
constitution or other fundamental law as well as the political structure of the new State or States shall be 
basically democratic, i.e., representative, in character, and that this shall be a prior condition to the grant of 
independence. In this regard, the constitution or other fundamental law of the new State or States shall 
include specific guarantees respecting…[f]ull protection for the rights and interests of minorities, 
including…full equality of all citizens with regard to political, civil and religious matters.”163 
In light of this recommendation, it is reasonable to conclude that UNSCOP’s majority accepted 
the fact that the only way it would be able to give effect to the emergence of two democratic 
states in Palestine was to negate the right of the indigenous majority of the whole of the country 
to those very same democratic rights ab initio and without its consent, in violation of prevailing 
international law. This says nothing of the fact that the population figures it used for the 
proposed Jewish state were subsequently determined to be incorrect by the findings of sub-
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committee 2 of the ad hoc committee, which determined that the Jews would, in fact, be in a 
minority in the Jewish State.164 Nor does it account for UNSCOP’s own admission that partition 
would not offer any great benefit to the proposed Arab State, the economic viability of which 
it openly admitted was “in doubt” from the start.165 Indeed, this viability was so concerning that 
the authors of the majority plan felt compelled to issue an appeal in the UNSCOP report that 
“sympathetic consideration should be given” to any claims the Arab state may make to the 
newly formed Bretton Woods institutions “in the way of loans for expansion of education, 
public health and other vital social services of a non-self-supporting nature.”166 Because no 
such appeal was felt required for the envisioned Jewish state, it is hard not to conclude this 
liberal concern for the economic wellbeing of the putative Arab state was feigned in light of the 
fact that it was UNSCOP itself who was the author of the plan that would render the Arabs 
vulnerable in the first place. 
 
Importantly, UNSCOP’s minority plan attempted to balance the competing interests more 
consistently with “democratic principles and protection of minorities” without the heavy hand 
of Eurocentricity animating it. This was in line with the relevant international law on self-
determination of peoples in class A mandates, rooted in the consent of the governed, and the 
overall international rule of law. It proposed the establishment of an independent unitary federal 
state of Palestine. This federation would be comprised of an Arab state and Jewish state based 
on a bicameral parliamentary system, with proportional representation the basis of one chamber 
and equal representation guaranteed in the other. The constitution of the proposed federal state 
would provide for a division of powers between the federal and state governments. Key 
positions in the executive and judicial branches would constitutionally be earmarked for 
members of both communities, with powers of local self-government in the hands of each state 
(e.g. education, health, local taxation, administration of justice, settlement etc.). Arabic and 
Hebrew would be the official languages of the country at both federal and state level, and 
minority rights would be constitutionally protected.167 In arriving at this plan, UNSCOP’s 
minority essentially deferred to the presence of Palestine’s indigenous majority as the 
controlling factor, but without sacrificing the Jewish national home. 168  Doubtless because 
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Palestine had nothing to do with Europe’s persecution of the Jews, UNSCOP’s minority also 
took a clear stand that separated the Jewish question from finding a resolution to the question 
of Palestine.169 In a separate note appended to UNSCOP’s report, Sir Abdur Rahman, the Indian 
representative, explained the approach that animated the minority report. His intervention 
highlighted the continued tension between the values of late-empire and those of the post-1945 
liberal age now before UNSCOP, and the justification of the minority plan in erring toward the 
latter: 
 
“According to the well-known international principle of self-determination, which is now universally 
recognized and forms a keystone of the Charter of the United Nations, the affairs of a country must be 
conducted in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants. In 1947, it is too late to look at 
the matter from any other angle. And thus looked at, the claim put forward by the Arabs is unanswerable 
and must be conceded, although it would be highly desirable – nay, almost impossible – to overlook 
important minorities, such as Jews in Palestine happen to be at present.”170 [emphasis added]  
 
With the minority plan having failed to gather enough support within the membership of 
UNSCOP, the majority plan of partition was the focus of debate in the ad hoc and plenary 
sessions of the General Assembly between 25 September and 29 November 1947. 
Unsurprisingly, those debates were also characterized by a strained logic among the largely 
European and settler-colonial bloc of states that supported partition. This was underscored by 
their obvious disregard for international law, democratic governance and the indigenous Arab 
majority, notwithstanding occasional pretentions to the contrary. The most eye-opening 
justification offered in support of partition came from none other than the Guatemalan 
representative, Mr. Garcia Granados, who it will be recalled was a member of UNSCOP. In 
response to the argument that Palestine’s Arab majority was entitled to have its freely expressed 
wishes accounted for, let alone deferred to, in any future government of Palestine in accordance 
with prevailing international law, Ambassador Garcia Granados demonstrated that the old 
standard of civilization – animating what he called “a certain order in the world” – continued 
to hold sway among some in the new UN system:  
 
“[W]hat characterized a nation was its culture and not the number of inhabitants. In twenty-five years, the 
Jewish people had left upon Palestine the indelible mark of an outstanding culture, which characterized the 
country even more than the Arab culture: Palestine was no more Arab than certain Spanish countries of 
Latin America were Indian. The Jews had come to Palestine on the strength of a promise. They had 
transformed the deserts, and their model farms compelled admiration not only for their productiveness but 
also for the democratic character of their social structure. […] [T]he Jews had made a pleasant and healthy 
country out of a land in which a sparse and rachitic population had merely vegetated. It was 
incomprehensible that the Arabs should adduce their numerical superiority as an argument when it was 
the Jews who had made the increase in the Arab population possible. […] Could anyone think of placing 
that flourishing community under the domination of another community, even a community of a comparable 
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standard of development? What would happen if the demands of the Arabs were yielded to and an 
independent State of Palestine were created? The Arab population with its simple religiousness and 
rudimentary political sense [would harm the Jews]. […] An ignorant majority should not be allowed to 
impose its will. […] There was a certain order in the world which helped to maintain the necessary 
equilibrium. If the United Nations wished to save that order it must consolidate it.”171 [emphasis added] 
 
While Garcia Granados seems to have parroted some of what the Jewish Agency had argued 
before the Assembly,172 not all delegations in favour of partition expressed their support for the 
plan in such openly racist terms. What is clear, however, is that they shared the same underlying 
assumptions rooted in the continued hegemonic/subaltern nature of the international system. 
This was expressed in the curious view that if the principle of self-determination was to be 
applied to Palestine, the exercise of such a right by the indigenous majority population had to 
impliedly be suppressed if it meant that the minority Jewish settler population would remain a 
minority. Predictably, the rhetorical moves employed to advance this position included 
exhortations to opt for (European) justice over law, and to treat the Jewish national home as 
tantamount to a Jewish state. In the end, however, the effect was to subvert the international 
rule of law based on the requirement to ensure respect for the consent of the governed in class 
A mandates and to impose an international rule by law on the non-Europeans of Palestine. 
 
Thus the Polish delegate indicated that while “a single bi-national state” in Palestine was 
desirable, “such a solution would be neither just nor appropriate” if it meant that the Arabs 
“would preponderate over a Jewish minority.”173 Likewise, the Chilean delegate noted that 
although the Arab case “was easily understandable and their argument was supported by 
unequivocal fact,” partition seemed the only way “to safeguard peace and justice” in “the 
absence of a solution acceptable to both parties.” 174  Echoing earlier exhortations of other 
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delegates,175 the Dominican representative urged that “the Palestine question could not be 
examined from an exclusively legal standpoint”, and that partition “most nearly accorded with 
justice” as it “left to the Arabs a country of their own, while endorsing the concept of the Jewish 
National Home by establishing a Jewish State in Palestine.”176 The Soviet delegate argued that 
partition “gave both the Arab and the Jewish people an opportunity to organize their national 
life as they desired”, because “[i]t was based on the principles of equality of peoples and the 
right of self-determination”, unlike the unitary state framework which allegedly “paid no regard 
to democratic principles.”177 Likewise, the Canadian delegate noted that the Arab case for a 
unitary democratic state was “otherwise unanswerable”, but for the fact of the Jewish national 
home policy embedded in the mandate.178  
 
Going through these and other similar statements given by the European and settler-
colonial bloc of states in the ad hoc and plenary records of the General Assembly, one is 
constantly confronted by their failure to take international law, democratic government, and the 
empirical reality of the Palestinian Arab population seriously. Instead, false equivalence 
abounds. Partition was presented to the Palestinian Arabs as a promising opportunity that was 
not to be missed. As it happens, other states – largely members of the Asian and Middle Eastern 
group – refused this approach and took the native population of Palestine seriously. They 
attempted to counter this Eurocentric international rule by law narrative with one of their own 
firmly rooted in prevailing international legal norms.  
 
One form of response was to question the logic of partition as an application of the self-
determination principle. As noted by the representative of Yemen “[s]ince the population of 
Palestine was predominately Arab, the only logical and just application of that principle was 
that Palestine should become an independent Arab State with full protection of the rights of 
Palestinian Jewish minorities. If it were conceded that the principle of self-determination could 
justify the grant of discriminatory and preferential privileges to a minority over the will of the 
majority, or the division of a country against the wishes of the majority, then the world would 
be overwhelmed with similar problems and chaos would prevail.”179 This view was shared by 
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the representative of Lebanon.180 He also queried how proponents of partition, who “admitted 
that the Arabs in Palestine were in a majority,” could nevertheless propose “that the Arabs 
should become a minority and the Jews a majority,” and expect that “that would constitute a 
peaceful solution.”181 The Cuban representative considered partition illegal and “unjust because 
it involves forcing the will of a minority upon an overwhelming majority, in contravention of 
one of the cardinal principles of democracy.”182 Unsurprisingly, the most direct of criticisms of 
the rule by law logic of partition-as-self-determination came from the representative of the 
AHC, Mr. Husseini, who pointedly noted: “After the Arabs had been deprived of self-
determination for a quarter of a century in order that a [European settler] minority might be 
artificially created” through the British Mandate, “what ground was there for asking that that 
artificial minority should have the right of self-determination” against the will of the majority 
of the population? In his view, “[i]f that request were granted, it would be a stain on the 
Charter.”183  
 
Another form of response was to question the logic of partition through the lens of double-
standards in application of the principle of self-determination. If the European Jewish settler 
minority possessed a right to self-determination justifying the partition of the country against 
the will of its majority, would the same principle be applicable to the Palestinian Arabs that 
would end up in the Jewish state, whether they were almost equal in number or in the majority? 
This slippery slope argument was expressed by the representatives of each of Lebanon, 184 
Pakistan,185 and Yemen.186 The issue of moral equivalence and justice was also spoken to. For 
instance, the Pakistani delegate stated that “[i]f it were considered unjust to place 600,000 Jews 
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in an Arab State, it was equally unjust to place 400,000 Arabs in the Jewish State set up by 
partition”.187 Elsewhere he demurred that partition was based on the assumption that “[t]he 
Jews are not to live as a minority under the Arabs, but the Arabs are to live as a minority under 
the Jews. If one of these is not fair then neither is the other.”188 The record demonstrates that, 
for the non-European states, the issue always came back to the preeminence of the principle of 
consent of the governed, in line with prevailing international law concerning class A mandates. 
Thus the Syrian representative affirmed “that self-determination could not be achieved in 
Palestine unless the inhabitants of the country were consulted.”189  The Pakistani delegate stated 
that “[i]n effect” the partition “proposal before the United Nations General Assembly says that 
we shall decide – not the people of Palestine, with no provision for self-determination, no 
provision for the consent of the governed – what type of independence Palestine shall have.”190 
Perhaps the Cuban delegate put it best when he stated that “[i]n fact the [partition] plan would 
mean deciding the fate of a nation without consulting it on the matter.” After indicating his 
view that partition would violate the Charter, he continued in a way that underscored the rule 
by law essence of what was being contemplated by the Assembly:  
 
“We [e.g. the UN] have solemnly proclaimed the principle of the self-determination of peoples, but we note 
with alarm that, when the moment comes to put it into practice, we forget it. This attitude seems to us highly 
dangerous. The Cuban delegation is firmly convinced that true peace and the international justice about 
which the great leaders of the Second World War spoke so often cannot be brought into being by setting 
forth certain fundamental principles in conventions and treaties, and then leaving them there as a dead letter; 
on the contrary, these ends can be attained only if all of us, great and small, weak and strong, are prepared 
to put our principles into practice when the occasion arises. Why was the democratic method of consulting 
all the people of Palestine not applied in this case? Is it because it was feared that the results of such a 
procedure would be contrary to what it was intended the outcome should be in any case? And, if that was 
so, where are the democratic principles which we are continuously invoking?”191 
 
In sum, the contempt displayed by UNSCOP’s majority report for democratic governance 
and international law is what led it to adopt a plan of partition for Palestine in furtherance of 
the rule by law ordering principle. The majority plan fashioned a proposal whose object and 
purpose was to circumvent the reality of the indigenous Arab population while paradoxically 
claiming that doing so was in complete conformity with the principle of self-determination as 
applicable to class A mandates under the Charter. The hegemonic/subaltern binary inherent in 
the work of UNSCOP was thus exposed, underscored by the geographical and philosophical 
split between its controlling European majority and its largely non-European minority. While 
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the former operated according to the values of the Eurocentric late-imperial global order, which 
privileged European interests over colonial ones, the latter remained consistent with the 
universal values of the ostensibly new liberal, rights-based global order. The result was a failure 
to take the indigenous population’s rights under the international rule of law seriously, thereby 
helping to reify their ILS condition in the new UN system.  
 
5. The Practical Consequences of the International Rule by Law: UNSCOP’s 
Cognitive Dissonance Regarding the Inevitability of Violence Befalling Palestine 
Following Partition 
Informed by the clash between hegemonic European and subaltern non-European 
worldviews and interests evident in the work of UNSCOP and subsequent General Assembly 
debates, it is clear how resolution 181(II) emerged as the lingering product of the interwar rule 
by law ethic inherited by the UN. But beyond its doctrinal and normative/discursive results 
under international law, did the resolution have any immediate tangible consequences on the 
subaltern Palestinians? Unfortunately for them, the short answer is yes.  
 
The practical consequences of resolution 181(II) are sometimes overlooked given that it 
was, in effect, stillborn. But it was precisely because the resolution’s terms were so repugnant 
to the liberal international legal order ostensibly prevailing and, by extension, the rights of 
Palestine’s Arab population, that it gave impetus for them to resist and fight if need be to block 
it, their general incapacity to do so notwithstanding.192 Viewed in the context of the preceding 
thirty years, during which time Palestine’s ILS had taken hold through the operation of the 
League of Nations, such Palestinian resolve was inevitable. The fact that the resolution was 
passed by a new international organization that, through its Charter, held itself out as 
embodying an end to empire and heralded self-determination of peoples as a new principle upon 
which friendly relations between sovereign equals was purportedly to be based, only made 
matters worse. It is no wonder, therefore, that on 1 December 1947, merely two days after the 
General Assembly’s passage of resolution 181(II), that the AHC leadership called a three-day 
general strike in Palestine. This gave rise to rioting and clashes between Arabs and Jews, 
ultimately setting off the 1948 war.193  
 
 The war lasted from December 1947 to July 1949 and was fought in two general phases. 
The first phase was a non-international armed conflict and lasted for six months. It was waged 
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between the European Zionist armed organizations – Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi – and loose 
bands of Palestinian Arab irregulars, supported by an Arab volunteer force, the so-called Arab 
Liberation Army. The protagonists were woefully mismatched, with the better-equipped Zionist 
forces numbering 50,000, mostly under a central command, against the ill-equipped and 
disunited Arab forces, who numbered less than 10,000.194 During this phase, approximately 
300,000 Palestinian Arabs from within the borders of the proposed Jewish State under the 
partition plan were forcibly expelled or took flight.195 The remainder of the war was fought on 
an inter-state basis following the intervention in Palestine of four Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Syria 
and Transjordan) on 15 May 1948, the day Israel proclaimed its statehood upon the departure 
of the British. During this phase, Israel expanded its territory to control some 78 percent of 
mandatory Palestine, well beyond the terms of the partition resolution. 196  Approximately 
400,000 more Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled during this phase.197 In response, the 
General Assembly passed resolution 194(III) on 11 December 1948, calling on Israel to 
repatriate the refugees “at the earliest practicable date”.198 Repatriation was barred, however, 
by a war-time decision of the Israeli cabinet in June 1948, and by the Zionists’ deliberate 
destruction of between 392 and 418 Palestinian villages from whence the majority of refugees 
hailed.199 Today, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) – a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly mandated 
to provide protection and assistance to those displaced in 1948200 – the Palestine refugees, 
including their descendants, number approximately 5.3 million persons and continue to remain 
in forced exile.201  
 
One might ask: what role UNSCOP in all of this? A review of the record indicates that 
UNSCOP’s deliberations were tainted by what can be regarded as a cognitive dissonance as to 
the inevitability of violence befalling Palestine following partition. To be sure, UNSCOP was 
aware of the fact that the mandate period was characterized by periodic outbreaks of low to 
medium-grade violence between all chief protagonists, Jews, Arabs and Britons. Indeed, 
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although historians have debated the reasons behind Britain’s choice to hand Palestine over to 
the UN, it is generally accepted that one principal factor to which UNSCOP was very much 
alive was the armed operations of the Zionist underground militias – Haganah, Irgun Zvai 
Leumi (Etzel or Irgun) and Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi or “Stern Gang”) – directed against 
the British in the years following WWII, and Whitehall’s concern of these operations 
developing into a full-scale clash.202  
 
Thus, the record does not suggest that UNSCOP and the General Assembly were 
oblivious to the possibility of violence occurring, per se. Rather it suggests an unwillingness to 
account for the possibility that any recommendation of partition would be followed by violence. 
Worse from the perspective of the subaltern, it suggests an unwillingness to account for the 
possibility that such violence would, for the most part, be directed against the unprotected Arab 
civilian population, and in a manner that would fundamentally alter the demographic and 
political status quo of the country. While there was no way UNSCOP and the General Assembly 
could have foretold the exact contours and scope of the seismic demographic shift that would 
mark the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 – what Israeli historian Ilan Pappe has called the ethnic 
cleansing of Palestine203 – there were certainly signposts available for it to have appreciated 
that the ultimate success of the Zionists in establishing a Jewish state in any partitioned area of 
the country would necessarily depend on that state having an unassailable Jewish majority. 
Given the almost 1:1 ratio of Jew to Arab in the proposed Jewish state projected by UNSCOP 
itself, and UNSCOP’s specific knowledge that the Zionists were prepared and able to use force 
to impose it on Palestine’s much weaker Arabs in the absence of British protection, it should 
have been apparent that the forcible removal of substantial portions of the indigenous Arab 
population would have been a possible result of any UN recommendation to partition the 
country.   
 
 This is something that UNSCOP intimated in its report to the Assembly. In its appraisal 
of the “Jewish case”, UNSCOP recounted that “[w]hen the Mandate was approved, all 
concerned were aware of the existence of an overwhelming Arab majority in Palestine”, and 
that “the King-Crane report, among others, had warned that the Zionist program could not be 
carried out except by force of arms”204 [emphasis added]. Despite concerted Zionist settlement 
during the mandate period, by 1947 the Palestinian Arabs were still very much the 
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overwhelming majority of the population and still refusing to acquiesce in the partition of their 
country. As a result, the fundamental calculus on the inevitability of violence being needed to 
give effect to Zionist aims could not have fundamentally changed. It was for these reasons that 
UNSCOP unequivocally affirmed that “the history of the last twenty-five years has established 
the fact that not only the creation of a Jewish State but even the continuation of the building of 
the Jewish National Home by restricted immigration could be implemented only by the use of 
some considerable force”205 [emphasis added].  
 
 As to the nature of this “considerable force”, the record indicates that UNSCOP was 
well aware of Zionist military capability and willingness to employ it if need be. When asked 
by UNSCOP on 7 July 1947 as to what the Jewish leadership would do in the event a UN 
recommendation to establish a Jewish state in Palestine was rejected by the Arabs, Ben Gurion 
replied in no uncertain terms: “First we will go to them and tell them, here is a decision in our 
favour. We are right. We want to sit down with you and settle the question amicably. If your 
answer is no, then we will use force against you” [emphasis added].206 After being questioned 
by UNSCOP chairman, Justice Sandstrom, as to the relationship between the Jewish Agency 
and the Haganah, Ben Gurion stated that the Haganah had been an organized underground 
armed Jewish force in Palestine “for at least the last forty years”, that he was formerly a member 
of it and that it would be happy to appear before UNSCOP, though in private given its status as 
an illegal organization.207 Subsequently, on 13 July 1947, Sandstrom and two members of the 
UNSCOP secretariat met privately with four Haganah leaders, including its chief of staff, 
Yisrael Galili. At that meeting, the Haganah expressed full confidence in its ability to manage 
local and international Arab force, including the ability to attack naval bases and airfields of 
neighbouring Arab states. According to Israeli historian, Elad Ben Dror, this meeting left 
Sandstrom with the “strong impression” that the Haganah, in addition to Etzel and Lehi, “would 
defeat the Arabs in the event of hostilities.”208 Most vitally, Sandstrom was convinced that if 
the UN voted for partition, the Jews could be relied upon to implement and impose it on the 
                                                 
205 Id. Neither was this a one-off acknowledgement, as UNSCOP elsewhere noted the inevitability of force being 
required to ensure Zionist aims if delayed independence pending the achievement of a Jewish majority was 
envisioned. It also assailed the “recurrent acts of violence, until very recently confined almost exclusively to 
underground Jewish organizations,” and indicated that such violence would render any decision arrived at by the 
UN difficult to implement. See id., 46. 
206 UNSCOP Report, Vol. III, 56. See also UNSCOP Report, Vol. IV, 37, where Judge Sandstrom stated to the 
Lebanese delegate testifying before UNSCOP on 23 July 1947 in Beirut, “[y]ou know as well as we do that certain 
disorders in Palestine now are caused by Jews and that the Jews have considerable underground forces, such as 
Haganah, and so on. Do you not think it would be necessary to have a rather strong police force to maintain order 
in that case?” 
207 Id., 68. 
208 Ben Dror (2013), 562. 
Chapter 3 – 1947 UN Plan of Partition 
 90 
Arabs in the Jewish State.209 In an indication of the Eurocentricity of the majority of UNSCOP’s 
orientation, it would appear that far from assessing the threat posed by the Zionist militias to 
the non-European indigenous population, Sandstrom was more concerned with whether the 
European settlers could impose themselves militarily. 
 
 Of course, the Zionists were not alone in issuing expressions of bellicosity. The 
verbatim and summary records of the UNSCOP hearings, as well as of the ad hoc and plenary 
debates of the General Assembly, demonstrate that the Arabs reserved their right to use force 
to protect against the dismemberment of Palestine.210 Despite these statements, however, the 
record suggests that UNSCOP understood that the Arabs were not capable of mounting any 
effective armed force in this regard and were, in any event, no match for the Zionists who were 
better armed and organized. This was made amply clear in the testimony given to UNSCOP by 
Sir Henry Gurney, Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, on 19 July 1947. According 
to him, the British were well aware that the Zionists were better armed and organized, they 
knew that “no Arab armed organization” existed in the country, and they were going out of 
their way prevent the establishment of such a force.211  
 
 The most crucial development in the record appears to have been the United Kingdom’s 
decision that it would refuse to enforce any UN recommendation on Palestine not agreed 
between the Jews and Arabs. Absent such agreement, the British would withdraw their troops 
and administration by 1 August 1948.212 In a sign that the values underpinning the liberal rights-
based order might prevail in the eleventh hour, this decision drew heavy criticism, including 
from members of the European and settler-colonial bloc of states. The Czech delegate indicated 
that this had “radically changed the background of the deliberations,” as the General Assembly 
would now “have to find the means of implementing” any solution it arrived at. 213  The 
American delegate derided the British for imposing “an impossible condition” of Jewish-Arab 
agreement, and therefore placing “upon the United Nations a very heavy moral 
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responsibility.”214 This was echoed by the Soviet representative, who accused the British of 
“burying” the Assembly’s recommendation before even taking it.215  Similar rebukes were 
issued by the Canadian, 216  New Zealand 217  and Swedish delegates, the latter of whom 
presciently noted that unless “a reasonable and realistic solution could be found” to the power 
vacuum the British would leave behind, “the possibility that had to be faced was a civil war 
between the two nascent states in Palestine, a situation which would gravely threaten peace and 
security in that part of the world.”218 Despite this apparent concern, however, in the end each 
of these states curiously voted in favour of partition rather than abstain or reject it. The cognitive 
dissonance involved in this respect was, once again, demonstrative of the general disregard for 
non-Europeans held within an Organization that remained fundamentally Eurocentric in its 
outlook. This was exhibited, for example by the Swedish delegate who informed the Assembly 
that although his “Government regrets to note that the method of enforcement” of the partition 
plan “does not appear to satisfy [the] essential condition” of being “practical” and “efficient”, 
Sweden would vote in favour of resolution 181(II) “since the efforts of the Assembly have not 
resulted in anything more perfect than the plan of partition.”219  
 
 Resolution 181(II) provided for the establishment of the UNPC which, as noted, was 
mandated to administer the transfer of power from Britain to the two proposed states during a 
transitional period to last until 1 October 1948. Under this scheme, the UNPC would, inter alia, 
exercise political and military control over the “armed militia” of each state with a view to 
maintaining public order. None of these plans came to fruition, however, given the predictable 
British refusal to allow the UNCP to enter Palestine until May 1948 (merely two weeks before 
its advanced departure date of 15 May) and, more generally, the Arab rejection of the partition 
plan – both of which factors were well known to the General Assembly while deliberating 
partition.220 Thus, attempts to create some form of UN-mandated force that would fill the 
vacuum left by the British were stymied from the start. This left a power imbalance in place in 
the country between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs.  
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 Thus, the record does not establish an awareness of UNSCOP or the General Assembly 
of the specific animus and plans Zionist forces had to expel the Palestinian Arabs from 
territories they would control in 1948; that would emerge later with the chronicling of the 1948 
war by Palestinian historians in the 1950’s and 1960’s, 221  subsequently and largely 
corroborated by Israel’s ‘new historians’ in the 1980’s.222 What it does establish, however, is 
the clear understanding UNSCOP had or ought to have had regarding the relative military 
capabilities of both sides, and the political imperatives underpinning their respective goals. For 
the stronger and better organized European Zionists, these goals were animated by a singular 
50-year effort to establish a Jewish state in a place in which, by all accounts, they were a decided 
demographic minority. It was well understood by the UN that for any Jewish state to 
materialize, the demographic balance had to be altered, including by force, if the opportunity 
arose. When one considers that the UN knew partition was anathema to the indigenous 
population, and that enforcement of partition was futile without British cooperation which was 
not forthcoming, the writing on the wall was clear for all to see. In this way, the illegality and 
rule by law character inherent in the terms of resolution 181(II) helped further the conditions 
that, in real terms, led to the consummation of what the Palestinian Arabs had feared most.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that the ILS condition derives its content, in part, from the 
structural Eurocentricity of international law and organization. To demonstrate this, it 
undertook a critical international legal analysis of the UN plan of partition of November 1947, 
and examined the effective travaux preparatoires of that plan as found in the UNSCOP records 
and report and animated in the General Assembly debates that followed. In 1945, the newly 
formed UN had a unique opportunity to prove its worth as an embodiment of a new liberal 
rights-based global order centered on the international rule of law following WWII. Instead, 
through the Assembly’s promulgation of resolution 181(II), the UN demonstrated that the old 
international rule by law order continued in fundamental respects, informed by the structural 
Eurocentricity of the order it inherited from the League of Nations. Although the passage of the 
resolution was procedurally valid, its terms were substantively illegal under the UN Charter for 
being in violation of the prevailing law and practice on self-determination of peoples in class 
A mandated territories. Because that law required the Assembly to defer to the freely expressed 
wishes of the people concerned, and because the indigenous non-European majority was against 
partition, there were only two courses of action open to the UN in Palestine in 1947: (1) 
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immediate independence in the whole of the country; or (2) conversion of it into a UN 
trusteeship.  
 
 In the event, territorial partition was the option recommended by an Assembly then 
dominated by hegemonic European states and their settler-colonial offshoots. Many of these 
states saw in the question of Palestine an opportunity to rectify Europe’s age-long Jewish 
question in the wake of the Holocaust thereby consummating the shift of the ILS condition from 
one group to another. Accordingly, the majority of UNSCOP and the Assembly chose to treat 
the acquired international legal rights of the Jewish people to a Jewish national home as 
equivalent to their right to a Jewish state at Palestine’s expense. A close examination of the 
UNSCOP records reveals at least three factors that undergirded its disregard for international 
law during the course of its work, and which influenced the General Assembly in attempting to 
facilitate the creation of this Jewish state through the passage of resolution 181(II). Between a 
Eurocentric bias in UNSCOP’s composition and terms of reference, its unwillingness to 
sufficiently engage the AHC, and it’s evident contempt for the application of democratic 
governance to the non-European people of Palestine, the institutional roots of the rule by law 
nature of resolution 181(II) were laid bare. To make matters worse, the record indicates that 
UNSCOP’s deliberations were tainted by what can be regarded as a cognitive dissonance as to 
the inevitability of violence befalling Palestine’s indigenous population following partition. 
 
 Resolution 181(II) effectively legislated into UN law the contingency and 
disenfranchisement of the Palestinian Arabs, thereby reifying Palestine’s ILS condition 
inherited from the interwar period. But there was a deeper twist. With partition, the international 
legal goalposts had now indelibly shifted. By virtue of events shaped by and within the UN, no 
longer would the subaltern Palestinians be able to claim sovereignty over the whole of their 
historical patrimony. From now on, any right to self-determination they would be allowed to 
legitimately assert within the UN system, if at all, would be confined to the truncated remnants 
of that patrimony. In today’s context, where the Palestinian people continue to struggle for 
universal recognition of their sovereign right to self-determination in the OPT, the two-state 
paradigm that resolution 181(II) set on course within the UN system has ironically become very 
important for the subaltern class, both politically and legally. Viewed in the context of 1947, 
however, the rule by law character of the partition resolution was something that confirmed 
Palestine’s subaltern status under international law and organization. As a demonstration of the 
ILS condition, it began a pattern within the UN system in which the promise of international 
law would be repeatedly proffered to the Palestinian people, but which would, in turn, 
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continually be withheld in some fashion or another. As will be demonstrated in the following 
chapters, overcoming this dilemma has been marked by a cruel paradox for the Palestinian 
people as an embodiment of the global subaltern; for they have at once had to become inured 
to the injustice of their contingent and qualified membership in the international legal order in 
order to find the space within which they may establish full and equal membership in that very 
same order.  
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MAP I 
 
Palestine, Plan of Partition with Economic Union Proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 
Map No. 103.1(b), United Nations, February 1956. Reproduced with permission of the United Nations.  
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MAP II 
Palestine, Distribution of Population by Sub-Districts with Percentages of Jews and Arabs (Estimated at 1946), 
Map No. 93, United Nations, November 1947. Reproduced with permission of the United Nations. 
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MAP III 
 
Palestine, Land Ownership by Sub-Districts (1945), Map No. 94(b), United Nations, August 1950. Reproduced 
with permission of the United Nations. 
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4 
 
1967 and After: The Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Maintenance 
of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity at the United Nations  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 This chapter addresses Palestine’s international legal subalternity (ILS) through the 
handling by the United Nations (UN) of the legal status of Israel’s prolonged military 
occupation of the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). The main claim is that the UN’s failure 
to consistently and clearly take a principled position on the very legality of Israel’s half-century 
‘temporary’ occupation of the OPT exposes a fundamental chasm in its position on the 
occupation demonstrative of the continuation of the international rule by law, under a different 
guise.  
 
 Central to this chapter is the cross-cutting theme of the structural limitations of Third 
World quasi-sovereignty in the post-decolonization era and its impact in the maintenance of the 
ILS condition in international law and organization. In contrast to the classical law governing 
conquest of territory during the age of empire, modern international law posits that occupation 
of enemy territory is meant to be temporary and that occupying powers may not rightfully claim 
sovereignty over foreign territory they occupy. Despite this, since 1967 Israel has 
systematically altered the status of the OPT with the aim of annexing, de jure or de facto, most 
or all of it to itself. In the intervening 50-year period, the Palestinian people have had their right 
to self-determination in the OPT recognized within a decolonized UN whose position has been 
held out to them as forming the only normative basis upon which the realization of this right is 
to be achieved. As part of this rights-based promise, the UN’s position on the OPT has been 
informed by the considerable documentation of a range of individual violations of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL) by the occupying power in furtherance 
of its purported rule of law ordering framework. Yet the Organization has paid scant attention 
to the legality of the occupation regime as a whole and the concomitant requirement that it be 
brought to an end unconditionally, in line with UN practice and the law governing state 
responsibility. Instead, emphasis has been placed on encouraging the parties to end the 
occupation through continued, though highly unbalanced and widely discredited, bilateral 
negotiations.  
 
Chapter 4 – 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 100 
 One consequence of this has been for the UN to have provided a measure of legitimacy 
to Israel’s occupation of the OPT at a time when the Third World membership of the 
Organization has been pivotal in developing a universally binding international legal 
proscription against all forms of alien domination, subjugation and exploitation, itself one of 
the bases upon which the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in the OPT rests. 
By choosing a humanitarian/managerial approach to assessing the legality of Israeli actions in 
the OPT, the constitutional propriety of its occupation regime has been taken as a given by the 
UN and has therefore been regarded intrinsically, if impliedly, to be legal. This chapter argues 
that through the UN’s failure to consistently and clearly identify Israel's prolonged occupation 
of the OPT as illegal owing to its structural violation of peremptory norms of international law, 
the UN’s position on the OPT runs counter to the conventional wisdom which has presented 
the re-emergence and relative gains made by the subaltern Palestinian people within the 
Organization during decolonization and after as emblematic of the UN’s commitment to finally 
uphold the international rule of law in their case. As an embodiment of the quasi-sovereignty 
of the Third World underpinning the ILS condition, UN recognition of Palestinian rights in this 
period has thereby remained contingent and nominal in essence. 
 
 In order to explore this, the remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. Part 2 
outlines the ostensible universalization of the promise of the post-1945 international liberal 
legal order within the UN as a result of decolonization, with specific reference to the 
crosscutting theme of the contingency of Third World sovereignty underpinning the ILS 
condition. Part 3 examines how the UN’s approach to the OPT post-1967 has helped maintain, 
rather than remedy, Palestine’s ILS in the Organization by reducing the question of Palestine 
almost exclusively to the humanitarian management of the occupation of the OPT through the 
IHL/IHRL paradigm without definitively addressing the central issue of the occupation’s 
legality. Finally, Part 4 examines why the occupation of the OPT is illegal under prevailing 
international law as supported by the UN record, including discussion of relevant legal 
consequences of such a finding. It posits that even though the General Assembly and 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) should be looked to as potential sites where the illegality of 
the occupation can be definitively established within the UN in order to mitigate Palestine’s 
ILS condition, such a counter-hegemonic approach would not in and of itself fundamentally 
disrupt that condition.  
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2. Realizing the Universal Promise of the International Rule of Law? Decolonization, 
Third World Sovereignty and the United Nations  
 When the UN was established in 1945, its membership consisted of 51 states, 40 of which 
were either European or settler-colonial derivatives of Europe. 1  Although on the decline, 
European colonialism was still a marked feature of the international system, with approximately 
one third of the global population – some 750 million people – still subject to some form of 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. 2  Accordingly, in its early years the 
Organization was shaped by the interests of an international state system still largely 
Eurocentric in orientation, and deeply influenced by the international legal standard of 
civilization that underpinned it going back to the nineteenth century. Although international 
law was beginning to give due regard to the interests of colonized and subject peoples, as 
evinced by the incorporation into the UN Charter of the principles of self-determination and 
human rights, the UN was still dominated by the old Western imperial powers. The legitimacy 
of the UN’s law-making actions was therefore highly questionable. If the basis of that 
legitimacy was the international character of the organization and the universality of its 
Charter, then the UN had some ways to go in its early years with so much of the world’s 
population denied a seat at the proverbial law-making table. As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, it was the global disenfranchisement of the non-European world that helped produce 
Palestine’s ILS in the interwar period, which was, in turn, reified within the UN system through 
the General Assembly’s partition plan of 1947.  
 
 It is for these reasons that the process of decolonization represented a watershed in the 
history of the United Nations. Decolonization opened a path through which it was thought the 
counter-hegemonic potential of the international rule of law could be realized in service of the 
global south. If colonial peoples were disenfranchised by virtue of not being regarded as fully 
sovereign under the very international law which purported to exercise dominion over them, 
the surest way to remedy the problem would be to put an end to colonialism itself and invite 
these subaltern peoples into the Organization as full members. UN recognition of Third World 
sovereignty was therefore the prerequisite for the universalization of the promise of the UN 
Charter, itself built on the principle of sovereign equality of states.3 From the perspective of 
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colonial peoples, recognition of Third World sovereignty was the entry-point through which 
their own ILS at the UN had a prospect of finally being remedied.   
 
 Of course, sovereignty is a broad concept and encompasses a number of different 
elements: territorial, political, economic and cultural among them. The first step in the 
decolonization process was for Third World peoples to assume effective control over their 
respective land, sea and airspace and obtain recognition of their territorial sovereignty within 
the UN. Once independence was proclaimed over their territory and membership in the UN was 
secured, the second step was for the new Third World states to assert their political, economic 
and cultural sovereignty through the multilateral framework now at their disposal. Because 
decolonization was a gradual process, in practice these developments unfolded concurrently 
and in a self-propagating manner, with exponential results as empire receded. The more the 
territorial sovereignty of Third World states was recognized and reflected through an expanded 
membership of the UN, the greater leverage the Third World had to collectively assert its 
political, economic and cultural sovereignty in the work of the Organization. Between 1945 and 
1980, UN membership over tripled to 154, the great majority of whom were former colonies 
from Africa and Asia. The effect of this rapid change was twofold: it shifted the automatic 
majority in the General Assembly from Europe to the Afro-Asian states, which in turn shifted 
the agenda of the Organization to issues that were of primary interest to the Third World.4 What 
had formerly been regarded as the exclusive concern of the colonized world – decolonization 
and Third World development – soon became the concern of the UN as a whole.5  In this sense, 
the Eurocentricity underpinning the ILS condition in international law and organization seemed 
to be giving way.  
 
 This change in priorities at the UN was reflected in the introduction by Third World states 
of new organizational machinery aimed at decolonization and development, challenging 
prevailing hegemonies in the system. This, in turn, enabled the progressive development of a 
number of areas of international law under the auspices of the UN that would fundamentally 
alter the course of the discipline. Moving beyond Chapters XI and XII of the Charter,6 Third 
World states utilized their newfound strength in the General Assembly to form new political 
blocs, such as the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which helped 
promulgate new normative frameworks aimed at bolstering their sovereignty in the system. 
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This included, inter alia, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples; 7  the 1961 Special Committee on Decolonization (known as the 
Committee of 24),8 the 1962 General Assembly resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources,9 and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.10 Among other things, these instruments and mechanisms affirmed the need to bring 
colonialism, in all its forms, to a speedy and unconditional end, that all peoples have the right 
to self-determination by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and that the subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle of self-
determination, fundamental human rights and the UN Charter.11 Perhaps more than anything, 
the evolution of the content of the principle of self-determination and its codification in 
common article 1 of the 1966 human rights covenants stands out as a particularly important 
contribution of the Third World during this period. As will be explored below, that principle 
has achieved the status of jus cogens,12 a development that would not have transpired but for 
the gradual enfranchisement of the Third World in the General Assembly through 
decolonization. 
 
 Yet, despite these gains, evidence suggests that the rule by law nature of the old 
international order survived the hey-day of decolonization and has persisted up to the present. 
For one thing, despite the almost complete eradication of classic forms of colonialism between 
the 1960’s and 1980’s, a number of regions continue to be afflicted by what effectively amounts 
to neo-colonial rule, with 17 non-self-governing territories presently “administered” largely by 
Western powers and monitored by the UN Committee of 24,13 and two territories suffering 
contemporary forms of colonial rule through prolonged occupation in Western Sahara and the 
OPT. More deeply, even accounting for the territorial sovereignty gained by most of the Third 
World during the decolonization period, certain structural inequities between the former 
imperial powers and their relatively newly independent colonies have remained, such that the 
full realization of Third World political, cultural and economic sovereignty seems to have been 
                                                 
7 1960 Declaration on Colonialism. 
8 A/RES/1654(XVI), 27 November 1961. 
9 A/RES/1803(XVII), 14 December 1962. 
10 Friendly Relations Declaration. 
11 E.g. 1960 Declaration on Colonialism, preamble, arts. 1, 2; and Friendly Relations Declaration, id.  
12 Crawford (2005), 188, 246-247.  
13 With the exception of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony the majority of which has been militarily 
occupied by Morocco since 1975, the remaining 16 non-self-governing territories have been administered by 
France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
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impaired from the start. The result was the evolution of Third World sovereignty as unequal 
and fractional relative to that of its Western progenitors, and the political legitimation of this 
state of affairs within the work of the UN system.14 Despite the best efforts of the Third World 
to utilize the counter-hegemonic potential of international law within the UN, their ILS 
condition has fundamentally remained in place through the contingent quasi-sovereignty of its 
subaltern members.  
 
 Given the highly diverse natures, histories and experiences of the Third World, it is 
impossible to identify a single way in which this quasi-sovereignty has manifested itself 
amongst its members. Guarding against reduction, it must be acknowledged that Third World 
quasi-sovereignty may, in principle, appear across a wide spectrum of areas – territorial, 
political, cultural, economic – and may vary depending on respective levels of development 
and independence achieved by the peoples in question. What seems clear, however, is that 
beyond this wide spectrum of potential fields of manifestation, a unifying theme that binds them 
together appears to be the unfulfilled promise of international law and institutions upon which 
they are based and which rests at the heart of the ILS condition itself.  
 
 To briefly illustrate, the following example from the field of economic development is 
useful. Following decolonization, the realization of economic development through the Bretton 
Woods institutions (BW) was promoted to Third World peoples, who in turn became 
preoccupied with advancing their interests through the so-called New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) under the auspices of the Group of 77 at the UN.15 Nevertheless, various liberal 
and neo-liberal mechanisms of the BW institutions, replete with legal conditions that privileged 
market fundamentalism through the Washington Consensus, resulted in considerable loss of 
Third World control over its economic sphere. These structural inequities transformed the old 
legal dichotomy between civilized and uncivilized peoples into a new cleavage between 
“developed” and “undeveloped” states.16  Substantively, Third World jurists argued that their 
territorial sovereignty implied an acceptance that sovereignty over their natural resources pre-
dated the colonial encounter and could therefore be nationalized post-independence subject 
only to the provisions of relevant internal law. In response, Western jurists argued that positivist 
intertemporal considerations made Third World sovereignty incapable of extending to the pre-
decolonization period (Third World sovereignty having originated with decolonization and UN 
                                                 
14 See Jackson (2011). 
15 Anghie (2005), 204; Otto (1996). 
16 Anghie (2005), 204.  
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recognition), and that even if post-independence nationalization were possible the relevant 
controlling law would be international law, not local law. Because the emerging international 
law of state secession included significant exceptions to the so-called ‘clean-slate doctrine’ 
requiring the new Third World states to respect some of the obligations of predecessor colonies, 
the economic interests of former colonial powers were well served.17 This was because during 
colonial times, they provided favourable terms and concessions over colonial resources to 
European trading companies under cover of an international law that then legalized colonial 
exploitation. 18  Thus, despite the ostensible independence of the Third World post-
decolonization, the former colonial powers ultimately stood to benefit from an international 
legal system they constructed, without the input of the uncivilized-cum-undeveloped world they 
colonized. The NIEO represented an attempt by the Third World to realize the promise of the 
international rule of law in a manner that took account of and tried to remedy, in economic 
terms, centuries of European exploitation. While the legal principle of sovereign equality of 
states underpinning the UN Charter system ostensibly allowed for the assumption of Third 
World international legal personality and membership in the system, that very legal personality 
relied on a positivist legal fiction of neutrality and objectivity which, by remaining oblivious to 
the inequity created by the old legal order, operated as a cloak of legitimization of continued 
European and Western privilege. 19  The effort to realize actual equality through the 
materialization of Third World economic sovereignty has thereby been structurally 
compromised through the work of the UN in the way of a continued rule by law with the result 
that its long-term condition of ILS has not been fundamentally altered.  
  
 As will be demonstrated below, the impact of the quasi-sovereignty of the Third World 
on the maintenance of Palestine’s ILS in the post-1967 era has manifested itself in a different 
way than that described above. Nevertheless, it has still been underpinned by the unifying theme 
of the unfulfilled promise of international law and institutions as promoted by the UN itself.   
 
3. Palestine as an Embodiment of Third World International Legal Subalternity at the 
United Nations 
 An examination of the UN’s treatment of the question of Palestine during the 
decolonization period and after brings the themes of the circumscribed nature of Third World 
sovereignty and the resulting preservation of ILS through the rule by law dynamic into sharp 
relief. Decolonization enabled a gradual if incomplete recognition and legitimation at the UN 
                                                 
17 DASST, art. 15, paras. 3, 15-16, 19. 
18 Id., 212-214. 
19 Otto (1996), 346. 
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of Palestinian legal personality and rights that in some respects approximated the recognition 
of Third World territorial sovereignty in this period. At the same time, a close examination of 
the UN record reveals that the Organization has operationally reduced the question of Palestine 
to a humanitarian problem, according to which the UN’s task has been to largely monitor and 
report the violation of IHL and IHRL within the OPT without paying sufficient attention to the 
illegality of the very regime generating this outcome. As a result, UN recognition of Palestinian 
rights seems to have been only nominal in nature. This is underscored by the fact that a central 
element of this humanitarian/managerial approach has been the UN’s insistence that the end of 
the occupation of the OPT must be contingent on endlessly futile negotiations with a bad faith 
and infinitely more powerful occupant, which in effect offers no way for the Palestinians to 
actualize their putative sovereignty, ostensibly recognized as a legal entitlement within and by 
the Organization. The result has been to maintain Palestine’s ILS in the UN during a period in 
which the received wisdom posits the Organization as the standard-bearer of the international 
rule of law. These claims are fleshed out in further depth below.  
 
3.1 Bringing the International Rule of Law to Bear in Palestine? Decolonization and the 
Gradual Recognition of Palestinian Legal Subjectivity at the United Nations 
 As part of the Third World’s attempt to promote decolonization as a means of reshaping 
the international legal order through the UN, specific effort was made to highlight the plight 
and international legal rights of the Palestinian people in the work of the new-look General 
Assembly. The context for this was what can only be described as an institutional erasure of 
the Palestinian people within the UN following the Organization’s attempt at partition, and the 
resulting dispossession of the Palestinians and collapse of the country in 1948. In the 20 years 
following the 1948 Nakba, the question of Palestine was treated merely as a ‘refugee problem’ 
in the machinery of the UN. This was largely manifested in the work of the two subsidiary 
organs created to deal with the fallout of the 1948 war, namely the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)20 and the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP).21 In the aftermath of the 1967 war, during 
                                                 
20 A/RES/302(IV), 8 December 1949. UNRWA is mandated to provide protection and assistance to Palestine 
refugees until they are able to exercise their rights to return and compensation in line with Assembly resolution 
194(III) of 11 December 1948. 
21 A/RES/194(III), 11 December 1948. UNCPP was mandated with mediating peace between Israel and the Arab 
states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), without the meaningful participation of the Palestinian Arabs whose 
only acknowledgement by UNCCP was an identification and valuation of “abandoned Arab property in Israel” as 
a result of the 1948 war. Despite failing to mediate peace in the early 1950’s, and completing its task of 
identification and valuation of Arab refugee property in Israel by 1963, the UNCCP’s mandate was never 
terminated. It continues to report annually to the General Assembly, indicating that it regrets that the terms of 
resolution 194(II) have yet to be implemented and “that it has nothing new to report”. See Seventy-First Report of 
the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, A/72/332, 15 August 2017. 
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which Israel captured the OPT (see Map IV), the Security Council passed resolution 242 in 
which it continued this trend by cryptically calling for “a just settlement of the refugee 
problem”, without reference to Palestine or the Palestinians.22  
 
 This effective erasure of the Palestinian people at the UN was curious given that 
Palestine’s independence had been provisionally recognized by the League of Nations as far 
back as 1919. Additionally, the Palestinian Arabs were a political collective known to the UN 
through the events surrounding partition. It would appear that with the UN’s denial of 
Palestinian independence in a unitary state in 1947, the fate of the Palestinian people became 
subsumed within the state-centric global order not unlike the indigenous peoples of the New 
World. This order not only literally engulfed the territorial sphere of their country in the form 
of the establishment of Israel on roughly 78 per cent of the whole and the resulting occupation 
of its remainder by Jordan and Egypt, but at the UN it operated to negate their very existence 
as a people as such and to legitimize that state of affairs within the Organization.  
 
 From a subaltern perspective, decolonization brought a needed push by the Third World 
to re-introduce the Palestinian people, its leadership and certain of its inalienable rights into the 
UN system. This move reflected an invocation of the counter-hegemonic promise of the 
international rule of law embedded in the Charter-based liberal global order, and an attempt to 
bring it to bear in the UN’s work on Palestine. Much like the Third World’s preoccupation with 
economic development through the promise of the BW institutions, the Palestinian people 
quickly became preoccupied with gaining recognition of their plight, narrative, and national 
movement within the UN. 
 
 The process was slow and was set against the political backdrop of the emergence of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and Israel’s victory in 1967. In 1969, the 
General Assembly recognized for the first time “that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees 
has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” and accordingly reaffirmed “the inalienable 
rights of the people of Palestine”.23 In 1970, the Assembly gave content to these inalienable 
rights when it recognized “that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-
determination.”24 In 1973, the Assembly condemned “all governments which do not recognize 
                                                 
22 S/RES/242, 22 November 1967.  
23 A/RES/2535(XXIV)B, 10 December 1969. 
24 A/RES/2672(XXV)C, 8 December 1970. 
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the right to self-determination and independence of peoples, notably the peoples of Africa still 
under colonial domination and the Palestinian people.”25 This was followed in 1974, when the 
Assembly voted to include a separate item entitled the “Question of Palestine” on its agenda 
for the first time since 1952, with the aim of underscoring UN accountability for its actions in 
1947, affirming the denial of Palestinian rights as the main impediment to peace, and laying the 
groundwork for the representatives of the Palestinian people to be given a platform at the UN 
to shape their own future.26 This unfolded in a series of resolutions adopted that year in which 
the PLO was invited to participate in the deliberations of the Assembly on the question of 
Palestine in plenary meetings,27 and granted observer status in the sessions and work of the 
Assembly, including international conferences convened under its auspices.28 The high-water 
mark came with the passage of resolution 3236(XXIX) of 22 November 1974, in which the 
Assembly reaffirmed the “inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: 
(a) the right to self-determination without interference; [and] (b) the right to national 
independence and sovereignty”.29 In a landmark address before the Assembly, Yasser Arafat, 
then Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, highlighted that decolonization offered 
a unique opportunity for the UN to render its work and role more capable of implementing the 
principles of the Charter and human rights universally. In his view, the re-opening of the 
question of Palestine at the UN represented “a victory for the world Organization as much as a 
victory for the cause of our people,” in that it was part of “a great wave of history bearing 
peoples forward into a new world that they have created.” [emphasis added].30  
 
 In the above actions, one is able to clearly identify the themes of enfranchisement of the 
global subaltern and the effects such enfranchisement in the deliberative processes of the UN 
were thought to have had in addressing the ILS condition of historically contingent actors. By 
appealing to the primacy and universalism of the international rule of law, the UN held itself 
                                                 
25 A/RES/3070(XXVIII), 30 November 1973. 
26 See UN GAOR, 29th Sess., 219th Mtg., item 111, at 11-13, A/BUR/SR.219, 19 September 1974, where, e.g., the 
Algerian representative stated that “[i]t was at the United Nations that the case of Palestine should be reopened 
and the matter be treated not as a social problem caused by the Palestinian refugees but as a political problem. The 
time had come for the United Nations to rectify its mistake and focus its efforts on settling a crisis with which it 
had been encumbered almost since its creation”. Likewise, the Yugoslav representative “deplored the fact that the 
question of Palestine was regarded as a refuge problem rather than as a problem of the usurpation of a people’s 
right to liberty and independence”. Finally, the Soviet representative indicated “that a discussion by the General 
Assembly of the question of Palestine in all its aspects, with the participation of a representative of the Arab people 
of Palestine, would further the settlement of that question...”.  
27 A/RES/3210(XXIX), 14 October 1974. 
28 A/RES/3237(XXIX), 22 November 1974. This set a precedent for the provision of UN observer status to the 
South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), then struggling for independence of the Namibian people. 
See A/RES/31/152, 20 December 1976. 
29 A/RES/3236(XXIX), 22 November 1974. 
30 UN GAOR, 29th Sess, 2282nd Mtg., item 108, A/PV.2282 and Corr. 1, at 861-862, paras. 7-9, 19, 13 November 
1974. 
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out as the essential platform for the PLO which, together with the rest of the global south, set 
out to establish a new counter-hegemonic international legal order responsive to its people’s 
needs. Whereas the old European imperial order was thought to be collapsing, a new post-
imperial world was actively being forged. The result was an apparent commitment within the 
UN to reaffirm and realize the promise of international law in its work regarding historically 
subordinated peoples, including on the question of Palestine. This was borne out in the growing 
attention afforded the Palestinian people in the UN, a large proportion of which was articulated 
in international legal terms.  
 
 Thus, mirroring the Committee of 24 and other Third World-initiated machinery designed 
to advance decolonization and development, in 1975 the General Assembly established the 
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (UNCEIRPP). 
Composed of twenty Member States drawn from the Third World, the UNCEIRPP was, and 
continues to be, mandated with promoting the realization of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people, as outlined in Assembly resolution 3236(XXIX) and subsequent resolutions. 
From that point, the General Assembly increased the number of its resolutions on Palestine, 
often times in response to developments on the ground, with the result that today there exists a 
copious body of resolutions demonstrative of widespread state practice and opinio juris 
supportive of Palestinian legal subjectivity and rights. Thus, to the long record of General 
Assembly resolutions affirming the rights of Palestine refugees under resolution 194(III) of 
December 1949, 31  has been added resolutions devoted to Palestine refugee property and 
revenues,32 the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination,33 the applicability to the OPT 
of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,34 
development assistance, 35  Jerusalem, 36  Israeli settlements in the OPT, 37  the permanent 
sovereignty of the Palestinian people over its natural resources in the OPT, 38 international 
protection of the Palestinian people,39 and the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,40 
among scores of others.  
 
                                                 
31 E.g., A/RES/70/83, 9 December 2015. 
32 E.g., A/RES/70/86, 9 December 2015. 
33 E.g., A/RES/70/141, 17 December 2015. 
34 E.g., A/RES/70/88, 9 December 2015. Geneva Convention IV. 
35 E.g., A/RES/70/108, 10 December 2015. 
36 E.g., A/RES/70/16, 24 November 2015. 
37 E.g., A/RES/70/89, 9 December 2015. 
38 E.g., A/RES/70/225, 22 December 2015. 
39 E.g., A/RES/70/90, 9 December 2015. 
40 E.g., A/RES/70/15, 24 November 2015. 
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 Viewed through the prism of the UN’s institutional erasure of the Palestinian people from 
1949-1969, the above developments demonstrate the extent to which decolonization was 
responsible for giving greater substance to the UN’s commitment to the universal application 
of international law in general, including its unique role in bringing it to bear as the normative 
framework upon which peace in Palestine had to be based. Evidence of the underlying promise 
to the Palestinian people inherent in this process is found in what the General Assembly has, 
since 1992, referred to as the UN’s “permanent responsibility” over the question of Palestine 
“until the question is resolved in all its aspects in accordance with international law”.41 The 
central importance of both international law and the unique role of the UN as guarantor of that 
law in helping forge a peaceful resolution to the question of Palestine has by now become a 
common article of faith within the international system, the original sin of partition 
notwithstanding. Nowhere has this faith been more reverent then among the Palestinian people 
themselves.42 Thus, notwithstanding the rule by law character of the UN’s management of the 
question of Palestine between 1947-1969, the conventional view of the UN as guarantor of the 
universal international rule of law appears to have held, largely due to the promise of justice 
and peace through its myriad invocations of same. With the apparent mitigation of Palestine’s 
ILS condition thorough the UN’s increased recognition of Palestinian legal subjectivity and 
rights following decolonization, it would appear that the only change in the landscape has been 
the acquiescence in this view by the political leadership of the Palestinian people. As will be 
seen, however, a critical examination of the evidence would not seem to justify this position.    
 
3.2 The Maintenance of the International Rule by Law in Palestine: The Reduction of 
Palestine and the Limits of Palestinian Legal Subjectivity at the United Nations 
 A closer review of the UN’s record in the decolonization period and after reveals that 
while the rule by law character of the Organization’s treatment of Palestine has been partially 
mitigated through a more genuine application of Charter-based international law to the issue, 
that situation has been substantially maintained, albeit in a different form. Essentially, while 
the partition resolution of 1947 was tainted with illegality resulting in the reification within the 
UN of Palestine’s ILS, what characterizes the maintenance of this condition in the 
decolonization period and after has been the UN’s unwillingness to bring the full normative 
regime of international law to bear on its treatment of the OPT in line with the international 
rule of law. Unlike events in 1947, here the stress is not so much on the illegality of a specific 
                                                 
41 E.g., A/RES/71/23, 30 November 2016. 
42 This was demonstrated in a 2017 address to the General Assembly of Mahmoud Abbas, current President of the 
State of Palestine, in which he stated that “[t]he path we have chosen as Palestinians and Arabs, and the path 
chosen by the world is that of international law.” See Abbas 72nd GA Statement. 
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UN action in respect of a disenfranchised group. Rather, the problem is with the failure by 
omission of the UN to apply the full array of relevant international law to that disenfranchised 
group. This, even as the UN has come to rely upon that group’s acquiescence in the legitimacy 
of prior illegal UN action (i.e. partition) as a condition of eventually gaining full membership 
in the Organization, and while the Organization has held itself out as a protector of Palestinian 
legal subjectivity and rights. More specifically, the evidence suggests that the problem rests 
primarily in the UN’s failure to clearly and consistently identify Israel’s prolonged presence in 
the OPT as illegal as such, with all of the consequences such illegality entails in international 
law. Most importantly, this includes the obligation of the UN to require the occupying power 
to unilaterally bring its illegal presence to an end unconditionally and in good faith, rather than 
condition such an end upon negotiation. In a sense, the UN’s reduction of Palestine to the 
documentation of Israel’s individual violations of IHL and IHRL within the OPT, important 
though it has been, has had its own dark side. Echoing the frustration of Third World 
sovereignty by the structural limitations of the BW institutions, UN recognition of Palestinian 
legal subjectivity, including the right to self-determination in the OPT, has been frustrated by 
the UN itself through its failure to definitively address the legality of the very regime impeding 
its actual exercise. Instead, the UN has satisfied itself with affirming and reaffirming selective 
elements of the relevant international law governing the status of the OPT, thereby frustrating 
its own ostensible commitment to maintaining international peace and security in accordance 
with the international rule of law resulting in the maintenance of Palestine’s ILS in the system. 
 
 To deconstruct this further, it is helpful to examine the following three interrelated aspects 
of the UN’s management of the question of Palestine in the post-1967 era: (1) the increased 
recognition of Palestinian legal subjectivity within the UN and its restricted territorialisation of 
Palestinian national claims to the OPT following the PLO’s 1988 recognition of the two-state 
formula embodied in resolution 181(II); (2) the proliferation of UN machinery focused on the 
humanitarian/managerial documentation of IHL and IHRL violations by the occupying power 
short of definitively identifying Israel’s continued occupation of the OPT as illegal; and (3) the 
UN’s conditioning of the end of Israel’s occupation of the OPT on negotiations. Each of these 
will be taken in turn. 
  
 First, the 1988 recognition by the PLO of Israel on the basis of resolution 181(II) signalled 
the acceptance by the PLO of the political legitimacy of the partition plan. Reminiscent of the 
Third World’s acceptance of the principle of uti possidetis, this recognition was notable for the 
fact that its adherents had no part in fashioning its terms but were compelled to accept them ex 
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post facto as a price to be paid if even a modicum of their national rights were to be achieved. 
In the form of a quid pro quo, this historic compromise resulted in greater levels of recognition 
of Palestine’s international legal personality at the UN, albeit curtailed in line with the two-
state formula. Thus, as part of its 1988 acknowledgement of the proclamation of the State of 
Palestine by the Palestine National Council, the General Assembly decided that the designation 
“Palestine” be used in the place of the “Palestine Liberation Organization” in the UN system.43 
This was followed in 1998 with the Assembly’s conferral of additional privileges on Palestine, 
including the rights to participate in the general debate and to co-sponsor draft resolutions on 
Palestinian and Middle East issues.44 Following Palestine’s failed 2011 attempt to seek full 
membership in the Organization the General Assembly upgraded its status to a non-member 
observer State in 2012 (see chapter 5).45 This has allowed the State of Palestine to accede to a 
host of multilateral treaties, including the main IHL and IHRL treaties and the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC),46 and to gain membership in a number of international 
organizations. Importantly, although the quid pro quo induced recognition of Palestinian legal 
subjectivity at the UN was accompanied by an affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people 
to self-determination in a state of their own, it wasn’t until 1988 that the exact territorial location 
of that state was expressly articulated by the UN. The territorialisation of Palestinian national 
rights within the UN in the post-decolonization era thus began with the PLO’s compelled 
recognition of resolution 181(II). This resulted in an affirmation by the General Assembly in 
1988 of “the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their 
territory occupied since 1967,” an area representing approximately half that proposed by the 
Assembly in 1947.47 Since then, the OPT has regularly been affirmed, expressly and impliedly, 
as the territorial sphere within which the Palestinian people are entitled to exercise self-
determination by each of the General Assembly, 48  the Security Council, 49  the ICJ, 50  the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 51  and the Secretariat through the Secretary-
General.52 To the extent that the promise of the UN’s copious affirmation of Palestinian legal 
                                                 
43 This change was done without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the PLO within the UN system. 
A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988. 
44 A/RES/52/250, 7 July 1998. 
45 A/RES/67/19, 29 November 2012. 
46 Rome Statute. 
47 A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988. 
48 E.g., A/RES/67/19, 29 November 2012. 
49 See e.g., S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016 and S/RES/1515(2003), 19 November 2003 where, in so far as 
the Council endorses a vision where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and 
recognized borders on the basis of SC Res. 242 (1967), it is implied that the OPT is the self-determination unit of 
the Palestinian people. 
50 Wall, paras. 115, 118, 122. 
51 E.g., E/RES/2017/10, 7 June 2017. 
52 E.g., Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine, paras. 23, 40. 
 Chapter 4 – 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 113 
subjectivity has yet to materialize, the historical compromise that produced it has arguably 
assumed the contours of a Faustian bargain of sorts.  
 
 Second, since the decolonization era there has emerged a proliferation of UN machinery 
devoted to a humanitarian/managerial approach through the documentation of IHL and IHRL 
violations by the occupying power in the OPT. This is in large part the result of the prolonged 
nature of the conflict and an expression of the above-mentioned permanent responsibility of the 
UN for its resolution in line with international law. Among the bespoke machinery is the UN 
Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 
Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories,53 the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territory Occupied Since 1967, 54 
UNCERIPP and its secretariat in the Division for Palestinian Rights,55 and the UN Register of 
Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the OPT (UNROD). 56  More general 
machinery includes portions of the work of a host of subsidiary organs such as UNRWA,57 the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,58 the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC), 59  the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 60  the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),61 and the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development, 62  among others. 63  Important judicial, quasi-judicial and/or 
investigative interventions have been carried out by the ICJ,64 HRC mandated commissions of 
inquiry such as the Goldstone65 and Davis66 commissions, and a host of special procedures 
                                                 
53 The Special Committee was established by the General Assembly in 1968 under the style “Special Committee 
to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories”. The 
contemporary name reflects the evolution of Palestinian legal subjectivity within the UN over time. See 
A/RES/2443(XXIII), 19 December 1968. 
54 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was established by the Commission on Human Rights in resolution 
E/CN.4/1993/2A, 19 February 1993. 
55 A/RES/71/21, 30 November 2016. 
56 A/RES/ES-10/17, 24 January 2007. 
57 An important element of UNRWA’s mandate is the provision of human rights-based protection to Palestine 
refugees. See UNRWA Annual Report, 2016, 31-33. 
58 E.g., Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/31/40, 20 January 2016. 
59 E.g., A/HRC/34/28, 11 April 2017. 
60 E.g., UNESCO Decisions, November 2016, 32. 
61 E.g., UN OCHA Report, October 2017. 
62 E.g., Economic Costs Report. 
63  These include the International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Program (WFP), the 
UN Human Settlements Program (UNHABITAT), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA).  
64 Wall. 
65 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza, September 2009. 
66 Report of the Detailed Findings, June 2015. 
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mandate holders.67 Finally, the machinery includes scores of regular reports and resolutions 
issued by other principal organs of the UN, namely the General Assembly,68 Security Council,69 
ECOSOC70 and the Secretariat through the Secretary-General.71 So prodigious has been the 
coverage of this UN machinery, that it is impossible to cover it all here. Suffice to say, those 
areas of IHL and IHRL violations of the occupying power that have been documented and have 
come to undergird the UN’s position on the question of Palestine include: the applicability of 
Geneva Convention IV to the OPT, the illegality and economic impact of Israeli settlement, 
wilful killing, torture and inhumane treatment, unlawful deportation or transfer, collective 
punishment, the taking of hostages, extensive destruction and appropriation of property not 
justified by military necessity, the right to life, liberty and security of the person, equality before 
the law, protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, due process of law, freedom of 
expression, freedom of thought, conscience and belief, freedom of association, the right to 
work, the right to an adequate standard of living, including food and housing, and the right to 
education. Despite the broad scope of this comprehensive cataloguing of the occupying power’s 
individual violations of relevant IHL and IHRL in the OPT, what makes it notable is its 
conspicuous failure to definitively address the legality of Israel’s very presence in the OPT. 
Indeed, the hyper-legality of the UN’s approach to the OPT through the relatively narrow 
confines of the IHL/IHRL paradigm has produced an absurd situation. By focusing so much 
energy on addressing IHL/IHRL violations in the OPT, the UN has unduly raised expectations 
of what application of that humanitarian normative paradigm can reasonably achieve. This has 
led to a false hope that adherence to IHL/IHRL norms will eventually deliver the end of the 
occupation. For the Palestinian people, this false hope has become reflected in the 
institutionalization of the IHL/IHRL paradigm in the official and civil society sectors of 
Palestine. This has been exacerbated and reinforced by the rights-based humanitarian 
approaches driving virtually all non-UN international stakeholders in the OPT to this day, 
                                                 
67 See e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, June 2017; Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, December 2012; and Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, June 2012. 
68 The number of GA resolutions are copious. In 2016 alone, the Assembly passed 16 resolutions on Palestine, 
including: A/RES/71/98, 6 December 2016 (Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem); A/RES/71/97, 6 December 2016 (Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan); 
A/RES/71/96, 6 December 2016 (Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and 
the other occupied Arab territories); A/RES/71/184, 19 December 2016 (Right of the Palestinian People to Self-
determination); and A/RES/71/247, 21 December 2016 (Permanent Sovereignty of the Palestinian People in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab Population of the Occupied Syrian 
Golan Over Their Natural Resources). 
69 E.g., S/RES/605(1987), 22 December 1987; and S/RES/904(1994), 18 March 1994.  
70 E.g., Repercussions of Occupation Report. 
71 E.g., Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem: Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/HRC/31/44, 20 January 2016. 
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including third states, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, etc. Although occupation is meant to end under international law, 
nothing in the conventional IHL/IHRL paradigm expressly compels this result; rather, 
adherence to its norms merely operates to enhance the manner in which the occupation is 
administered pending its eventual end. Thus, by focusing on the IHL/IHRL framework instead 
of failing to definitively identify Israel’s occupation as illegal as such, the UN has privileged a 
humanitarian/managerial approach to the OPT over a remedial/emancipatory one. This has 
ultimately lent Israel’s presence in the OPT a legitimacy in which its legality has also been 
implied. The result has been to affirm the theme of Third World quasi-sovereignty underpinning 
Palestine’s ILS condition. 
 
 Third, and arguably most important, has been the UN’s position that the end of Israel’s 
prolonged occupation of the OPT must be contingent on the conclusion of negotiations between 
it and the PLO. This is a universally held position among each of the relevant five principal 
organs, and one that has accordingly been parroted throughout the UN system by subsidiary 
organs and other bodies. Thus, the Security Council has since 1967 affirmed the need for Israel 
to withdraw from the OPT as part of a negotiated settlement under the land for peace formula.72 
In 2016, the Council accordingly stressed the need “to create the conditions for successful final 
status negotiations and for advancing the two-State solution through those negotiations” aimed 
at achieving “an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967.”73 Likewise, the General 
Assembly has on multiple occasions stressed “the need for a resumption of negotiations based 
on the long-standing terms of reference” set out in relevant UN resolutions, including “the 
principle of land for peace,” and called upon Israel to refrain from undertaking actions in the 
OPT, such as settlement building, that are aimed “at prejudging the final outcome of peace 
negotiations, with a view to achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began 
in 1967.”74 For its part, ECOSOC has reiterated “the importance of the revival and accelerated 
advancement of negotiations…on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions” and “the 
principle of land for peace”, with the view “to pave the way for the realization of the two-State 
solution…based on the pre-1967 borders.”75 To this has been added repeated calls by various 
Secretaries-General for a negotiated resolution of the end of the occupation, coming most 
                                                 
72 S/RES/242, 22 November 1967, paras. 1, 3. 
73 S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016, preamble, para. 9. 
74 A/RES/71/23, 30 November 2016, paras. 4, 16. See also A/RES/67/19, 29 November 2012, paras. 4, 5; and 
A/RES/66/17, 30 November 2011, para. 15.  
75 E/RES/2014/26, 16 July 2014, para. 17. See also E/RES/2017/10, 7 June 2017, para. 7.  
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recently in a June 2017 statement in which Antonio Guterres indicated that “[e]nding the 
occupation that began in 1967 and achieving a negotiated two-State outcome is the only way to 
lay the foundations for enduring peace” and “the only way to achieve the inalienable rights of 
the Palestinian people.”76 Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the ICJ reiterated this position 
when it ruled in 2004 that the construction of the wall by Israel in the OPT was contrary to 
international law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court went out of its way to underscore that 
the question of Palestine “can be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith 
of all relevant Security Council resolutions,” and continued “efforts to initiate negotiations to 
this end.”77 It accordingly underscored “the need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view 
to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the 
outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with 
Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region.”78 This uniform 
insistence of negotiations as the only way to end the occupation and realize Palestinian rights 
is fraught with a telling paradox. Because the OPT has been determined by the UN to be the 
territorial unit within which the Palestinian people are entitled to exercise their right to self-
determination under international law, the result has been for the UN to have frustrated, on its 
own terms, the very recognition it has bestowed upon the Palestinian people since 
decolonization. How? If realization of Palestinian self-determination in the OPT is a long-
established right in the nature of a peremptory norm of international law derogation from which 
is not permitted, how can the culmination of this right can be left to negotiation between an 
infinitely more powerful occupier and a beleaguered and vastly weaker occupied people? This 
is particularly so, if the occupation itself is or has become illegal through the acts of a bad-faith 
occupant, as is the case with the OPT.  
 
 In so far as the above factors have been the basis of the UN’s ostensibly rights-based 
approach to the question of Palestine through which the subaltern Palestinians have been 
encouraged to overcome their contingent status, the research suggests that they actually 
demonstrate the perpetual nature of Palestine’s quasi-sovereignty inherent in the present 
international legal order. Palestinian acquiescence to the partition brought with it UN 
recognition of Palestinian national rights, if only in the OPT. Nevertheless, actual realization 
of those rights has been frustrated by the UN itself owing to its failure to definitively 
characterize Israel’s occupation as illegal, as such. Instead, the UN has dogmatically insisted 
                                                 
76 UN Press Release SG/SM/18554, 5 June 2017. 
77 Wall, para. 162. 
78 Id. 
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on the chimera of negotiations as the only means through which the occupation’s end is to be 
brought about. Once again, we can see a shifting of the legal goalposts for the subaltern who, 
having acquiesced to prior illegal acts of the UN cannot be allowed to rely in good faith that 
the gesture will be met with a commitment by the Organization to bring international law fully 
to bear in their case. In place of a position based upon the fulsome application of the 
international rule of law, the interests of the subaltern Palestinians are governed according to a 
rule by law dynamic, where rights are affirmed only to a point (e.g. IHL/IHRL), and 
implementation is left subject to the whims of a purportedly legitimate Israeli hegemon. In a 
very real sense then, it is possible to see in the UN’s position in this period the maintenance of 
Palestine’s ILS. 
 
 In the following section, we examine the question of whether Israel’s continued 
occupation of the OPT is illegal, and what the consequences of such a finding would be in law. 
In addition, we examine how various organs of the UN can be resorted to in order to confirm 
this finding with a view to mitigating the effects of the rule by law nature of the Organization’s 
handling of the question of Palestine in the post-1967 period.  
 
4. Mitigating Palestine’s Continued International Legal Subalternity at the United Nations: 
The Illegality of Israel’s Continued Presence in the OPT and its Legal Consequences 
4.1 Why Legality Matters: Negotiating the Illegal in Light of the Law of State Responsibility 
 Before we delve into why Israel’s continued presence in the OPT is illegal, further 
discussion about why its legality matters is in order. At the heart of the issue is the tension 
between the UN’s position on the OPT with the relevant international law governing state 
responsibility. On the one hand, is the political consensus that the emergence of an independent 
Palestinian state in the OPT can only arise through a negotiated withdrawal of the occupying 
power and the conclusion of peace on the basis of the two-state land for peace formula. This 
consensus has been codified in a wide array of resolutions by the principal political organs of 
the UN and affirmed by its principal judicial organ and Secretary-General. On the other hand, 
is the relevant international law concerning the responsibility of states for internationally 
wrongful conduct, an elemental foundation of which is the proposition that states may not 
negotiate the consequences of their actions if those actions are themselves illegal: ex injuria jus 
non oritur.79 A review of the relatively sparse literature on the illegality of Israel’s occupation 
of the OPT demonstrates a curious neglect of the international legal consequences of same in 
                                                 
79 See infra note 91. 
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light of the law of state responsibility.80 Nevertheless, in view of the above, it is submitted that 
understanding the international law governing state responsibility is a prerequisite to 
appreciating the continued rule by law character of the UN’s handling of the OPT in the post-
1967 era, and how its effects might ultimately be mitigated.  
 
 The International Law Commission’s 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASRIWA) is widely considered to be a codification of customary 
international law governing state responsibility. 81  Under the ARSIWA, an internationally 
wrongful act of a state occurs when conduct consisting of an action or omission is both 
attributable to the state under international law and constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of that state.82 A state may breach an international obligation through a composite 
series of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, in which case the breach 
extends over the entire period starting with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and 
lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with 
the international obligation of the state.83 The state responsible for an internationally wrongful 
act is under three general obligations in respect of that act. First, if continuing, it must cease the 
act forthwith.84 Second, it must offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition 
if circumstances so dictate.85 Third, it must make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
act, including any material or moral damage.86 Finally, where a state’s internationally wrongful 
conduct entails a serious – meaning gross or systematic – breach of an obligation arising under 
a peremptory norm of general international law, in addition to the above obligations of the 
wrongdoing state, all other states are under a twofold obligation to cooperate to bring the serious 
breach to an end through lawful means, and to refrain from recognizing as lawful the situation 
created by the serious breach nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.87   
                                                 
80 See Gross (2017); Lynk Report; and Finkelstein (2018), Appendix, none of which engage with the law on state 
responsibility. See also Ben-Naftali, et al. (2005), 612, where the authors merely restate in their conclusion that a 
state "whose conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful act having a continuing character is under an 
obligation to cease that conduct, without prejudice to the responsibility it has already incurred.” No other elements 
of the law of state responsibility are discussed by Ben-Naftali et al., nor is the dilemma raised by the UN’s 
conditioning of the end of the occupation on negotiation examined in this light. In a similar vein, the only article 
that raises the legal consequences of “illegal occupation”, per se, at any length confines its discussion of 
negotiation as a means of ending such an occupation to one line. See Ronen (2008), 228. Although Ronen partially 
examines General Assembly and ICJ pronouncements on the legality of Israel’s occupation of the OPT, her 
analysis does not examine the UN’s position that the end of the occupation must be contingent on negotiation.  
81 ASRIWA, 26-30. For the customary nature of the ASRIWA, see Genocide Case, para. 401; Crawford (2013), 43.  
82 ASRIWA, id., art. 2. 
83 Id., art. 15. 
84 Id. art. 30(a). Although the text of the article does not reference any time parameters within which cessation 
must occur, ICJ jurisprudence suggests cessation must occur forthwith. See Wall, paras. 151, 163. 
85 ASRIWA, id., art. 30(b).  
86 Id., art. 31. 
87 Id., arts. 40, 41; Wall, para. 163. 
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 The international law governing state responsibility is rooted in a desire to ensure a global 
order that is based on the primacy of the international rule of law, in line with the ostensible 
organizing principle of the UN. In his commentary on the ASRIWA, James Crawford indicates 
that “[t]he responsible State’s obligation of cessation thus protects both the interests of the 
injured State or States and the interests of the international community as a whole in the 
preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of law.” 88  Where a state responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act refuses to perform its obligations of cessation, non-repetition and 
reparation, as applicable, an injured state may take appropriate and proportional 
countermeasures to help induce such performance.89 Where the obligation breached is owed to 
a group of states and is established for the protection of a collective interest of that group or is 
owed to the international community as a whole (i.e. obligations erga omnes), states other than 
the injured state are entitled to take lawful measures against the responsible state to ensure its 
observance.90  
 
 It therefore follows that where an internationally wrongful act has taken place and/or is 
continuing, the international rule of law neither mandates nor requires the responsible state to 
make adherence to its obligations of cessation, non-repetition and reparation conditioned on 
negotiation.91 To do so would be to legitimate that which is illegal. Rather, the law requires 
strict, unconditional and timely performance of those obligations in keeping with its overall 
object and purpose, namely to ensure the international rule of law. This is particularly so where 
a state’s internationally wrongful conduct entails a serious breach of an obligation arising under 
a peremptory norm of general international law. In such case, international law neither 
mandates nor requires third states (collectively or individually) to make adherence to their own 
                                                 
88 Crawford (2005), 197. 
89 ASRIWA, arts. 49-54.  
90 Id. arts. 48, 54. 
91 While art. 52(1) of the ASRIWA imposes an obligation on an injured state to, inter alia, notify the responsible 
state of any decision to take countermeasures and to offer to negotiate with that State, such recourse to negotiation 
remains the sole prerogative of the injured state, and only then if it invokes countermeasures. Negotiation cannot 
be invoked by the responsible or any other state under the ASRIWA. In any event, even where invoked by an injured 
state, it is doubtful whether the ASRIWA contemplates recourse to negotiations if doing so would frustrate the 
overall obligation of the responsible state to abide by the underlying primary rule it has violated. Such an allowance 
would sabotage the object and purpose of the ASRIWA and the international rule of law itself. For a judicial opinion 
in which these principles are followed, see Armed Activities, paras. 261, 345, where, after determining that Uganda 
was internationally responsible for making reparations to DRC for illegal actions arising on the territory of the 
DRC, the ICJ deferred to the DRC’s wish to resolve the issue by negotiation with Uganda, failing which the matter 
would be settled by the Court. In so doing, the Court made clear that while “[i]t is not for the Court to determine 
the final result of these negotiations...the Parties should seek in good faith an agreed solution based on the findings 
of the present Judgment” (i.e. based on international law). 
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obligations to bring such breaches to an end, nor to recognize their legality nor render aid or 
assistance in their maintenance, conditional on negotiation.   
 
 It is apparent, therefore, that the question of the legality of Israel’s continued presence in 
the OPT, as such, is important because it animates the continued ILS of Palestine in the UN’s 
position in the post-1967 period. If Israel’s occupation is legal, for the Organization to 
contemplate its end through negotiation would amount to a mere invocation of Charter 
principles regulating the peaceful resolution of disputes. In such case, the legitimacy of the 
Organization’s call for negotiations could not be impugned on the basis that it runs counter to 
international law, despite any disparity in negotiating power of the parties. If, on the other hand, 
Israel’s presence is or has become illegal, for the Organization to condition its end on 
negotiation would run counter to the relevant international law governing state responsibility. 
In such a case, any disparity in negotiating power could be abused by the more powerful party 
to consolidate its illegal actions under a cloak of legitimacy provided by the UN. This would 
only operate to marginalize the weaker party, thereby prolonging injustice and conflict 
indefinitely.  
 
 This is why, for instance, the UN has never suggested that the end of Israel’s individual 
violations of IHL or IHRL in the OPT, including settlement and wall construction, be 
conditioned on negotiation.92 It is also why the practice of the UN in respect of occupations in 
other contexts tends to demonstrate that where an occupation has been deemed illegal by the 
Organization, the end of that illegality has not been made contingent on negotiation, and vice 
versa. Before demonstrating the illegality of Israel’s prolonged occupation of the OPT, it is 
important to briefly review some of this practice as an embodiment of the UN’s purported 
commitment to upholding the international rule of law.  
 
4.2 Relevant United Nations Practice 
 This section summarizes six cases of alien occupation as handled by the UN, juxtaposing 
the UN’s management of the OPT against them. The first three (Namibia, Afghanistan, Kuwait) 
concern cases where the UN consistently declared the occupation to be illegal, whereas the 
second three (Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus, East Timor) concern situations where the UN 
remains/ed silent on the legality of the occupation. Each of these cases involve/d some violation 
by the occupying power of the jus ad bellum, its corollary prohibiting the acquisition of territory 
                                                 
92 See e.g., S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016. See also Bekker (2005), 560 (“Why should illegalities be subject to 
negotiations, which according to the ICJ are to proceed ‘on the basis of international law’?”). 
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through the threat or use of force, or the right of the occupied population to self-determination. 
Yet only in the former cases was the end of the occupation understood as an unconditional 
requirement consistent with the law of state responsibility, whereas in the latter cases the end 
of occupation was made contingent on negotiation, the occupation not being defined by the UN 
as an internationally wrongful act in itself.  
 
 Namibia. Upon the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, South Africa asserted 
that the mandate it held over Namibia (then South-West Africa) had lapsed and sought UN 
recognition for its annexation of the country. The General Assembly refused and submitted the 
matter to the ICJ in 1950, which ruled, inter alia, that South Africa continued to be the 
mandatory power with supervisory functions over the mandate to be exercised by the UN.93 
Following South Africa’s refusal to adhere to the ruling, in 1966 the Assembly reaffirmed the 
right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and terminated the mandate for failure by 
South Africa to fulfill its obligations as mandatory.94 Subsequently, both the Assembly and 
Security Council passed a series of resolutions which, inter alia, reaffirmed the right of the 
people of Namibia to self-determination, denounced South-Africa’s “illegal occupation” of 
Namibia as a violation of the latter’s territorial integrity, and/or affirmed the requirement that 
South Africa withdraw from Namibia “unconditionally and without delay”. 95  This was 
followed by another Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in 1971, which affirmed that South Africa’s 
continued presence in Namibia was illegal and it was under an “obligation to withdraw its 
administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the 
territory”.96 The Court further ruled that UN Member States were under an “obligation to 
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on 
behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings 
with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support 
or assistance to, such presence and administration”.97 South-African withdrawal eventually 
occurred in 1988, against the backdrop of the impending fall of its Apartheid regime at home. 
At no point did the UN suggest that the end of its illegal occupation of Namibia be made subject 
to negotiation.  
 
                                                 
93 South-West Africa. 
94 A/RES/2145(XXI), 27 October 1966, paras. 1, 3. 
95 See A/RES/2248(S-V), 19 May 1967; A/RES/2325(XXII), 16 December 1967; A/RES/2372(XXII), 12 June 
1968; A/RES/2403(XXIII), 16 December 1968; S/RES/246, 14 March 1968; S/RES/264, 20 March 1969; 
S/RES/276(1970), 30 January 1970. 
96 Namibia, para. 133. 
97 Id. 
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 Afghanistan. Following a communist coup d’état in Kabul on 27 April 1978, Afghanistan 
became a satellite of the Soviet Union. As internal opposition mounted against the coup the 
following year, the USSR invaded the country ostensibly upon the invitation of an unelected 
expatriate Afghan resident in Moscow. With the Soviet intervention, the expatriate was 
installed as the head of state and the two countries promptly concluded a secret treaty regulating 
the terms of the USSR’s “temporary” presence in Afghanistan.98 An attempt to condemn the 
illegality of the Soviet invasion and call for its unconditional withdrawal in a draft resolution 
of the Security Council was blocked by a Soviet veto.99 This lack of unanimity of the permanent 
five resulted in the Council deciding, in a procedural vote, to call an emergency special session 
of the General Assembly to consider the matter. 100  The Assembly subsequently passed 
resolution ES-6/2 in which it reaffirmed “that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle” of the UN Charter, “any 
violation of which is contrary to its aims and purposes”, strongly deplored the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan as being “inconsistent with that principle”, and called for “the immediate, 
unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its 
people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political, and 
social systems free from outside intervention.”101 Resolution ES-6/2 was affirmed on an annual 
basis by the Assembly until the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988 against the backdrop 
of impending collapse of the Soviet Union. At no point did the UN make withdrawal contingent 
on negotiation. 
  
 Kuwait: On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, setting off a relatively rapid response 
by the UN. On the same day, the Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded that 
Iraq “withdraw immediately and unconditionally” from Kuwait.102 On 6 August, acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council indicated its determination “to bring the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Kuwait”, imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. 103 Two 
days later, an Iraqi declaration of its “comprehensive and eternal merger” with Kuwait was met 
with a Council decision affirming that the “annexation” of Kuwait “under any form and 
whatever pretext has no legal validity and is considered null and void.”104 The Council further 
                                                 
98 Benvenisti (2012), 178. 
99 UN SCOR, 2189th Mtg., Draft Res. S/13729, 7 January 1980, S/13737/Add.1, 16 January 1980. 
100 S/RES/462, 9 January 1980. In procedural votes of the Council, permanent members may not exercise veto 
power. 
101 GA Res. ES-6/2, A/RES/ES-6/2, 14 January 1980. 
102 S/RES/660, 2 August 1990. 
103 S/RES/661, 6 August 1990. 
104 S/RES/662, 9 August 1990. 
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“called upon all states, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize the 
annexation and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect 
recognition of the annexation.” 105  In the face of continued Iraqi non-compliance with its 
international legal obligations, the Council indicated that if Iraq failed to withdraw its forces 
from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, Member States were authorized to use “all means necessary” 
to end the illegal annexation of Kuwait.106 Thereafter, the General Assembly condemned Iraq 
for its violation of IHL and IHRL in “occupied Kuwait”.107 Within hours of the passage of the 
Council-imposed deadline, a United States-led multinational coalition commenced military 
action to compel Iraqi withdrawal, which was effected on 28 February 1991. At no point did 
the UN make Iraqi withdrawal subject to negotiation. 
 
 Western Sahara. Following a report by the Committee of 24, in 1965 the General 
Assembly urged Spain, the colonial power in Western Sahara (then Ifni and Spanish Sahara), 
to take all necessary measures for the “liberation” of the territory and “to enter into negotiations 
on the problems relating to sovereignty” in relation to it. 108 In addition to the indigenous 
Sahrawi people, competing claims to sovereignty over the territory were advanced by both 
neighbouring Morocco and Mauritania. A 1975 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ affirmed the right 
of the population of Western Sahara to self-determination.109 By agreement later that year, 
Spain handed administration over the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, who subsequently 
partitioned it between themselves. Morocco took control over the whole of it in 1979, when 
Mauritania withdrew on the strength of a peace agreement with the representatives of the 
Sahrawi people, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro 
(POLISARIO). In line with the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions have repeatedly affirmed, both expressly and impliedly, the right of the 
Sahrawi people to self-determination.110 The Assembly has also affirmed the fact that Morocco 
is in “continued occupation” of the territory,111 and Morocco has illegally settled some 200-
300,000 of its civilians in it who now form the majority of the population.112 Nevertheless, at 
no point has the UN declared Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara to be illegal,113 and it 
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106 S/RES/678, 29 November 1990. 
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has conditioned the realization of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination upon 
negotiations and the holding of a referendum in agreement with both parties.114 Over forty years 
on, the referendum has yet to take place, Morocco remains in occupation of Western Sahara 
and the indigenous people of that territory have yet to attain freedom and independence. 
 
 Northern Cyprus. On 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus following years of inter-
communal strife between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority, and a 
coup that brought a pro-Greek unification leadership to power. The tumult of the coup and the 
invasion that followed threatened to upend the delicate balance upon which the island’s 
independence from British rule in 1960 was forged. With the northern third of the island under 
effective Turkish military control, and over two-hundred thousand Cypriots internally displaced 
– Turks taking refuge in the north, Greeks in the south – what pre-invasion communal links that 
did exist had been indelibly severed. Attempts by the Turkish Cypriots to establish a federal 
state system between 1975 and 1983 failed, and in November 1983 the community declared the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The response at the UN 
was swift, in so far as both the General Assembly and Security Council called upon all states 
to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, 
deplored the continued occupation of part of its territory by foreign forces, demanded the 
immediate withdrawal of those forces, and affirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by force.115 The Council was particularly firm in denouncing the establishment of the 
TRNC as “legally invalid” and called upon all states not to recognize or “in any way assist” 
it.116 Notwithstanding these clear positions, at no point has the UN ever declared Turkey’s 
occupation of Northern Cyprus to be illegal, but has instead repeatedly called upon the parties 
to negotiate its end under UN auspices.117 Despite the good offices of multiple Secretaries-
General, the occupation of Northern Cyprus continues.  
 
 East Timor. On 8 December 1975, Portugal vacated East Timor, a non-self-governing 
territory it had held since the sixteenth century, following a declaration of independence by the 
Frente Revolutionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN). At approximately the same 
time, Indonesia invaded East Timor in an attempt to supress the emergence of indigenous 
                                                 
114 E.g., S/RES/1495, 31 July 2003; S/RES/2351, 28 April 2017. 
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November 1978; A/RES/34/30, 20 November 1979; A/RES/37/253, 20 December 1982; S/RES/365, 13 December 
1974; and S/RES/367, 12 March 1975. 
116 S/RES/541, 18 November 1983; S/RES/550, 11 May 1984. 
117 Each of the resolutions in supra note 115 and well as id. urge the parties to negotiate under UN auspices. See 
also A/RES/31/12, 12 November 1976 and A/RES/32/15, 9 November 1977. 
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independence under FRETILIN. Having established effective control over the territory, in July 
1976 Indonesia declared East Timor to be its twenty-seventh province. Initially, the UN 
response was principled with the Security Council and the General Assembly deploring the 
Indonesian invasion, calling upon all states to respect East Timor’s territorial integrity and the 
right of its people to self-determination, rejecting Indonesia’s purported annexation and calling 
for it to withdraw without delay. 118  Notwithstanding these clear positions, neighbouring 
Australia recognized Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in February 1979. This lead to 
proceedings brought by Portugal before the ICJ in which the Court affirmed the right erga 
omnes of the people of East Timor to self-determination, though expressly refusing to rule on 
the legality of Indonesia’s presence in the territory.119 At the same time, UN action in both the 
Council and the Assembly shifted away from expressly calling for Indonesia’s unconditional 
withdrawal, opting instead for UN mediated talks.120 After years of violence in which hundreds 
of thousands of East Timorese lost their lives, Indonesia vacated East Timor in 1999 leading to 
a UN sponsored referendum that led to independence and full membership of the UN in 2002.121 
At no time throughout its engagement with the question of East Timor did the UN expressly 
recognize the illegality of Indonesia’s presence in the territory.  
 
 The six case studies above demonstrate two points of interest relevant to the impact of 
the UN’s fidelity to international law in perpetuating the ILS condition. First, there is a 
correlation between the UN’s determination of the illegality of an occupant’s presence in 
occupied territory and the fact that that presence was eventually brought to an end consistent 
with the law on state responsibility. To be clear, the emphasis here is not merely on the fact of 
the occupation having come to an end, as such, but rather that its end was consistent with the 
relevant international law on state responsibility thereby demonstrating a commitment of the 
UN to the maintenance of the international rule of law, the ostensible organizing framework of 
the UN system. In these three cases, tendencies toward consigning the occupied population to 
contingent ILS status were thereby mitigated. Second, in those cases where the UN has 
remained silent on the legality of an occupant’s presence in occupied territory and made its end 
subject to negotiation, the possibility of a correlative rule by law character in UN action arises 
that arguably has made it more difficult to resolve conflict in accordance with international law. 
In such cases, the more powerful occupant has benefited from a measure of political legitimacy 
                                                 
118 See S/RES/384, 22 December 1975; S/RES/389(1976), 22 April 1976; A/RES/3485(XXX), 12 December 1975; 
A/RES/31/53, 1 December 1976; A/RES/32/34, 28 November 1977; and A/RES/33/39, 13 December 1978. 
119 East Timor, paras. 17, 29, 33-35. 
120 See A/RES/35/27, 11 November 1980; A/RES/36/50, 24 November 1981; A/RES/37/30, 23 November 1982. 
121 S/RES/1414, 23 May 2002. 
Chapter 4 – 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 126 
bestowed upon its prolonged violation of international legal norms, including those of a 
peremptory character, thereby affirming the contingent ILS condition of the weaker occupied 
population, undermining the international rule of law and rendering the prospects for peace in 
conformity with that law more distant.  
 
 The Occupied Palestinian Territory. Based on the record, the UN’s handling of Israel’s 
prolonged occupation of the OPT falls into the second batch of cases cited above, in so far as it 
has failed to definitively determine that presence to be illegal on the basis of its own UN record, 
and has made its end subject to negotiation. The need for definitiveness derives from the fact 
that the Organization’s treatment of the issue has suffered from inconsistency and contradiction. 
While some UN organs began consideration of the matter with a principled approach, their 
positions have become diluted or legally confused over time. Still, other organs have remained 
silent on the matter altogether. The net result has been an undermining of the UN’s stated 
commitment to the maintenance of the international rule of law in its policy positions on the 
question of Palestine. Concomitantly, Palestine’s reliance on the unfulfilled promise of those 
positions has in turn resulted in the maintenance of its ILS condition.  
 
 Thus, in 1975 and 1976 the General Assembly condemned the occupation as a “violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations”,122 while from 1977 to 1981 it expressly qualified it as 
“illegal”.123 Between 1981 and 1991 the Assembly dropped this reference and reverted to 
condemning the occupation as a “violation of the Charter of the United Nations”, albeit 
demanding Israel’s “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal”.124 Taken together, this 
practice would suggest the Assembly was of the view that at least by the eighth year of the 
occupation, Israel’s presence in the OPT had become illegal for being in violation of the jus ad 
bellum provisions of the Charter and, accordingly, could not condition its end on negotiation 
in line with the law on state responsibility. The problem arises from the fact that from 1992 
onward – just after the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference – all such references in 
Assembly resolutions simply vanish. From that point on, the Assembly has satisfied itself with 
an annual affirmation that “the occupation itself” constitutes a “grave”, “gross” or “primary” 
                                                 
122 A/RES/3414(XXX), 5 December 1975; A/RES/31/61, 9 December 1976. 
123 See A/RES/32/20, 25 November 1977; A/RES/33/29, 7 December 1978; A/RES/34/70, 6 December 1979; 
A/RES/35/122E, 11 December 1980; A/RES/35/207, 16 December 1980; and A/RES/36/147E, 16 December 
1981, the latter of which references “illegal Israeli military occupation”.  
124 See A/RES/36/147E, 16 December 1981; A/RES/36/226A, 17 December 1981; A/RES/37/123F, 20 December 
1982; A/RES/38/180D, 19 December 1983; A/RES/39/146A, 14 December 1984; A/RES/40/168A, 16 December 
1985; A/RES/41/162A, 4 December 1986; A/RES/42/209B, 11 December 1987; A/RES/43/54A, 6 December 
1988; A/RES/44/40A, 4 December 1989; A/RES/45/83A, 13 December 1990; and A/RES/46/82A, 16 December 
1991. 
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violation only of “human rights”, while expressing the “hope” that the parties are able to bring 
it to an end through negotiation.125 The only other organ of the UN that has qualified Israel’s 
occupation as illegal as such has been ECOSOC. This has been done on an annual basis since 
2010, while curiously also urging the international community to renew efforts aimed at the 
conclusion of a negotiated peace leading to the occupation’s end, the requirements of the law 
on state responsibility notwithstanding.126 For its part, the office of the Secretary-General has 
taken a more conservative line. When Kofi Annan called upon Israel to “end the illegal 
occupation” of the OPT in 2002, public criticism resulted in a quick reversal of course with a 
clarification that his reference to illegality was meant to be understood in relation to the IHL 
and IHRL violations of the occupying power, not the nature of the occupation as such. Notably, 
this clarification included an affirmation of the standard UN position on the need for 
negotiations between the parties based on the land-for-peace formula.127 In the Wall advisory 
opinion, the ICJ failed to opine on the legality of Israel’s presence in the OPT, although in a 
separate opinion Judge Elaraby affirmed “the illegality of the Israeli occupation regime 
itself”.128 The silence of the majority opinion on the legality of the occupation was made 
problematic by the fact of the Court’s invocation of the need for negotiations as a means to 
resolve the conflict, as noted above. In addition, any value placed in Elaraby’s illegality finding 
was undermined by his incorrect statement of law that occupation per se is always illegal.129 
The Security Council has never opined on the legality of Israel’s presence in the OPT, an 
omission demonstrative of the lack of unanimity among Member States on the legality of 
Israel’s use of force in 1967. Finally, the current UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in 
the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967, Michael Lynk, has very recently issued a report 
                                                 
125 The reference to the occupation constituting a “grave”, “gross” or “primary” violation of human rights dates 
from 1981. See A/RES/36/147C, 16 December 1981; A/RES/37/88C, 10 December 1982; A/RES/38/79, 15 
December 1983; A/RES/39/95, 14 December 1984; A/RES/40/161D, 16 December 1985; A/RES/41/63D, 3 
December 1986; A/RES/42/160D, 8 December 1987; A/RES/43/58, 6 December 1988; A/RES/44/48, 8 December 
1989; A/RES/45/74, 11 December 1990; A/RES/46/47, 9 December 1991; A/RES/47/70A, 14 December 1992; 
A/RES/49/36, 9 December 1994; A/RES/50/29, 6 December 1995; A/RES/51/131, 13 December 1996; 
A/RES/52/64, 10 December 1997; A/RES/53/53, 3 December 1998; A/RES/54/76, 6 December 1999; 
A/RES/55/130, 8 December 2000; A/RES/56/59, 10 December 2001; A/RES/57/124, 11 December 2002; 
A/RES/58/96, 9 December 2003; A/RES/59/121, 10 December 2004; A/RES/60/104, 8 December 2005; 
A/RES/61/116, 14 December 2006; A/RES/62/106, 17 December 2007; A/RES/63/95, 5 December 2008; 
A/RES/64/91, 10 December 2009; A/RES/65/102, 10 December 2010; A/RES/66/76, 9 December 2011; 18 
December 2012; A/RES/68/80, 11 December 2013; A/RES/69/90, 5 December 2014; A/RES/70/87, 9 December 
2015; and A/RES/71/95, 6 December 2016. 
126  See E/RES/2010/6, 20 July 2010; E/RES/2011/18, 26 July 2011; E/RES/2012/25, 14 September 2012; 
E/RES/2013/17, 9 October 2013; E/RES/2014/1, 18 July 2014; E/RES/2015/13, 19 August 2015; E/RES/2016/4, 
22 July 2016; and E/RES/2017/10, 4 August 2017. 
127 See UN GAOR, 57th Sess., 4488th Mtg. at 3, S/PV.4488, 12 March 2002; Fletcher (New York Times, 21 March 
2002); Eckhard (New York Times, 23 March 2002). 
128 Wall, Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby at 124. 
129 See id. where Elaraby opined: “Occupation, as an illegal and temporary situation, is at the heart of the whole 
problem”. See also infra section 4.3. 
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identifying Israel as an illegal occupant in the OPT.130 Nevertheless, given Lynk’s status as an 
independent expert, his views cannot be taken as reflective of the official position of the UN 
Organization.   
 
 Therefore, between the incongruity and, at times, incoherence of the positions articulated 
by various organs of the UN, it is clear there is a need for the Organization to definitively 
confirm whether Israel’s continued occupation of the OPT is legal. This is perhaps why the 
scant literature on the legality of Israel’s occupation has largely neglected to discuss the above-
noted practice of the UN, instead taking it as a given that the international community treats 
Israel as the lawful occupant of the OPT.131 By definitively addressing the illegality of Israel’s 
occupation regime, the UN would be able to complete its application of the international rule 
of law on the question of Palestine, going beyond the usual humanitarian/managerial IHL & 
IHRL paradigm. This, in turn, would allow the Palestinian people to mitigate the effects of the 
quasi-sovereign and contingent status upon which their ILS condition in the UN has been 
maintained in the post-1967 era. 
  
4.3 The Illegality of Israel’s Continued Presence in the OPT 
 Assessing the legality of Israel’s prolonged occupation of the OPT requires a detailed 
consideration of three interconnected branches of international law, including as confirmed 
within the extensive UN practice on the OPT outlined above. These are the law governing the 
use of force (jus ad bellum), the law governing how force is used in armed conflict (jus in bello 
or IHL), and IHRL, including the law on self-determination of peoples. Because of the OPT’s 
status as an occupied territory, the starting point must be the law of occupation. As will be 
demonstrated, this lex specialis is underpinned by all three of these branches. 
 
 As a component of IHL, the law of occupation governs the administration of enemy 
territory captured as a result of an armed conflict pending the withdrawal of the occupying 
power and the return of the occupied territory to its people, the lawful sovereign. Although it 
consists of general rules recognized as customary international law and therefore binding on all 
states, it is codified to a large extent in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
                                                 
130 Lynk Report. At the request of the Special Rapporteur, the author advised him in the preparation of his report 
while conducting this research. 
131 Lynk Report, para. 18. See also Benvenisti (2012); Gross (2017); Finkelstein (2018); and Ben-Naftali, et al. 
(2005). The only exception to this is Ronen (2008), 216-221, who surveys the UN’s position on the illegality of 
Israel’s occupation based only on a sample of GA and ICJ practice, without going into that of other key organs of 
the Organization. The result is to give the false impression that the UN’s position on the illegality of the occupation 
is more definitive than it actually is.  
 Chapter 4 – 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 129 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War132 and the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, along with its annexed Regulations, 133  themselves widely 
regarded as codifications of custom. While Israel has not disputed the applicability of the 1907 
Hague Regulations to the OPT given its acceptance of its customary status, it holds that Geneva 
Convention IV, to which it is signatory without reservation, does not apply to the territory. This 
position has been rejected by all relevant organs of the UN, including the ICJ.134 
 
 In essence, the law of occupation delineates how the civilian (or “protected”) population 
is to be treated while an occupying power maintains effective control over an occupied territory. 
The law also outlines the duties and corresponding rights of the occupying power in respect of 
its overall obligation to protect the civilian population and maintain public order in the territory. 
Although the law aims to balance the legitimate military interests of the occupying power with 
the interests of the civilian population, its overriding imperative is to protect the human and 
political rights of the latter when confronted with claims of military necessity of the former.135   
 
 There are two fundamental principles underlying the law of occupation. The first 
principle is that occupation is a temporary condition during which the occupying power’s 
authority is limited merely to that of the de facto administrator of the territory in question. Such 
authority is to be exercised for the principle benefit of the protected population in the way of a 
fiduciary duty, although the occupying power is permitted in specific circumstances to take 
measures to protect its legitimate military interests in the occupied territory so long as the 
advantage gained is proportionate to the harm suffered by the protected population. 
Accordingly, an occupying power may not use its forces to further an objective unrelated to its 
military interests in the territory or is itself manifestly illegal in character (i.e. population 
transfer, including civilian settlement). Thus, an important corollary of the temporariness 
principle, is the proposition that under no circumstances may an occupying power exercise its 
authority under the law of occupation to further its domestic needs (e.g. acquisition of scarce 
natural resources), national political interests (e.g. territorial aggrandizement or the 
establishment of a puppet regime), or to impose regimes and systems of government on the 
protected population inimical to humanity as a whole (e.g. racial discrimination).136 Because 
                                                 
132 Geneva Convention IV. 
133 1907 Hague Regulations. 
134 E.g., S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016; A/RES/70/88, 9 December 2015; E/RES/2017/10, 4 August 2017; and 
Wall, para. 101. For examination of the Israeli claim, see Imseis (2003), 92-100. 
135 Imseis, id., 66. 
136 Benvenisti (2012), 349, is of the view that where a “recalcitrant occupant” takes “measures aimed at the 
occupant’s own interests”, viz. those that go beyond the security of the military in the occupied territory, such 
interests should be viewed as “illegal and void”.    
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occupation is inherently temporary, the occupying power is prohibited from altering the status 
of the occupied territory.137 In addition, it is bound to permit and ensure the functioning of the 
pre-war administration of the territory, including the obligation to respect the laws in force in 
the territory, amending them only to the extent required to enable the occupying power to meet 
its obligations under the law. 138  Despite the temporariness principle, one lacuna in the 
prevailing law is the lack of a specific provision imposing a time limit on occupation. 
 
 The second principle is that under no circumstances does the fact of being in occupation 
of a territory entitle the occupant to sovereignty over that territory. This non-sovereign principle 
evolved from the antiquated law and practice governing the right of states to resort to force in 
their international relations, including as a means of acquiring territory. The right of conquest, 
as it was understood, has gradually given way to the notion of occupation: the idea that 
sovereign possession of territory occupied through force, whether defensive or aggressive, can 
never be definite until the restoration of sovereignty in the people of the territory is achieved 
through withdrawal of the occupying power. Until such time, occupation of territory thus 
acquired or maintained can only be regarded as provisional in nature. Contemporary state 
practice on occupations, exemplified by the American-led occupation of Iraq following the US 
invasion in 2003, underscores that the modern law of occupation defers to the principle of self-
determination of peoples and the complementary idea that sovereignty lies in the people and 
not in its ousted government. The right of peoples to self-determination has been recognized by 
the ICJ as a right erga omnes.139 As such, occupying powers are obligated to respect that right 
and do nothing to permanently frustrate its exercise.140 In addition, the non-sovereign principle 
is an embodiment of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of 
force, itself a corollary of the general prohibition of the threat or use of force as codified in 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter.141 The Friendly Relations Declaration, which according to Ian 
Brownlie is “a useful epitome of the law and a form of state practice”,142 makes clear that “[t]he 
                                                 
137 Imseis (2003), 91. Although a principle of customary international law, this proposition finds expression in 
1977 API, art. 4, which provides that “[n]either the occupation of a territory nor the application of the Conventions 
and this Protocol shall effect the legal status of the territory in question”.    
138 These general propositions are given expression in a number of treaty provisions codifying both the Hague and 
Geneva law. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, a first point of reference, provides that the occupant “shall 
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Likewise, Article 64 of Geneva 
Convention IV states that “[t]he penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that 
they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security 
or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention”.    
139 East Timor, para. 29; Wall, para. 88; and Namibia, para. 12. 
140 Benvenisti (2012), 198. 
141 Wall, para. 87; S/RES/242, 22 November 1967. 
142 Brownlie (2003), 705. 
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territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the 
threat or use of force” and that “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of 
force shall be recognized as legal”.143 This peremptory norm is reflected in a host of other norms 
under public international law relevant to the situation in the OPT, including in both the law of 
occupation144 and international criminal law.145 
 
 The significance of the abovementioned fundamental principles cannot be overstated. 
They are rooted in the protection of at least three jus cogens norms of international law of erga 
omnes character, derogation from which is not permitted: the prohibition on the acquisition of 
territory through the threat or use of force, the obligation of states to respect the right of peoples 
to self-determination, and the obligation of states to refrain from imposing regimes of alien 
subjugation, domination, and exploitation inimical to humankind, including racial 
discrimination.146 As interdependent concepts, they constitute the pith and substance of the 
modern law of occupation and inform virtually every aspect of that normative regime as exists 
in both treaty and custom.  
 
 Because the humanitarian imperative underpinning IHL contemplates the existence of a 
legal regime governing military occupation, it necessarily follows that occupation as such does 
not ipso facto represent an illegal state of affairs. That said, the fundamental distinction between 
the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello has rendered it generally accepted among scholars that 
occupations resulting from the impermissible use of force (i.e. aggression) are necessarily 
                                                 
143 Friendly Relations Declaration, first principle, para. 10. 
144 Geneva Convention IV provides for the continued application of the Convention in situations of purported 
annexation of occupied territory by an occupant (art. 47), and classifies as a grave breach the extensive 
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (art. 147). 
145 The Rome Statute prohibits the extensive appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes (art. 8(2)(a)(iv)). 
146 Crawford (2005), 188, 246-247. Of note, Crawford’s commentary on the ASRIWA was published in 2002 and 
does not expressly identify the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force as a 
jus cogens, but rather only its parent principle, the general prohibition on the threat or use of force. Nevertheless, 
as Orakhelashvili has argued, “once the exercise of sovereign authority entails, or is consequential upon, a breach 
of a peremptory norm, the acts performed become subject to the overriding effect of jus cogens.  Not only are they 
illegal – which would be the case for every wrongful act – but they are also void”, resulting in what he calls “a jus 
cogens nullity”. See Orakhelashvilli (2006), 216, 218-223. But it is doubtful whether a jus cogens nullity should 
be understood as a separate sub-category of jus cogens norms, per se. The better view would be that there is little, 
if any, substantive legal difference or effect between the two, particularly because both are rooted in the identical 
purpose of safeguarding the most fundamental value of the international state system: respect for the territorial 
integrity and political independence of states. As a matter of state practice, this is presumably the rationale behind 
the virtually indistinguishable treatment these two precepts have been afforded on the international plane, 
particularly in resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, including the Friendly Relations 
Declaration. In its 2004 written statement furnished to the ICJ in the Wall advisory opinion, Palestine submitted 
that the prohibition on the acquisition of territory through force amounted to a jus cogens norm. It is of note that 
Crawford, now a Judge on the ICJ, was then among counsel of record for Palestine. See Wall, Palestine Written 
Statement.  
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illegal,147 while occupations resulting from a lawful use of force under the UN Charter are 
legal, per se, notwithstanding subsequent transgressions by the occupying power of the jus in 
bello during the occupation.148 The legality of occupations has therefore traditionally only ever 
been conceived against these two separate paradigms; the jus ad bellum understood as providing 
the normative framework for assessing the legitimacy of the original act giving rise to the 
occupation, the jus in bello perceived as providing a valuable normative framework within 
which to measure the behaviour of the occupant during an occupation, but inappropriate for, if 
incapable of, assessing the legality of the particular regime of occupation itself. 149   This 
traditional view was affirmed, in part, by Judge Koojimans in Armed Activities, where he opined 
in obiter dicta that: “[i]t goes without saying that the outcome of an unlawful act is tainted with 
illegality.  The occupation resulting from an illegal use of force betrays its origin but the rules 
governing its regime do not characterize the origin of the result as lawful or unlawful”.150 
 
The problem with this traditional bifurcation is that it fails to consider a third possibility, 
a failure which is found at the heart of the UN’s current position on the question of Palestine 
and one that continues to inform the Palestine’s ILS condition in the system. Namely, where an 
initially lawful occupant engages in gross or systematic violations of international law 
involving breaches of obligations of a jus cogens and erga omnes character, by what rationale 
can it be said that the regime of force maintaining such situation remains legal and therefore 
legitimate? Only a few writers have touched upon this question, and the implications of the 
collapse of the fundamental distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello inherent in it, 
particularly though not exclusively in situations of prolonged occupation. Benvenisti has argued 
that “the law of occupation ought not to condone an occupant that holds out in bad faith, using 
its control of the occupied territory as leverage”, as such a situation would be “no different from 
outright annexation” and “aggression”.151 Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli have proposed to 
read into the law of occupation the notion of “reasonable time”, with the reasonableness of an 
occupation’s duration measured by the “nature, purpose and circumstances” of the actions 
                                                 
147 Benvenisti (2012), 140.  See also Friendly Relations Declaration, first principle, para. 10 (“[t]he territory of a 
State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions 
of the Charter”). 
148 But see Dinstein (2009), 2, who argues that it is a “myth surrounding the legal regime of belligerent occupation 
that it is, or becomes in time, inherently illegal under international law”.   
149  This is a view shared by Ben-Naftali, et al. (2005), 552, who ascribe the “virtual immunity” enjoyed by Israel 
from any critical discussion of the legality of its occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) to “the 
perception of the occupation as a factual, rather than a normative, phenomenon. Thus posited, the fact of 
occupation generates normative results – the application of the international laws of occupation – but in itself does 
not seem to be a part of that, or any other, normative order”.   
150 Armed Activities, para. 60.    
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undertaken by an occupant to maintain it in place.152 Ronen posits that the illegality of an 
occupation is established where a jus cogens norm is violated, so long as that norm relates to 
territorial status.153 Finkelstein has argued that failure of an occupant to negotiate the end of the 
occupation in good faith is enough to taint it with illegality.154 Finally, Lynk has argued that 
occupants “will cross the red line into illegality if they breach their fundamental obligations as 
alien rulers”, namely respect for the non-annexation of occupied territory, ensuring the 
temporariness of their presence, and governing the territory in the best interests of the protected 
population in good faith.155  
 
Collectively, these writers draw upon principles/themes of temporariness, trusteeship and 
good faith, and all deal to varying degrees with the two fundamental principles of occupation 
law as informed by the content of most of the jus cogens norms in issue. However, there are at 
least four gaps in the body of this work. First, of the three legal tests that are proposed, one 
(Ben-Naftali et al.) is rooted in the realm of lex ferenda, focused as it is on rectifying the lacuna 
in the law as to time limits on occupation by proposing a wholly new legal test as yet 
unrecognized in international law. Another (Ronen) circumscribes her jus cogens-based test to 
those norms that relate to territorial status. Finally, another (Lynk) unfortunately does not to 
speak to the very peremptory character of the norms underpinning his otherwise well thought 
out approach. Second, as noted above, all but one of these authors fail to deal with the important, 
though confused, UN practice that at least for a time already declared Israel’s occupation to be 
illegal, as such, while the one that does (Ronen) fails to account for UN practice beyond a 
portion of that of the General Assembly and the ICJ. Third, neither of the latter two 
contributions (Finkelstein; Lynk) have taken into account the upgraded status of the State of 
Palestine at the UN, which is curious in light of the elevated consequences that status portends 
in view of the cardinal principle protecting the territorial integrity of states codified in article 
2(4) of the Charter. Fourth, with the exception of one author, none of this work deals to any 
great extent with the legal consequences of Israel’s illegal occupation under the law of state 
responsibility; the one that does (Ronen) fails to examine what is perhaps the fundamental 
problem of the UN’s practice in this area, namely that the end of Israel’s occupation should be 
contingent on negotiation.  
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155 Lynk Report.  
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In view of the above, and informed by the need to read subaltern interests fully into 
relevant international law so as to mitigate against the ILS condition, it is submitted that the 
most plain and efficient test to assess the legality of any occupation not otherwise impugned by 
an initial violation of the jus ad bellum is to focus on whether the occupant in question is 
systematically violating any of the three key jus cogens norms underpinning the law of 
occupation: (i) the prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force; 
(ii) the obligation to the respect the right of peoples to self-determination; and/or (iii) the 
obligation to refrain from imposing regimes of alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation 
inimical to humankind, including racial discrimination. The benefit of using jus cogens norms 
as the standard derives from the fact that these norms reflect prevailing law (lex lata) and form 
part of the constitutional bedrock upon which the post-WWII international order, both legal and 
political, is based. Where the acts or omissions of the UN run counter to jus cogens norms of 
an erga omnes character, the corrosive effect on the international rule of law will be 
pronounced, with negative implications for both the authority of the Organization and 
international law as a whole. Indeed, where such a corrosion exists, as is the case with the UN’s 
management of the OPT post-1967, the contingency of subaltern peoples who have been made 
to rely on the promise of international law and organization can only be mitigated through 
maintaining respect for these jus cogens norms.  
 
The legality of Israel’s occupation of the OPT may be impugned on two grounds. The 
first of these is that it may be regarded as illegal ab initio, being the result of the impermissible 
use of force in 1967. Without wholly discounting its merits, the problem with this argument for 
the purposes of this research is that the historical record as established in UN practice does not 
lend itself to a finding that Israel’s invocation of force in 1967 was illegal, as such. Between 
the silence of the Security Council on the issue in 1967, and the subsequent confusion in General 
Assembly resolutions in the years that followed, it is difficult to point to any UN practice 
sufficient to ground such a claim in either fact or law.156 The second ground is that even if the 
occupation was not illegal ab initio, it has been rendered illegal over time for being in violation 
of the jus cogens norms outlined above. This ground is easier to establish on the basis of the 
UN record, which demonstrates a clear nexus between Israeli contraventions of IHL and IHRL 
and Israel’s systematic violation of the relevant jus cogens norms in play over time.  
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In the section below, and relying primarily on the UN record, we briefly assess various 
Israeli actions in the OPT against each of these norms in turn. As we do, it is important to keep 
in mind that of all of Israel’s relevant actions, the one that almost singularly constitutes the 
proximate cause of its violations of these norms is its policy of introducing civilian settlers into 
the OPT in violation of Geneva Convention IV, 157  the Rome Statute, 158  and customary 
international law.159 
 
Prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force. The question 
of whether or not occupied territory may be considered “annexed” is a factual one that does not 
necessarily require formal declarations of annexation to be satisfied under international law.160 
Since 1967, Israel has undertaken actions that have effectively annexed a substantial portion of 
the OPT through a series of legislative, administrative and other acts in contravention of the 
peremptory norm prohibiting the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force.  
 
Following the 1967 war, Israel extended its municipal law and jurisdiction to occupied 
East Jerusalem, unilaterally expanding the city’s 6.5km2 area to encompass 71km2 of 
expropriated Palestinian land in the surrounding areas of the West Bank.161 In response, the 
General Assembly declared “all measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city” to be 
“invalid”,162 while the Security Council determined that “all legislative and administrative 
actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to 
change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status.” 163 These 
resolutions both affirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. After the 
passage of Israel’s 1980 ‘basic law’ declaring Jerusalem to be its “complete and united” capital, 
the Security Council once again determined that “all legislative and administrative measures 
and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the 
character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent ‘basic law’ on 
Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith.” It further decided “not to 
recognize the basic law, and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to 
alter the character and status of Jerusalem,” and called upon “all Member States to accept this 
decision”.164 Despite Israel’s agreement in the Oslo accords from initiating “any step that will 
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change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip” during the interim phase of negotiations 
with the PLO,165 since 1993 Israeli polices designed to alter the status of Jerusalem have been 
pursued at a continually aggressive pace, with thousands of Palestinians being evicted from the 
city while the population of Israeli settlers has grown exponentially. In response, the General 
Assembly and the Security Council have continued to denounce Israel’s purported annexation 
of East Jerusalem as “illegal”, “null and void”, and having “no validity whatsoever”.166 
 
Beyond Jerusalem, Israeli actions in the rest of the OPT have operated to effectuate its 
annexation in all but name. Key among these has been the unilateral expropriation of large 
segments of the territory for the establishment of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure 
(by-pass roads, electrical and sewage grids, tunnels, military checkpoints, etc.), as well the 
construction of the wall and its associated regime in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 
Far from being a secret, as noted by a 2012 UN Human Rights Council International Fact-
Finding Mission on Settlements, each successive Israeli government since 1967 has “openly 
lead and directly participated in the planning, construction, development, consolidation and/or 
encouragement of settlements” in the OPT through a variety of political, military and economic 
means.167 Whereas between 1967 and 1973, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank 
stood at just over 1,500,168 by 1987 their number in the whole of the OPT, including East 
Jerusalem, had grown to 169,000.169 Since the commencement of the Oslo process in 1993 – 
with its proviso that nothing be done by either party to prejudge the outcome of negotiations – 
the settler population has over tripled, with the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Settlements 
estimating its figure to be 520,000 as at 2012 (200,000 in East Jerusalem, 300,000 in rest of 
OPT),170 and the Israeli Prime Minister himself putting the figure at 650,000 in 2011.171 This 
means that today between 19 and 23 percent of the population of the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, are settlers. 172  According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Settlements, the 
growth rate of settlers in the OPT between 2002-2012 was almost triple that of the yearly 
average in Israel.173 In total, OCHA reports that Israel has allocated over 43% of the West Bank 
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to local or regional ‘settlement councils’.174 These councils are located predominately within 
‘Area C’ of the territory, which comprises over 60% of the total area of the West Bank and 
within which Israel exercises exclusive control, including over planning and construction.175  
 
In 2004, the ICJ found the wall, along with its associated regime, being constructed by 
Israel in the OPT to be contrary to international law as it “gives expression in loco to the illegal 
measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements”.176 The Court also found 
that the wall and its associated regime give rise to “a risk of further alterations to the 
demographic composition” of the territory “in as much as it is contributing…to the departure 
of Palestinian populations from certain areas.” 177  It further noted that the wall would 
incorporate, in the area between it and the 1949 armistice line, “more than 16 per cent of the 
territory of the West Bank” and “[a]round 80 per cent of the settlers” in the OPT. The Court 
accordingly considered “that the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a ‘fait 
accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent”, in which case “it would be 
tantamount to de facto annexation.”178 Some 14 years since this opinion was issued, Israel has 
maintained and expanded the wall and its associated regime with its attendant effects of 
annexation of huge swathes of the OPT, as foretold by the ICJ.  
 
 The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination. Israel’s violation of the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination in the OPT has equally been driven by its settlement 
policy. In his commentary on Geneva Convention IV, Jean Pictet explains that the prohibition 
on civilian settlement by an occupying power was intended to prevent the introduction of 
demographic changes in occupied territory “for political and racial reasons”, and to frustrate 
attempts “to colonize” such territory.179 Yet, according to the UN record, that is precisely what 
has transpired in the OPT over the past 50 years. As noted by the UN Fact-Finding Mission on 
Settlements, Israeli governmental authorities in East Jerusalem have openly pursued a policy 
of “demographic balance” in the city, most recently incorporated into the “Jerusalem 2000” 
master-plan expressly envisioning a ratio of Jews to Arabs of no worse than 60/40 in favour of 
the former.180 The Fact-Finding Mission has further noted that Israel’s settlement of the rest of 
the OPT has largely followed a series of ‘master plans’ drawn up by governmental or quasi-
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governmental bodies, including the Allon Plan (1967), the Drobles Plan (1978), the Sharon 
Plan (1981) and the Hundred Thousand Plan (1983).181 The principal aim of these plans has 
been to use civilian settlement as means to simultaneously colonize the OPT and forestall the 
emergence of an independent Palestinian state in it. Thus, in the words of the Drobles Plan:  
 
“The best and most effective way of removing every shadow of doubt about our intention to hold on to Judea 
and Samaria [viz. the OPT] forever is by speeding up the settlement momentum in these territories. The purpose 
of settling the areas between and around the centers occupied by the minorities [viz. the Palestinian majority] 
is to reduce to the minimum the danger of an additional Arab state being established in these territories. Being 
cut off by Jewish settlements, the minority population will find it difficult to form a territorial and political 
continuity.”182 
 
 In 2012, the Secretary-General reported that because self-determination of the Palestinian 
people requires a territorial state in the OPT, “the current configuration and attribution of 
control over the land”, dominated by Israel and its settlement policy, “severely impedes the 
possibility of the Palestinian people expressing their right to self-determination.” Confirming 
the success of the strategy outlined by Drobles, the Secretary-General noted that, “because the 
settlements are scattered across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the territory of the 
Palestinian people is divided into enclaves with little or no territorial contiguity,” with a 
resulting “fragmentation” that “undermines the possibility of the Palestinian people realizing 
their right to self-determination through the creation of a viable state.”183 He further noted that 
given the “settlements and the associated restrictions on access of Palestinians to large portions 
of the West Bank”, the Palestinian people are impeded from exercising permanent control over 
their natural resources. Most vitally, this includes water, “which Palestinians have virtually no 
control over”, and 86% of the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area, which are “under the de facto 
jurisdiction of the regional councils of the settlements and which prohibit Palestinian use.”184 
Similar views were articulated by the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Settlements, which echoed 
the Secretary-General’s concern over the threat the settlements pose to the “demographic and 
territorial presence of the Palestinian people” in the OPT. It took issue with the fragmentation 
of the Palestinian territorial sphere, highlighting in particular the bisecting effect on the West 
Bank of the Ma’ale Adumim settlement, as well as the impediments posed by the settlements 
as a whole on Palestinian access to and control over their natural resources. It accordingly found 
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that the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination “is clearly being violated through 
the existence and ongoing expansion of the settlements.”185  
 
 These observations should be read in the context of the ICJ’s 2004 finding that Israel is 
obligated to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in the OPT, and 
that “all states” are independently obligated “to see to that any impediment, resulting from the 
construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-
determination is brought to an end.”186 For their part, on the many occasions the General 
Assembly and the Security Council have affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination, those resolutions have often been accompanied by statements stressing that the 
settlements constitute an “obstacle” to the achievement of peace through a two-state solution,187 
thereby implying a nexus between the settlements and a violation of the Palestinian people’s 
self-determination right. At any rate, both the Council and the Assembly have passed 
resolutions recalling the ICJ’s Wall advisory opinion, with the Assembly demanding that Israel 
“comply with its legal obligations” as affirmed by the Court.188 
 
 Contrary to popular belief, at no point has any Israeli government formally agreed to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the OPT. This assertion has become commonplace, yet 
in return for the PLO’s recognition of the “right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and 
security”, the only recognition made by Israel at Oslo was of “the PLO as the representative of 
the Palestinian people.”189  While it is true that recognition of the “Palestinian people” perforce 
implies a right in that people to self-determination, Israel has consistently adopted an emaciated 
view of the kind of “sovereignty” it would offer the Palestinians, if at all. Thus, it is common 
to hear that the Palestinian “state” that Israel would accept would be deprived of a military, 
control over its air space, territorial sea, borders, the Jordan valley, and be territorially non-
contiguous – akin, in many respects to the Bantustan model of Apartheid South Africa. 190 
Doubtless, this would fall considerably short of the attributes of statehood as universally 
accepted under international law.191 In this respect, it is instructive to find that the ruling Likud 
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party in Israel has always officially rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the 
Jordan river,192 and that Israel’s current Prime Minister, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, 
was elected in 2009 on a promise that there would be “no Palestinian state” established in the 
OPT “on my watch”.193 This was most recently reflected in a series of 2017 public statements 
by Netanyahu that no settlement will be uprooted in the West Bank, that Israel will remain in 
the territory “forever”,194 and that insofar as the notion of a Palestinian state is concerned, “it’s 
time we reassessed whether the modern model we have of sovereignty, and unfettered 
sovereignty, is applicable everywhere in the world.”195 Far from being alone, Netanyahu’s 
views are widely shared among the Israeli political and governing elite.196 
 
 Prohibition on Racial Discrimination. Finally, Israel’s settlement enterprise has 
introduced a system of government in the OPT that, according to the UN record, is 
systematically engaged in racial discrimination. More than a series of individual acts of racial 
discrimination, this system has developed into an overall governing regime. The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), to which Israel 
is signatory without reservation, defines “racial discrimination” as: 
 
“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin 
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life”.197 
 
Like its position on the non-applicability of Geneva Convention IV, Israel’s view that 
international human rights law, including ICERD, does not apply to the OPT has been rejected 
by the UN, including the ICJ. 198  The racial discrimination embodied in the regime the 
occupying power has erected through the imposition of exclusively Jewish settlements in the 
OPT, both in their service and for their expansion, is systematic and widespread.  
 
 Among the transgressions of ICERD the settlements have given rise to is the violation 
of the right to equal treatment before the law.199 This is the result of Israel’s maintenance of 
separate civilian and military legal systems operating concurrently in the OPT, the applicability 
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of which is determined solely by the national or ethnic origin of the individual concerned, 
effectively dividing the population along racial lines. Thus, any person in the OPT who is 
Jewish, whether a citizen of Israel or not, 200  is governed by Israeli municipal law, 
extraterritorially applied to them in personam and to the occupied lands upon which they 
illegally reside or travel. On the other hand, Palestinians in the OPT are governed by Israeli 
military law, which is much more draconian in both scope and effect, covering both civil and 
criminal matters.201 Another violation is the right to security of the person and protection by the 
state against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government or individuals.202 Since 
1967, thousands of Palestinians have been killed or injured by Israeli security forces for 
protesting the occupation,203 including through legally sanctioned extrajudicial execution204 
and torture,205 none of which methods are routinely used against Israeli settlers. In addition, 
Israeli settlers – who, unlike Palestinians, are permitted to own and bear arms – have regularly 
committed violence against the person and property of Palestinians with an impunity rooted in 
what the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Settlements calls “institutionalized discrimination” that 
is aimed at “forcing Palestinians off their land.”206 Yet another violation concerns the right to 
universal and equal suffrage.207 While the extrajudicial application of Israeli municipal law to 
settlers in the OPT provides for their right to vote, participate in and stand for elections, and to 
otherwise take part in public affairs and benefit from equal access to public services under the 
Israeli political system, none of these rights are extended on an equal basis to the Palestinians 
in the OPT. This abject disenfranchisement stands out owing to the fact that, despite the 
existence of the Palestinian Authority – a body created through the Oslo process meant to 
temporarily exercise local and limited ‘self-autonomy’ in Palestinian enclaves in the OPT 
pending conclusion of peace – the Israeli government, in effect, exercises exclusive control 
over the territory in which these two populations reside and within which it remains the 
occupying power.208 Another violation is the right to freedom of movement.209 With Palestinian 
space having been fragmented into numerous discontiguous enclaves by Israeli settlements, 
settler-only by-pass roads, hundreds of checkpoints and other similar roadblocks, the wall and 
                                                 
200 As the self-declared state of the ‘Jewish people’, Israeli law only recognizes Jewish, as opposed to Israeli, 
nationality. See George Rafael Tamarin v. State of Israel, 20 January 1972, in Decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Israel (Supreme Court, 1972) Vol. 25, pt. 1, at 197 (in Hebrew) as quoted in Tilley (2012), 119. On the application 
of Israeli municipal law to Jewish non-citizens of Israel in the OPT, see Tilley (2012), 67.  
201 Tilley (2012), 64-77.  
202 ICERD, art. 5. 
203 Tilley (2012), 131. 
204 Id., 132-133; Gross (2017), 243-244. 
205 Imseis (2001); B’Tselem Torture Report, May 2007. 
206 UN Fact-Finding Mission on Settlements, paras. 50-57, 107. 
207 ICERD, art. 5. 
208 Wall, para. 78. S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016. 
209 ICERD, art. 5. 
Chapter 4 – 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 142 
other closed military zones, the only way they are able to move into and out of these enclaves, 
or into and out of occupied East Jerusalem, is with permits issued by the Israeli military. Only 
a very small minority of Palestinians obtain such permits, which are spatially and temporarily 
limited and are notoriously difficult and costly to obtain. No such administrative restrictions 
apply to settlers under the applicable law.210 Finally, another violation is the right to leave and 
to return to one’s country.211 Leaving aside the Palestine refugees forcibly exiled as a result of 
the 1948 war, approximately 300,000 Palestinians either fled or were expelled from the OPT 
when Israel conquered it in 1967.212 In addition, approximately 90,000 were abroad during the 
hostilities and therefore rendered refugees sur place.213 Despite the Security Council having 
called upon Israel to facilitate the return of these people to the OPT, to this day Israel has 
refused.214 In contrast, by operation of Israel’s Law of Return (1950), any person who is of 
Jewish heritage is automatically entitled to immigrate to Israel and take up residence in the 
OPT, irrespective of where they were born.215 These are but a representative sample of the 
systematic violations of the ICERD that arise from the settler colonial regime Israel has 
imposed on the OPT since 1967.216 
 
 For these and other related reasons, in its concluding observations on Israel’s 2012 
periodic review under ICERD, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
reiterated its view that Israeli settlements in the OPT “are an obstacle to the enjoyment of human 
rights by the whole population, without distinction as to national or ethnic origin.” 217  It 
expressed its concern with Israel’s refusal to apply ICERD in the OPT and the fact that Israeli 
law does not provide for equality guarantees, including the prohibition on racial 
discrimination.218 It continued: 
“The Committee is extremely concerned at the consequences of policies and practices which amount to de 
facto segregation, such as the implementation by the State party in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of two 
entirely separate legal systems and sets of institutions for Jewish communities grouped in illegal settlements 
on the one hand and Palestinian populations living in Palestinian towns and villages on the other hand. The 
Committee is particularly appalled at the hermetic character of the separation of two groups, who live on the 
same territory but do not enjoy either equal use of roads and infrastructure or equal access to basic services 
and water resources. Such separation is concretized by the implementation of a complex combination of 
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movement restrictions consisting of the Wall, roadblocks, the obligation to use separate roads and a permit 
regime that only impacts the Palestinian population (art. 3 of the Convention).”219  
These findings were echoed by the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Settlements, which decried the 
“[t]he legal regime of segregation” operating in the OPT for having “enabled the establishment 
and consolidation of the settlements through the creation of a privileged legal space for 
settlements and settlers.” In its view, this has resulted “in daily violations of a multitude of the 
human rights of the Palestinians” in the OPT, “including, incontrovertibly, violating their rights 
to non-discrimination, equality before the law and equal protection of the law.”220  
 
 The racial discrimination inherent in Israel’s settlement regime in the OPT has given rise 
to concerns that the occupying power is also engaged in the crime of apartheid, as proscribed 
in the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid.221 Although Israel is not a signatory to the Apartheid Convention, the convention 
itself is declarative of customary international law and is therefore binding on all states. The 
Apartheid Convention defines the crime of apartheid as involving any number of “inhumane 
acts” – including those proscribed by the ICERD above, as well as “measures designed to divide 
the population along racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the 
members of a racial group or groups”222 – when these acts are “committed for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over another racial 
group of persons and systematically oppressing them.”223 It is therefore the element of mens 
rea – in this case demonstrative of an intent to racially dominate and systematically oppress – 
that renders the crime of Apartheid distinct from the commission of what would otherwise be 
a series of discreet acts of racial discrimination. For reasons of economy, it is not possible to 
cover in any sufficient detail the extent to which Israeli actions in the OPT satisfy the constituent 
elements of the crime of Apartheid in this research. Suffice to say, given the UN record 
establishes that Israel’s prolonged occupation of the OPT is clearly characterized by systematic 
racial discrimination, an increasing number of opinions and studies have been produced that 
have made strong cases to this effect.224 Of course, because none of these opinions and studies 
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represent the views of the UN, the Organization has yet to make a definitive pronouncement on 
the matter, despite the urging of at least one previous President of the General Assembly to do 
so in 2008.225   
 
 In light of the above, it is apparent that Israel’s prolonged occupation of the OPT has 
become illegal for its systematic violation of at least three jus cogens norms. According to the 
UN record, these are the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force, the obligation to 
respect the right of peoples to self-determination, and the obligation to refrain from imposing 
regimes of alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation inimical to humankind, including 
racial discrimination. The systematic nature of Israel’s violation of these norms is rooted in a 
series of discrete but interconnected violations of IHL and IHRL over an abnormally prolonged 
foreign military occupation. In and of themselves these discrete violations constitute 
internationally wrongful acts attributable to the occupying power. What lends them their true 
normative bite, particularly when considering the research question, is the fact that, when taken 
together, they constitute a composite series of actions defined in the aggregate as internationally 
wrongful. As such, and in accordance with the international rule of law of which they form a 
part, they give rise to specific international legal consequences for both Israel and third states 
the substance of which clashes with the UN’s long-standing position on the OPT in the post-
1967 period. This position, focused as it is on holding out the promise of addressing only a 
variety of IHL and IHRL violations while at the same time affirming that the end of the 
occupation giving rise to those violations must be made contingent on negotiation, has in turn 
been pivotal in the maintenance of Palestine’s ILS condition in the UN system. Its incoherence 
represents an embodiment of the international rule by law – in this case, the limited remit and 
selective application of IHL and IHRL – and affirms the essentially encumbered character of 
the international legal subjectivity of Palestine as a Third World quasi-sovereign within the UN. 
In order to demonstrate this further, it is useful to look more closely at the legal consequences 
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concurred in by Richard Falk, Dugard’s successor as UN Special Rapporteur, and Virginia Tilley, in a 2017 study 
commissioned by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), a report which the 
Secretary-General caused to be withdrawn ostensibly for reasons of process rather than substance (his office was 
not consulted in its preparation). See UN ESCWA Apartheid Report; and UN Official Resigns Over Israel 
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225  In his capacity as President of the General Assembly, Father Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, permanent 
representative of Nicaragua to the UN, described Israeli policies in the OPT as a form of Apartheid and urged the 
Assembly to “not be afraid to call something what it is.” UN GAOR, 63 Sess., 57th Plen. Mtg. at 2, A/63/PV.57, 
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of Israel’s illegal presence in the OPT, highlighting how those consequences are at odds with 
the negotiations condition at the center of the UN’s position on the issue, and whether and to 
what extent having recourse to them can assist in mitigating Palestine’s ILS condition in the 
Organization.   
 
4.4 Legal Consequences and the Mitigation of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity 
 Under the international law of state responsibility, the legal consequences of Israel’s 
illegal occupation of the OPT are three-fold. First, it is obligated to end the occupation forthwith 
and unconditionally. Second, it must offer appropriate guarantees of non-repetition. Third, it 
must make full reparation for injury caused, including any material and moral damage. Given 
the occupation involves gross and systematic breaches of jus cogens norms, the law of state 
responsibility imposes additional consequences on third states. These require third states to 
cooperate to bring to an end, through lawful means, Israel’s occupation of the OPT and to 
refrain from rendering aid or assistance to Israel in maintaining its illegal occupation of the 
OPT. In light of the general principle of law that states may not do collectively that which they 
are bound to refrain from doing individually, these third state obligations necessarily set the 
parameters of what the UN is obligated to do as an international organization. 
 
 It is apparent from the above that the UN’s conventional approach to ending Israel’s 
illegal occupation of the OPT – based on conditioning such end on negotiation between the 
parties – is highly problematic from a subaltern standpoint as it underscores the overall 
contingency of those gripped by the ILS condition. This is for at least three reasons. First, it 
runs counter to prevailing international law. Just as most municipal legal systems do not 
countenance a common thief being able to negotiate the terms of the return of stolen property, 
international law does not contemplate allowing states who are engaged in internationally 
wrongful conduct to negotiate the terms of how, to what extent, and when that conduct is to be 
brought to an end. This is particularly so where the internationally wrongful conduct is the 
result of a composite series of wrongful acts that violate peremptory norms, respect for which 
is non-derogable for being in the interest of, and owed to, the international community as a 
whole. In light of the 2012 upgrade in the status of Palestine at the UN to a non-member 
observer state, the implications of the UN’s position on negotiations as a condition of ending 
the illegal occupation of Palestine are important. For they go beyond the mere rights that accrue 
to a protected population under IHL and IHRL, and touch upon the rights and duties of all states 
to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any 
other state, as codified in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. It is not for nothing that this principle 
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has been characterized as the “cornerstone” and the “heart” of the Charter system by both the 
ICJ226 and publicists alike.227 Without it, the international system would be vulnerable to a 
complete collapse under the specter of a return to the age of total war and the legitimation of 
territorial aggrandizement through conquest. By conditioning the end of Israel’s occupation of 
the OPT on negotiation, the UN is undermining its raison d’être as rooted in the international 
rule of law upon which the promise of the Organization is ostensibly built. In this sense, the 
upgrade in Palestine’s status at the UN has elevated the urgency of the legal issues at play not 
only for the subaltern Palestinian people, but also for the Organization and its members as a 
whole. To the extent the UN continues to adopt a position at variance with the international rule 
of law, the legal rights and subjectivity of the Palestinian people purportedly recognized by it 
will remain contingent. 
 
 Second, the UN’s insistence on negotiations as a condition of ending Israel’s prolonged 
occupation of the OPT runs contrary to its own practice on foreign military occupations in other 
contexts. That practice demonstrates that where an occupation has been determined by the 
Organization to be illegal, the obligation to bring it to an end has not been conditioned on 
negotiation, but rather made an unconditional requirement to be speedily fulfilled in line with 
the law on state responsibility. The fact that the General Assembly and ECOSOC have to 
varying degrees affirmed the illegality of Israel’s occupation of the OPT would suggest that the 
Organization’s ‘negotiations condition’ is at odds with this practice. Nevertheless, because the 
UN cannot claim any measure of consistency in characterizing Israel’s occupation to be illegal, 
complications arise. The above assessment of the legality of Israel’s prolonged occupation 
highlights a potential remedy for this in so far as it shows, on the basis of legal positions and 
determinations already established by the UN itself, that the occupation has indeed become 
illegal for its violation of a number of jus cogens norms of an erga omnes character. In this 
light, it is submitted that the fact that the Organization has failed to adopt a position more in 
line with the requirements of international law on the issue is demonstrative of the continued 
rule by law binary inherent in its handling of the question of Palestine in the post-1967 period.  
 
 Third, the UN’s ‘negotiations condition’ is problematic because it renders conflict 
resolution more difficult to achieve by providing a measure of political legitimacy to the claims 
and positions of Israel vis á vis the territory without full regard for its track-record, again as 
established by the UN itself, of bad faith in adhering to its legal obligations as an occupying 
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power. Given the disparity in negotiating power between hegemonic Israel and the subaltern 
people subject to its rule in the OPT, it is hard to imagine how a negotiated resolution could be 
concluded at all, leave aside “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law” 
as envisioned in the Charter, if the full weight of international law is not brought to bear on the 
situation. For the past 50 years the occupying power has exercised absolute dominion over the 
OPT and its population to the point where nothing and no one is able to enter, exit or subsist in 
the territory without doing so under its de facto sovereign authority. In the quarter century since 
negotiations began at Oslo, the occupying power has consolidated its hold on the OPT under a 
public claim that it will never relinquish it, in complete contravention of the norms 
underpinning the law of occupation and its treaty obligations to refrain from prejudging the 
outcome of negotiations themselves. How calling for continued negotiations in such a context 
can be regarded as an effective way to bring about a peace in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law under the Charter, instead of an effective endorsement of the 
internationally wrongful acts of the hegemonic party, is a question no one seems to have 
seriously asked. It is against this context that the UN’s conditioning of the end of the occupation 
of the OPT on negotiations falls clearly short of the mark and represents a continuation of the 
rule by law character of the Organization’s management of the question of Palestine in the post-
1967 period. 
 
 In view of the above, the question arises whether the way is open for the UN to correct 
its position and, if so, whether this would vitiate the quasi-sovereignty at the heart of Palestine’s 
ILS condition? In line with the counter-hegemonic potential of international law set out in the 
introduction to this research, it is submitted that although important enhancements can be made 
to the UN’s position, such enhancements would only mitigate not vitiate, Palestine’s ILS 
condition. That said, both the General Assembly and the ICJ should be looked to as potential 
sites where the illegality of the occupation of the OPT can be definitively established, with all 
of the legal consequences such a finding would entail.  
 
 Because the General Assembly remains a venue where the State of Palestine enjoys 
continued widespread support, it holds an important place as an entry point on the issue. The 
temporal correlation between the onset of the Oslo process and the cessation of the Assembly’s 
characterization of Israel’s occupation of the OPT as “illegal” and/or in “violation of the UN 
Charter” is something of note. It can be reasonably assumed that this change in Assembly 
practice was the result of the promise the Oslo process held out of the parties finally realizing 
a negotiated resolution based on the two-state formula. Nevertheless, following 25 years of 
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process, there has been little peace to show for it. On the contrary, the UN record demonstrates 
that Israel has used this time to consolidate its hold over the OPT while gaining increased 
political legitimacy both regionally and internationally by paying lip service to “peace” at the 
UN, while pursuing patently illegal objectives in the territory that run counter to the 
Organization’s declared two-state “land for peace” formula. Now that the peace process is all 
but dead,228 the Assembly could be engaged in order to revive its previous position on the 
illegality of the occupation, thereby furnishing the international community with greater 
leverage to call for the unconditional and immediate end of the occupation in line with the law 
on state responsibility.  
 
 Another possibility that might be considered would be to seek a second advisory opinion 
of the ICJ. The proposed question could ask the Court for an opinion on “the legal consequences 
for all states and the United Nations arising from Israel’s continued settlement and prolonged 
occupation of the State of Palestine, in particular when and how that occupation must come to 
an end, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the UN Charter, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, international human rights law, relevant Security Council 
and General Assembly resolutions, and this Court’s advisory opinion of 9 July 2004?” Such a 
question would allow arguments to be advanced that go to the illegality of Israel’s occupation 
based on the jus cogens norms identified above with a view to terminating it, rather than merely 
managing it. If, before the matter reaches the Court, previous General Assembly practice 
referring to the occupation of the OPT as “illegal” and in “violation of the Charter” can be 
reinvigorated, this will make it easier to advance such arguments before the Court.   
 
 In public discussions under UN auspices held in 2015 involving the author and the current 
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the UN, the latter opined that seeking a second 
advisory opinion is “not a good idea”. Instead, it was suggested that “all the available tools 
must be revisited,” including the 2004 Wall advisory opinion.229 To be sure, aside from the 
establishment of UNROD, there has been little follow up by the UN on the Wall advisory 
opinion, so the point is well taken. Nevertheless, one of the problems with this view is its 
mistaken assumption that even robust follow-up on the Wall advisory opinion would offer a 
break from the rule by law inherent in the UN’s conventional humanitarian/managerial 
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approach to the occupation under the IHL/IHRL paradigm. What good would follow-up bring, 
if the only result would be to enhance the manner in which Israel maintains its over 50-year 
occupation and colonization of the OPT rather than end it?  
 
 It is well to recall that even though the ICJ’s 2004 opinion identified various Israeli 
violations of international law and called upon the occupying power and third states to see to it 
that those violations were brought to an end, these did not include reference to any obligation 
of Israel to actually end its continued occupation of the OPT. On the contrary, as noted above, 
after setting out its findings on the illegality of the wall, the Court went to pains to call for “a 
negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, 
existing side by side with Israel”, thereby upholding the conventional UN position.230 A second 
advisory opinion would enable the ICJ to determine that the very presence of Israel in occupied 
Palestine has become, in and of itself, illegal, and that its end cannot reasonably be pinned to 
continued, essentially hollow negotiations between what the UN’s own record proves has been 
a bad faith occupant and a besieged and occupied people under duress, but can only be fulfilled 
through immediate, unconditional and full withdrawal in line with the law on state 
responsibility.  
 
 Of course, under prevailing international law, neither the General Assembly nor the ICJ 
when exercising its advisory jurisdiction are endowed with authority to legally bind the 
international community. Therefore, neither a revival of General Assembly practice nor a 
second advisory opinion of the ICJ would in and of themselves result in an end of the 
occupation. They would, however, help the Palestinian people build further legal and political 
momentum in the UN in support of its rights in line with the international rule of law, thereby 
mitigating the effects of Palestine’s ILS condition within the UN. In this regard, the role of third 
states would be vital given the imbalance of power between the parties and the historical record 
since Oslo. In addition to requiring Israel to end its occupation forthwith and unconditionally, 
an ICJ advisory opinion affirming the continued occupation of the State of Palestine as illegal 
would also enable the Court to require all states to cooperate to bring that occupation to an end, 
to not recognize it as lawful, nor to render aid or assistance in maintaining it. Questions would 
arise concerning the scope of what measures third states would be required to take in order to 
bring Israel’s serious breaches of jus cogens norms in the OPT to an end. But, as noted by 
Crawford, although such measures “must be through lawful means, the choice of which [to 
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pursue] will depend on the circumstances of the given situation”.231 Set within the context of a 
finding that Israel’s very presence in the State of Palestine, as opposed to a narrower set of 
practices undertaken within it, has become illegal, the way will thus be open to require third 
States to do much more, individually and collectively, than they have been required to do until 
now under the conventional UN approach given the higher order norms involved (i.e. territorial 
integrity of states). This could include a host of targeted economic, political and cultural 
measures, taken individually or collectively through the UN, as was done in support of other 
subaltern groups in other similar contexts.  
 
 For an instructive precedent on the benefits such a counter-hegemonic recourse to 
international law may offer the subaltern, we return to Namibia and the string of cases brought 
before the ICJ between 1950 and 1971 in respect of its occupation by South Africa.232 As noted 
above, it was in the last of these opinions that the ICJ ruled that the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia was illegal, that it was under an obligation to withdraw immediately, and 
that third states were required to recognize this illegality and to refrain from lending support or 
assistance to South Africa so long as it remained in Namibia.233 But for prior political and legal 
determinations made by various organs of the UN on the question, it is possible the Court may 
not have arrived at the principled conclusions it did. Key among these was the 1950 ruling by 
the Court affirming the General Assembly’s supervisory role over Namibia, resolutions of the 
Assembly terminating the mandate for South Africa’s failure to abide by its obligations as 
mandatory, and resolutions of the Security Council affirming the illegality of South Africa’s 
continued presence in Namibia. While it wasn’t until 1988 that South Africa ended its illegal 
occupation of Namibia, there is little doubt that this result was given vital legal momentum by 
the ICJ’s 1971 advisory opinion and the merger of international legality with international 
legitimacy represented in the Organization’s work through it. For the much less powerful 
subaltern Namibians, having the full force of international law upon which to rely made the 
legitimacy of their position and that of the UN that much stronger. As noted by Judge 
Weeramantry in Nuclear Weapons: 
 
“The Court’s decision on the illegality of the apartheid regime [i.e. in Namibia] had little prospect of 
compliance by the offending Government, but helped to create the climate of opinion which dismantled the 
structure of apartheid. Had the Court thought in terms of the futility of its decree, the end of apartheid may 
well have been long delayed, if it could have been achieved at all. The clarification of the law is an end in 
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itself, and not merely a means to an end. When the law is clear there is greater chance of compliance than when 
it is shrouded in obscurity.234 
 
In a similar vein, Richard Falk has noted that the “overall purpose of relying on international 
legal mechanisms in the absence of prospects for compliance is to alter the political climate in 
ways that make the realization of Palestinian rights, including the right of self-determination, 
more probable.”235 It is submitted that a second advisory opinion on the legal consequences of 
Israel’s continued settlement and occupation of the State of Palestine, with a particular focus 
on when and how that occupation must come to an end, would offer a similar promise of clarity 
and alteration of the political climate that, while not assuring the end of the occupation itself, 
would make that result more probable than it is at present.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the UN’s handling of the legal status of Israel’s 50-year 
military occupation of the OPT. Its basic claim is that the UN’s failure to consistently and 
clearly take a more principled position on the very legality of Israel’s occupation regime 
exposes a fundamental chasm in its position on the OPT, and is ultimately demonstrative of the 
continuation of the rule by law in the Organization’s handling of the question of Palestine post-
1967. 
 
 Decolonization brought about a shift in the UN that changed the post-war late-imperial 
features of the Organization responsible for the 1947 plan of partition and the resulting 
reification of Palestinian legal subalternity in it. Through the ostensible enfranchisement of the 
Third World in the UN, this shift promised to help universalize the application of international 
law and the UN Charter in the work the Organization. With most of the former Afro-Asian 
colonies now members of the system, the legal output of the UN became the product of a more 
representative community of nations than had hitherto been the case. This empowerment of the 
Third World gave rise to a gradual recognition by the UN of Palestinian legal subjectivity and 
rights, including the right to self-determination in the OPT as part of the two-state framework. 
The conventional wisdom has presented these developments as emblematic of the UN’s 
commitment to finally uphold the international rule of law in its management of the question 
of Palestine.  
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 Yet, despite these important changes, the circumscribed nature of Third World quasi-
sovereignty persisted following decolonization. For the Palestinian people, this has manifested 
itself in the maintenance of Palestine’s ILS in the system, as evidenced in the UN’s adoption of 
a humanitarian/managerial approach to the occupation of the OPT. Under this approach, the 
Organization has satisfied itself merely with addressing a host of individual violations by the 
occupying power of IHL and IHRL in the OPT without definitively addressing the legality of 
the very regime giving rise to those violations themselves, all while insisting on negotiations as 
the only means through which the occupation can be brought to an end. The curiosity of this 
position is rooted in the fact that there is more than enough in the UN record to demonstrate 
that Israel’s occupation has become illegal over time for being in violation of three jus cogens 
norms of international law, being the prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the 
threat or use of force, the obligation to the respect the right of peoples to self-determination, 
and the obligation to refrain from imposing regimes of alien subjugation, domination, and 
exploitation inimical to humankind, including racial discrimination. As an internationally 
wrongful act, prevailing international law on state responsibility, including as affirmed by UN 
practice in other cases of alien occupation, does not allow for negotiation as the means of ending 
Israel’s occupation, but rather requires that it be ended forthwith and unconditionally. What is 
more, by making the end of the occupation contingent on the chimera of negotiation between 
what the UN record also demonstrates is a bad faith and immensely more powerful occupant 
and an enfeebled population held captive by it, the UN has in effect undermined its own 
position. It has thereby made the realization of Palestinian rights under international law 
repeatedly affirmed by it impossible to achieve, while facilitating the consolidation of the illegal 
actions of the occupying power that operate to violate those rights under a cloak of legitimacy 
provided by the Organization.  
 
 Despite the conventional wisdom, it is apparent that the UN’s recognition and affirmation 
of Palestinian legal subjectivity and rights in the OPT post-1967 can only therefore be regarded 
as nominal in nature, contingent on the exercise of hegemonic forces virtually beyond reach. 
Once again, the promise of international law – this time in a far more truncated portion of 
Palestine as even envisioned in the partition plan – is repeatedly proffered by the UN, but 
ultimately withheld by operation of the Organization’s own failure to bring the full application 
of prevailing international law to bear on the situation.  
 
 To be sure, the possibility for incremental positive change exists, in so far as recourse 
may be had to the General Assembly and ICJ to definitively establish the UN’s position on the 
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illegality of Israel’s occupation regime. Although largely ignored in the literature, relevant 
practice exists in the Assembly going back decades in which Israel’s occupation of the OPT 
has been qualified as illegal, in itself. Were this practice to be revived, including through a 
judicial affirmation of the ICJ, the research suggests that further strides could be made. 
Nevertheless, owing to prevailing legal limits on the binding authority of these bodies, having 
resort to them would only operate to mitigate, not vitiate, the effects of the occupation and, by 
extension, Palestine’s continued ILS in the UN system.  
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MAP IV 
Territories Occupied by Israel Since June 1967, Map No. 3243 Rev.4, United Nations, June 1997. Reproduced 
with permission of the United Nations. Author’s note: only the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East 
Jerusalem, constitute the OPT; Israeli occupation of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula ended in 1982, while its 
occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights continues. 
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2011: Membership of the United Nations and the Perpetuation of 
Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity  
 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter addresses Palestine’s international legal subalternity (ILS) through the issue 
of its attempted admission to the United Nations (UN) as a Member State in 2011. The essential 
claim is that the UN’s failure to admit Palestine to full membership under operation of a 
procedural power of the Security Council to decide who may be recommended for admission 
is the latest manifestation of how Palestine’s ILS has been perpetuated within the UN system. 
Central to this chapter is the crosscutting theme of the role of neo-imperial power in the 
maintenance of the ILS condition in international law and organization. 
 
Following the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) acceptance of resolution 181(II) 
in 1988, and the commencement of over two decades of state-building undertaken in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) resulting from the Madrid and Oslo peace processes, this 
truncated version of Palestine made considerable legal advances on the road to being 
universally recognized as a state, the sine qua non for UN membership. By 2011, this included 
recognition by over two-thirds of the General Assembly, membership in a number of 
international intergovernmental entities, and endorsements of Palestine’s statehood by the 
Bretton Woods institutions, among other influential actors. Set against this backdrop, this 
chapter critically examines Palestine’s bid for membership of the UN of September-November 
2011. In particular, it undertakes an international law assessment of the report of the Security 
Council’s Committee on the Admission of New Members (“Committee on Admission”), which 
concluded that it could not unanimously recommend Palestine’s membership in the UN after 
having examined whether Palestine satisfied the criteria for membership under Article 4(1) of 
the UN Charter.1   
 
When measured against the prevailing international law and practice governing UN 
membership, the research demonstrates that Palestine’s failure to gain admission in 2011 was 
the result of United States pressure to adopt an unduly narrow and erroneous application of 
Article 4(1), a provision of the Charter that has long been given a liberal, flexible and 
permissive interpretation by the Organization. Thereafter, Palestine turned to the General 
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Assembly, which upgraded its observer status to that of a non-member observer state in 2012. 
While the legal consequences of this upgrade have been considerable, its juxtaposition against 
the refusal of the Committee on Admission to recommend membership to the Security Council 
as a result of the US position is demonstrative, yet again, of the rule by law principle at work. 
While the UN has allowed for a gradual and qualified recognition of some Palestinian legal 
subjectivity and rights over time, including through Palestine’s upgrade to non-member 
observer state, its failure to provide it with the legal and political foundation upon which those 
rights have a greater chance of being realized through full membership in the Organization – 
the legal conditions of which Palestine objectively fulfills based on UN practice – has ultimately 
perpetuated Palestine’s ILS in the system.  
 
To explore this claim, the remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts along the 
rule of law/rule by law axis underpinning this research. Part 2 sets out the international rule of 
law as embodied in the law and practice governing admission to membership of the UN. With 
few exceptions, this law and practice is marked by a liberal, flexible and permissive 
interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter, ostensibly predicated on the principle of the 
universality of the Organization. Part 3 contrasts this against the international rule by law 
evidenced in Palestine’s failed membership bid in 2011. Owing to the unduly narrow and 
erroneous interpretation of Article 4(1) taken by some members of the Committee on 
Admission under US pressure, it shows that Palestine has been unfairly kept from availing itself 
of the full protection of its rights under international law within the Organization, despite having 
considerably adjusted its own claims and national development to accommodate the two-state 
formula imposed upon it through prior UN action. Part 4 then examines the implications of 
Palestine’s turn to the General Assembly and its upgrade to non-member observer state status 
in 2012. In keeping with the pattern of Palestine’s treatment at the UN since the decolonization 
period, it posits that the move to the Assembly represents a good example of both the promise 
and the limits of the counter-hegemonic use of international law by subaltern classes. 
 
2. The International Rule of Law as Represented Through the Principle of the 
Universality of the Membership of the United Nations 
2.1  Universality of Membership as the General Principle 
 
In chapter 3, it was noted that the post-World War II (WWII) emergence of the UN as the 
standard-bearer of the international rule of law was one of the Organization’s defining features. 
A central aspect of this has been the Organization’s universality of membership. Given the 
general purposes of the UN, not least the safeguarding of international peace and security, it is 
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axiomatic that it remains “an open organization with a universal vocation.”2 The greater the 
Organization’s membership, the greater the global adherence and contribution to the 
international rule of law ordering principle, represented foremost in the terms of the Charter. 
UN membership brings with it a host of rights and obligations under the Charter. This includes 
automatic voting membership of the General Assembly,3 periodic membership of the Security 
Council,4 Economic and Social Council,5 and Trusteeship Council,6 and ipso facto accession to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).7 While a handful of states have chosen to 
remain outside the UN of their own accord (e.g. Holy See, Switzerland until 2002), that is a 
rare exception to the general rule of universal membership. Today, the Organization boasts a 
membership of 193 states.  
 
Membership of the UN is governed by Chapter II of the Charter. Under Article 3, 
“original” members of the UN were those states that participated in the San Francisco 
conference, or associated themselves with the allied powers during WWII, and who signed and 
ratified the Charter in June 1945.8 Under Article 4, acquisition of membership subsequent to 
the Organization’s founding is governed as follows:  
 
“(1) Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the 
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing 
to carry out these obligations; 
 
(2) the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision 
of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”9 
 
Articles 3 and 4 are similar, in so far as they envision that only states may be members of the 
United Nations. 10  They are also different, in so far as the latter imposes substantive and 
procedural conditions that, with the exception of the condition of statehood, do not exist under 
the former. Appreciating the interdependence of these conditions – the substantive and 
                                                 
2 Ginther, “Membership: Article 4” in Simma (2002), 178. 
3 UN Charter, art. 9(1). 
4 Id., art. 23. 
5 Id., art. 61. 
6 Id., art. 86(1). 
7 Id., art. 93(1). 
8 This was with the exception of Poland, who did not sign until October 1945. Fastenrath, U. “Membership: Article 
3”, in Simma (2002), 173-174. 
9 UN Charter, arts. 3, 4. 
10 Because of the lack of political independence of some original members (e.g. Belorussia, India, Philippines and 
Ukraine), Higgins, (1963), 15-16, argues that inclusion of these entities in the Organization were sui generis. She 
cites various political reasons for the inclusion of these members. Yet, from an international legal standpoint, this 
does not square with the ordinary meaning of the term “state” as used in Article 3. This is particularly so because 
(as Higgins herself notes) the Charter’s drafters consciously chose to use the term “state” over “nation”, when the 
latter had been proposed by the Philippine delegation.  
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procedural – is vital for a full appreciation of Article 4 as the legal gateway to membership in 
the Organization (post-1945) and the maintenance of its universal function.  
 
 Substantively, the conditions laid out in Article 4(1) have been determined by the ICJ 
as subjecting admission to the UN to a five-part test. The applicant must: (1) be a state; (2) be 
peace-loving; (3) accept the obligations of the Charter; (4) be able to carry out those 
obligations; and (5) be willing to do so. 11  Procedurally, the responsibility of determining 
whether an applicant meets these five criteria is jointly exercised by the Security Council and 
the General Assembly under Article 4(2). However, because a decision of the Assembly 
necessarily requires a recommendation of the Council, admission of new members resides, in 
the first instance, with the Council whose permanent members may utilize their veto power in 
making such determinations.12  
 
 From a subaltern perspective, the practical consequences of this are readily apparent. 
With the great powers commanding permanent seats on the Security Council, the international 
law governing admission of new members to the UN is clearly open to the exercise of 
hegemonic interest, and occasionally abuse. For those applicants who find themselves 
negatively subjected to the exercise of such interest and abuse, the resulting disenfranchisement 
owes its existence to the exercise of what amounts to neo-imperial power, the third crosscutting 
theme underpinning the ILS condition. Because such power is exercised out of pure self-interest 
and realpolitik, its hallmark, from the vantage point of the subaltern, rests in the potential of its 
pernicious and arbitrary use.  
 
 This was the case during the first decade of the UN’s existence, when the Cold War rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union gave rise to a general deadlock on admission 
of new states under the guise of narrow, at times overtly political, interpretations of the Article 
4(1) criteria.13 The result was that, during this period, no discernable consensus was reached on 
the normative legal content of the criteria, thereby leaving the substantive international law on 
membership in the UN inchoate. Between 1945 and 1955, only nine of 31 applicant states were 
admitted to membership.14 It wasn’t until the end of the deadlock in 1955, following the so-
called package-deal admission of 16 members en bloc, that there began to emerge a consensus 
of practice in any meaningful legal sense. Since then, Article 4(1) has been interpreted within 
                                                 
11 Conditions of Admission, p. 62. 
12 This was affirmed by the ICJ in the Competence Case, p. 10. 
13 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 179. 
14 Id.  
Chapter 5 – The State of Palestine at the UN 
 160
the organization in a very liberal, flexible and permissive manner, giving it a normative content 
wholly consistent with the principle of the universality of the UN’s membership.15 It is the 
permissiveness of this normative content that underpins the international rule of law governing 
membership in the UN. 
 
 It is noteworthy that even at the height of the Cold War deadlock, the position of the 
Organization and its members was virtually unanimous on the principle of the universality of 
membership of the UN and the need that a liberal approach be adopted in favour of an expansive 
admission of new members. At a meeting of the Security Council in 1946, the Secretary-
General noted that the “founding Members of the United Nations and all of the great powers 
which form part of our Organization have agreed, on numerous occasions, that the United 
Nations must be as universal as possible. This is one subject where there has never been a 
serious difference of opinion.”16 At the same meeting, the American representative stated that, 
despite his government’s own “misgivings” about the “complete readiness” of some applicants 
for membership, “the Organization should move toward universality of membership”.17 He 
therefore urged the Council to “take broad and far-sighted action to extend the membership of 
the United Nations now as far as is consistent with the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter.”18 
Subsequently, the principle of universal membership was expressly endorsed in resolutions of 
the General Assembly,19 and continues to be reflected in the contemporary period through 
numerous references to it by Member States in the deliberations of both the Assembly and the 
Security Council.20  
 
 The Cold War deadlock served a useful and abiding purpose from an international law 
standpoint. With each of the United States and the Soviet Union agreeing with the principle of 
universality of membership but nevertheless exercising neo-imperial power to refuse admission 
to allies of one another without an equivalent quid pro quo, in 1948 the General Assembly 
requested the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion. The Court was asked whether a member of the UN, 
when called upon to consider an application for admission under Article 4 of the Charter, is 
“juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly 
provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article”.21 In particular, the Court was asked whether a 
                                                 
15 Higgins (1963), 14; Crawford (2006), 179, 182; Quigley (2010), 236. 
16 UN SCOR, 1st Yr., 54th Mtg., at 44, S/PV.54, 28 August 1946. 
17 UN SCOR, 1st Yr., 54th Mtg., at 41-42, S/PV.54, 28 August 1946. 
18 Id., 42. 
19 E.g., A/RES/197B, 8 December 1948; A/RES/506A(VI), 1 February 1952; and A/RES/718(VIII), 23 October 
1953.  
20 Repertory of Practice. 
21 Conditions of Admission, p. 58. 
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member could “subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be 
admitted to membership in the United Nations” at the same time.22 In answering both of these 
questions negatively, a majority of the Court opined that the “natural meaning” of the text of 
Article 4(1) makes clear that the five conditions for membership thereunder are “exhaustive”, 
and that the “provision would lose its significance and weight, if other conditions, unconnected 
with those laid down, could be demanded.”23 The Court accordingly held that “considerations 
extraneous to the conditions laid down in” Article 4(1) could not be employed to “prevent the 
admission of a State which complies with them”.24 In the Court’s view this includes “new 
condition[s]…concerning States other than the applicant State.”25 It also includes “political 
considerations”, so long as such considerations cannot reasonably and in good faith be 
connected with the exhaustive conditions of admission under Article 4.26 In a separate opinion, 
Judge Alvarez agreed with the majority and went one step further. Having acknowledged “the 
purposes of the United Nations Organization and its mission of universality,” he took the view 
that “all States fulfilling the conditions required by Article 4 of the Charter have a right to 
membership in that Organization”, and that the “exercise of this right cannot be blocked by the 
imposition of other conditions not expressly provided for by the Charter”, including “grounds 
of a political nature.” In his view, if members of the Security Council or General Assembly 
were to do otherwise, that would be “an abuse of right which the Court must condemn.”27  
 
 The ICJ’s opinion regarding the exhaustive nature of the Article 4(1) criteria remains 
valid today. Whether Judge Alvarez was correct in his characterization of membership as a 
positive right where those criteria are met by an applicant is arguable, given the fact that Article 
4(1) does not expressly speak of a “right” to membership as such. Nevertheless, Article 4(1) 
does provide that membership “is open” to applicant states that meet the criteria, which can be 
read to imply such a right once the threshold has been passed. As such, Alvarez’s 
characterization of membership constituting a right upon fulfillment of the Article 4(1) criteria 
would seem to logically hold. Indeed, the author of a leading study of Article 4, Thomas Grant, 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id., 62. 
24 Id., 63. 
25 Id., 65. 
26 Id., 62-63. This latter proviso has led Thomas Grant to observe that the majority’s opinion was “wide enough 
that it is to be wondered whether a State, in spite of the court’s interpretation, might add an ‘extraneous 
consideration’ by folding it into” a determination under the Article 4(1) criteria. Nevertheless, Grant concludes, 
given “admission procedure in time was treated in most cases as an essentially pro forma exercise”, such 
application of additional criteria “would not, in practice, be [a] problem.” Grant (2009), 36, 39, 45. 
27 Conditions of Admission, p. 67. 
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has indicated that it is now a “presumption that any State seeking admission will be granted 
admission.”28 
 
 The Conditions of Admission advisory opinion was critical in setting legal limits on the 
influence of political factors and the imposition of other extraneous conditions on the process 
for application of new members to the UN that plagued the Organization through the exercise 
of neo-imperial power during its first decade. Taken together with the unanimously held 
principle of the universality of membership of the UN, the international legal practice of the 
Security Council and General Assembly rapidly led to the adoption of a permissive approach 
to the Article 4(1) criteria, thereby shelving the exercise of that power. This was particularly 
apparent during the decolonization period and after. Writing in 1963, Rosalyn Higgins noted 
that UN practice on Article 4(1) had, as early as that time, demonstrated a “flexibility” in 
approach to the criteria that had become widely evident.29 Since 1963, of the 87 successful 
applications for membership in the UN, all but five were approved without any objection.30 
During decolonization, the admission of new states “took place as a rule without even 
mentioning the [Article 4(1)] criteria.”31 This is not to suggest that all admissions decisions 
down the years have been uniformly unproblematic or automatic.32 But it is reasonable to say 
that the liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of the Article 4(1) criteria in the vast 
majority of cases has reduced that provision of the UN Charter to what Konrad Ginther has 
called “a mere procedural formality.”33 Grant concurs, noting that “in time, the substantive 
criteria for admission came scarcely to be implemented at all.”34 All of this has ultimately led 
to an “unconditional universality” of membership within the Organization as the defining 
feature of the international rule of law on UN membership.35 The following brief survey of state 
practice on each of the criteria bears this out. 
 
2.2 Relevant United Nations Practice 
 
 The first criterion for UN membership is that the entity in question must be a state. 
International law proffers two theories on the existence of statehood.36 The constitutive theory 
                                                 
28 Grant (2009), 244. 
29 Higgins (1963), 14. 
30  Crawford (2006), 180, puts the figure at 85 successful applicants between 1963 and 2005. Since then, 
Montenegro and South Sudan have been admitted to membership without objection. 
31 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 180. 
32 Crawford (2006), 180. 
33 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 180. See generally, Grant (2009). 
34 Grant (2009), 52. 
35 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 180. 
36 Crawford (2006), 19-28. 
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holds that a state exists only if it is recognized by other states, thus rendering it a product solely 
of political facts established between sovereigns. In contrast, the declarative theory posits that 
an entity must possess the following four de jure qualifications, codified in the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a 
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”37 
Although some authors have suggested additional factors under this theory, such as 
independence, sovereignty and effectiveness,38 the four Montevideo requirements have been 
the standard followed in UN admissions practice. When any additional factors have been taken 
into account in UN practice, they have only been factored in as part of the relevant Montevideo 
qualifications (normally the second two) and in no manner have been given uniform treatment. 
In addition, there is a slight hybridity of the two theories in UN practice, in so far as the issue 
of recognition (upon which the constitutive theory rests) figures prominently in determining the 
fourth of the Montevideo qualifications (foreign relations capacity). As noted by James 
Crawford, statehood is therefore a mixed question of law and fact.39 All of this underscores the 
liberal, flexible and permissive reading that the four qualifications have been given in UN 
practice.  
 
 Thus, with respect to a permanent population, practice indicates that a state’s population 
need not be homogenous. For example, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia are UN Member 
States40 whose populations consist of a multiplicity (in some cases hundreds) of differing 
ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. Nor does a state’s population have to be in situ for a 
prescribed period of time. In this respect, the Member States of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, South Africa and the United States stand out, with their mix of indigenous peoples, 
and descendants of slaves, indentured servants and European settlers each adding to the general 
population at varying points in time, along with other newer migrants. Finally, there is no lower 
or upper limit that a state’s population must reach. UN membership includes microstates such 
as Tuvalu, Nauru, and Palau, whose populations only number in the few thousands.41 It is clear, 
therefore, that the population requirement has been applied permissively in UN admissions 
practice. 
                                                 
37 Montevideo Convention, art. 1. Although the UN practice has consistently referred to the Montevideo criteria 
when assessing whether an entity is a state under international law, some scholars have questioned the validity of 
the criteria themselves. See e.g., Crawford, “Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999)” in Goodwin-Gill 
(2012), 113. 
38 Crawford (2006), 46, 62-89; Higgins (1963), 25. 
39 Crawford, in Goodwin-Gill (2012), 95. 
40 A/RES/491(V), 28 September 1950; A/RES/1492(XV), 7 October 1960; Yugoslavia was an original member.   
41 Crawford (2006), 52. See also A/RES/55/1, 5 September 2000; A/RES/54/2, 14 September 1999; A/RES/49/63, 
15 December 1994. 
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 The requirement of a defined territory has been similarly construed by the UN. Practice 
indicates that there is no lower limit to the size a territory must be before it can satisfy this 
branch of the Montevideo test. Diminutiveness does not preclude statehood.42 Thus, microstates 
such as Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino did not face objections to their membership on 
the basis of their relatively negligible areas of 160, 2, and 61 km2, respectively.43 Likewise, 
great allowance has been made for the extent to which a territory must be demarcated by definite 
borders. As noted by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf, “[t]here is…no rule that the land 
frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often in various places and for long 
periods they are not.” 44  The most obvious example of this is Israel, which gained UN 
membership despite not having settled territorial delimitations with any of its neighbours 
following the first Arab-Israeli war. 45  Similarly, there have been other cases where the 
qualification of a defined territory has been questioned on the basis of competing territorial 
claims of other states. Nevertheless, the existence of unsettled Iraqi claims to Kuwait and 
Moroccan claims to Mauritania did not frustrate the attainment of membership in the UN by 
each of those two latter states. 46  It is equally clear, therefore, that the defined territory 
requirement has enjoyed a liberal interpretation by the UN.   
 
 In practice, the government requirement has been bound up with notions of independence 
and effective control over territory and public administration.47 According to this approach, 
government cannot logically be said to exist if it is not effective and/or independent. Like the 
other Montevideo criteria, this requirement has been construed broadly. For example, when the 
Republic of the Congo’s application was approved by the General Assembly on 20 September 
1960,48 the fact that the country was embroiled in a civil war was not regarded as barring the 
existence of its statehood. Only six days prior, its elected Prime Minister was removed from 
office in a coup d’état, and the central government was consequently divided into two factions, 
both claiming to be lawfully in control.49 To complicate matters, despite gaining independence 
                                                 
42 Grant (2009), 240. 
43 A/RES/45/1, 18 September 1990; A/RES/47/231, 28 May 1993; A/RES/46/231, 2 March 1992. But see Grant, 
id., 240-244, who discusses the concern of some Member States in the 1960’s and 70’s as to the ability of 
microstates, in general, to assume their obligations as full members.  
44 North Sea Continental Shelf, p. 32. 
45 A/RES/273(III), 11 May 1949. Higgins (1963), 17-18. See also text accompanying infra notes 195-198, 207-
210. 
46 Id., 18-19. A/RES/1872(S-IV), 14 May 1963; A/RES/1631(XVI), 27 October 1961. 
47 Id., 21. 
48 A/RES/1480(XV), 20 September 1960. 
49 Crawford (2006), 56. Indeed, the continued fighting between these split groups made it impossible for the 
Assembly to identify which among the warring factions should be allocated a UN delegation chair. See UN GAOR, 
15th Sess., 864th Plen. Mtg., at 6, A/PV.864 (20 September 1960); Higgins (1963), 21-22. 
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from Belgium on 30 June 1960, Belgian forces remained in the country, prompting the Security 
Council to call for their withdrawal and authorize the deployment of UN forces.50 Another 
similar case concerns the admission of Rwanda and Burundi. Held as a single Trusteeship under 
Belgian administration, these entities were declared “independent” on 1 July 1962. Their 
purported independence was belied by the fact that Belgian forces remained in the territories 
after 1 July, and a UN commission suggested that neither entity possessed the capacity for 
effective government at the time. 51  Nevertheless, the General Assembly admitted both to 
membership.52 Guinea-Bissau was admitted to UN membership under similar circumstances, 
in the sense that its colonial power, Portugal, remained in control of the country after 
“independence” and admission. 53 Other emblematic cases concern original members. Thus 
neither Belorussia nor Ukraine were independent when the UN was formed, but were rather 
constituent territories of the Soviet Union, which was clearly another state. As noted by John 
Quigley, the Soviets enjoyed “broad legislative power” over these states.54 Likewise, both the 
Philippines and India were still dependent territories when they helped form the UN in 1945, 
with the former only gaining its independence from the United States on 4 July 1946, the latter 
its independence from Great Britain on 15 August 1947.55 Thus, practice indicates that when 
considering the requirement of government, the degree and extent to which such government 
must be independent and effective has been given a very wide and flexible interpretation by the 
UN.   
 
 The requirement of capacity to enter into foreign relations has also been given a flexible 
and permissive interpretation in UN admissions practice. Staying with Belorussia and Ukraine, 
the Soviet Union maintained authority in matters concerning foreign trade and external defence, 
and neither of them were authorized to enter into international treaties on their own initiative, 
but instead required approval from the Soviet Union.56 Likewise, Monaco was admitted to 
membership in the UN in 1993,57 despite the fact that under a 1918 treaty with France it ceded 
                                                 
50 S/RES/143(1960), 14 July 1960. See also, S/RES/145(1960), 22 July 1960; S/RES/146(1960), 9 August 1960. 
After admission, the General Assembly added its voice to the call for the withdrawal of Belgian and foreign forces, 
which continued. See A/RES/1599(XV), 15 April 1961.  
51 Higgins (1963), 23. 
52  A/RES/1746(XVI), 27 June 1962; A/RES/1748(XVII), 18 September 1962 and A/RES/1749(XVII), 18 
September 1962. 
53 A/RES/3205(XXIX), 17 September 1974. Quigley (2010), 239. Other examples include the Federated States of 
Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, who were admitted to UN membership despite having entered 
into a compact granting the United States extensive authority over their domestic affairs. Palau also has a similar 
arrangement with the US. See id. 240-242. See also text accompanying infra notes 59-60.  
54 Quigley (2010), 236-237. 
55 Id., 239. 
56 Id., 236-237. 
57 A/RES/47/231, 28 May 1993. 
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all authority over its defence to France, agreed to govern itself in “complete conformity with 
the political, military, naval and economic interests of France”, and agreed not to conduct its 
international relations without prior consultation with France. Notably, it was France, and not 
Monaco, that registered the 1918 treaty with the UN.58 Two more examples are the cases of the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, which were admitted 
to membership in the UN in 1991.59 Similar to the arrangement between Monaco and France, 
these microstates entered into a tripartite agreement with the United States in 1986 in which 
they agreed, inter alia, to cede “full authority and responsibility for security and defense 
matters”, and to not engage in foreign affairs without prior consultation with the United States.60 
It is apparent from these and other cases61 that the requirement of possessing the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states has also been furnished with a very permissive 
interpretation by the UN.  
 
 Leaving the Montevideo requirements for statehood, we now turn to the second criterion 
for UN membership under Article 4(1) of the Charter. The requirement that an applicant state 
be peace-loving derives from the desire of the framers of the Charter to disqualify the Axis 
powers and their allies from gaining immediate membership in the Organization in the 
aftermath of WWII.62 The framers also agreed that an applicant’s peace-loving credentials 
could not properly be judged by reference to its domestic political institutions.63 Over time, the 
criterion was relaxed to the point that, during decolonization, when the vast majority of UN 
Member States were admitted to membership, the requirement of being peace-loving “was of 
no practical importance at all.” 64  On those occasions when the criterion has figured into 
admission determinations, it has sometimes been assessed through whether the applicant state 
has shown sufficient respect for principles upon which the UN Charter is based, including non-
intervention and peaceful resolution of disputes. 65  Even then, there are enough cases to 
demonstrate that the threshold has remained low. There can be no better evidence of this than 
the fact that the UN has admitted states to membership despite being in situations of active 
and/or formal war with their neighbours. Thus, Israel was deemed a peace-loving state when it 
was admitted in May 1949, despite the fact that it was still formally at war with Egypt, Jordan, 
                                                 
58 France-Monaco Treaty, arts. 1, 2. Quigley (2010), 239-240. 
59 A/RES/46/2, 17 September 1991; A/RES/46/3, 17 September 1991. 
60 Compact of Free Association, 1822. Quigley (2010), 240-242. 
61 See Grant (2009). 
62 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 182. 
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Lebanon and Syria, having only concluded armistice agreements with the former three. 66 
Likewise, as noted above, when the Republic of the Congo was admitted it was involved in an 
active civil war that required the deployment of UN peacekeepers by the Security Council. 
Finally, when the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted to membership in 1992,67 
it was in the middle of a multi-party war that would last for three more years. It is evident, 
therefore, that the criteria of being peace-loving has been interpreted very permissively by the 
UN in its admissions decisions.  
 
 The third criterion under Article 4(1) of the Charter is that an applicant must accept the 
obligations contained in the Charter. This is a matter of procedure and has historically been 
satisfied through the submission of a formal instrument of acceptance affixed to the application 
for membership in which the applicant solemnly accepts the obligations of the Charter, usually 
“without any reservation”.68 As a pro forma act, this requirement has not given rise to any great 
difficulties in practice. 
 
 The fourth and fifth criteria under Article 4(1), namely that the applicant must be both 
able and willing to carry out its obligations under the Charter, have also been given a broad 
and liberal application in UN admissions practice. Ability was originally intended to bar from 
membership those states that lacked sufficient material and human resources to meet their 
obligations under the Charter (e.g. troop and financial contributions, etc.). Yet, the admission 
of states with little to no military or financial capacity over the years (e.g. Austria, Japan, the 
microstates, etc.) has rendered this criterion “practically irrelevant.”69 As to the willingness 
criterion, in 1952 the General Assembly suggested that it be assessed against such factors as an 
applicant’s maintenance of friendly relations with other states, the fulfillment of its international 
obligations and its record and disposition to have recourse to pacific means of dispute 
settlement.70 Despite this early attempt to provide substance to the criterion capable of objective 
verification, the Assembly’s suggestions were never formally endorsed by Member States.71 
This may be due to the fact that there is a considerable overlap between the willingness and 
                                                 
66 In the debates on Israel’s application for admission in May 1949, these factors did not preclude a finding that 
Israel was peace-loving for the purposes of Article 4(1). UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., 207th Plen. Mtg., A/PV.207, 11 
May 1949, at 306-336. See also text accompanying infra notes 195-198. See generally, 1949 Egypt-Israel 
Armistice Agreement; 1949 Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement; 1949 Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement; 1949 
Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement. 
67 A/RES/46/237, 22 May 1992. 
68 SC Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 58; and GA Rules of Procedure, Rule 134. See also Repertory of 
Practice. 
69 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 183. 
70 A/RES/506A(VI), 1 February 1952. 
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peace-loving criteria of Article 4(1). 72 It is noteworthy that according to the Repertory of 
Practice of the United Nations Organs – which as at time of writing is available for the years 
1945-2009 – “although there have been statements of position [by Member States] in respect 
of specific interpretations of” the terms “peace-loving state” and “able and willing” to carry out 
the obligations of the Charter, “there has never been any attempt, in proposals submitted to the 
Council or the Assembly, to define their meaning in any general sense.”73 No doubt, this too is 
indicative of a desire of the UN to maintain as open and permissive an application of these 
criteria as possible. 
 
2.3 General Observations 
 
 The current law on admission to membership of the UN is relatively clear. As affirmed 
by the ICJ in 1948, the criteria laid down in Article 4(1) of the Charter are exhaustive. No 
condition extraneous to them may factor into an assessment of an application for admission. 
This includes conditions of a political nature, including in relation to other states, so long as 
such conditions cannot reasonably and in good faith be connected to the criteria themselves. 
Once those criteria are met, a presumption, and arguably a positive right, exists for an applicant 
to assume membership in the Organization. With the exception of the first decade of the UN’s 
existence, when the exercise of neo-imperial power by the US and USSR blocked a number of 
states from gaining membership for political reasons, the Organization’s admissions practice 
has consistently applied the Article 4(1) conditions in a liberal, flexible and permissive manner. 
In many cases, substantive application of the criteria has been dispensed with altogether. This 
approach can be attributed to the international vocation of the UN and its overarching interest 
in the maintenance of the universality of its membership.  
 
 From the standpoint of the maintenance and development of the international rule of law, 
the principle of the universal membership of the UN is vital.74 While it is true that not all 
Member States of the UN are endowed with equal resources and material capabilities, in 
juridical terms they technically enjoy the same standing as one another. Because sovereign 
equality among Member States remains a pillar of the Charter-based international legal order, 
it is therefore evident that access to that order can for the most part only be fully secured through 
membership in the UN. Given the Security Council’s role as the effective gatekeeper of 
membership in the Organization, it is not hard to see how and why admission to the UN remains 
                                                 
72 Ginther, in Simma (2002), 184. 
73 Repertory of Practice.  
74 Grant (2009), 79. 
Chapter 5 – The State of Palestine at the UN 
 169 
a site where the hegemonic-subaltern binary can rear its head, giving rise to the substitution of 
the international rule of law with an international rule by law if so desired by the neo-imperial 
powers that be. 
 
 As cryptically noted by Simon Chesterman, Ian Johnstone and David Malone, cases of 
admission to the UN “are interesting from a policy point of view because they illustrate how 
restrictions on participation can be used as a kind of sanction, registering disapproval of a 
regime or its policies.”75 For those on the receiving end of such sanction or disapproval, it is 
the contingency of their own international legal status that such decisions affirm that this 
research is concerned with. In underscoring the ILS condition of the peoples and states left out 
of the system, the cross-cutting theme of neo-imperial interest reminds us of the power of law 
as a tool for the suppression of the weak. While substantive parameters have been set by judicial 
opinion and state practice on the interpretation of the Article 4(1) criteria, the procedural power 
vested in the UN’s two principal political organs to apply those criteria under Article 4(2) in 
good faith holds within it a most significant and, in the end, controlling authority. This is 
particularly so, when that power is being wielded and/or heavily influenced by a permanent 
member of the Security Council for what are, in effect, hegemonic interests. Along with the 
abiding Eurocentricity of international law and institutions and the quasi-sovereignty of the 
Third World, it is the pernicious and arbitrary exercise of this neo-imperial authority under the 
legitimizing cloak of the UN Charter that forms the essence of the ILS condition. It is to the 
application of that authority in the consideration of Palestine’s application for membership in 
the UN, and its consequences in enabling the perpetuation of its ILS condition, that we now 
turn.  
 
3. Membership of the State of Palestine in the United Nations and the Continued 
International Rule by Law 
 
 Palestine’s application for membership of the UN was submitted by President Mahmoud 
Abbas to the Secretary-General on 23 September 2011.76 Unsurprisingly, the application was 
rooted in the prevailing international rule of law, not only as reflected in the long-established 
UN position on the question of Palestine but also as regards the law relating to membership in 
the Organization. The application accordingly stated that it was based, inter alia, on General 
Assembly partition resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 and the Declaration of 
Independence of the State of Palestine of 15 November 1988. Particular reference was made to 
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“the successful culmination” of Palestine’s “State-building program,” endorsed by the Quartet 
of the Middle East Peace Process (UN, US, Russia, European Union), and to the Palestinian 
people’s long-established right to self-determination, as affirmed on countless occasions by the 
Security Council, General Assembly and ICJ. It recalled that “the vast majority of the 
international community” has accorded “bilateral recognition to the State of Palestine on the 
basis of the 4 June 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital” (i.e. highlighting the self-
determination unit as the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT)), and further indicated that the 
application was consistent with the rights of the Palestine refugees under international law. 
Finally, the application reaffirmed Palestine’s commitment to resume negotiations with Israel 
on all final status issues – Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, security and water – with 
the goal of the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict based on the vision of two states living side by side in peace and security, 
as endorsed by the Security Council and General Assembly.77 Notwithstanding the international 
rule of law basis of Palestine’s application, an assessment of how it was legally appraised by 
the UN reveals why its effective failure can be better understood as a result of the exercise of 
the international rule by law by operation of neo-imperial power.   
 
 Upon receiving Palestine’s application for membership from the Secretary-General, the 
Council referred it to the Committee on Admission.78 Procedurally, the Committee is required 
to examine the application and report its conclusions to the Council, including any 
recommendation for membership.79 Because each member of the Council is represented on the 
Committee, in practice there is little substantive difference between it and the Council proper 
on matters concerning admission. 80  Following its consideration of the application, the 
Committee issued its report to the Council indicating that it “was unable to make a unanimous 
recommendation” on Palestine’s admission. 81  Since then, no action has been taken in the 
Council on Palestine’s application for membership, further consideration of which effectively 
remains adjourned sine die.82 In effect, Palestine’s application for admission was rejected. 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 SC Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 59. 
79 Id. 
80 The original intention of the Committee on Admission was to provide “a sort of Charter due process”, allowing 
Council members to engage in substantive review, with input from applicants, prior to making a recommendation 
to the General Assembly on admission cases. Although it performed this function in the first few years of the UN’s 
existence, and at least once in the early 1970’s, in practice it has fallen into disuse. Admission having become a 
pro forma exercise, as a rule the Committee does not normally engage in any substantive assessment or fact finding 
when an application is referred to it by the Council. It is, effectively, a dead letter. Grant (2009), 45, 58-62. Ginther, 
in Simma (2002), 184. 
81 Committee on Admission Report. 
82 This is result seems to violate Rule 60 of the SC Provisional Rules of Procedure, id., under which the Council 
is required to take one of three actions: (1) recommend membership; (2) not recommend membership; or (3) 
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 In assessing the substance of the report of the Committee on Admission under 
international law, two general and related points should be kept in mind. First, contrary to the 
liberal, flexible and permissive application of the Article 4(1) criteria that characterizes the 
overwhelming corpus of UN admissions practice, the report reveals that some members of the 
Committee preferred an unduly narrow and strict approach. This made the usual method of pro 
forma consensus recommendations to the Council impossible to reach, thereby frustrating 
Palestine’s admission. 83  Second, because the report of the Committee on Admission was 
anonymous as to the particular views of given Council members, it is difficult to determine 
with precision from that document alone which positions where taken by which members. For 
that, we require an examination of other contemporaneous UN records, in particular the 
verbatim record of the Security Council debate for 24 October 2011. Based on that record, it 
was the spectre of a certain US veto that made it impossible for Palestine’s application to 
succeed.84 Those Council members that indicated they might join the US, or were otherwise 
unclear as to their intentions, were Bosnia and Herzegovina, 85  Colombia, 86  Gabon, 87 
Germany, 88  France, 89  Nigeria, 90  Portugal91  and the United Kingdom. 92  This lack of clarity 
introduced challenges for the Palestinians, not least because three of these states (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Gabon and Nigeria) already enjoy full diplomatic relations with the State of 
Palestine but were generally non-committal on the issue of its membership in the UN owing to 
pressure being brought to bear by the US on them and other members of the Council. 93  
However, even if one were to assume positive votes from those three states, when combined 
                                                 
postpone consideration of the application. In the event of (1), the Council must inform the General Assembly, 
providing a complete record of its discussion on the matter. In the event of either (2) or (3), the Council must 
submit a “special report” to the Assembly with a complete record of the discussion. In Palestine’s case, despite 
receiving the report of the Committee on Admission on 11 November 2011, the Council has yet to take any of 
these actions. This is confirmed by a review of the annual reports of the work of the Security Council, available 
for the years 2011-2016. See Council actions set out in the Report of the Security Council, at 206, none of which 
reference the Council having taken any action following receipt of the Committee on Admission’s report as 
required under Rule 60.    
83 Some authors have suggested that consensus is required, e.g., Moussa (2016), 60. Based on practice, this is 
questionable. Thus, when the Committee on Admission recommended the Republic of Nauru’s admission, China 
indicated it was unable to associate itself with that recommendation and yet it still went through. See Report of the 
Committee on the Admission of New Members Concerning the Application of the Republic of Nauru for 
Admission to Membership in the United Nations, S/1999/716, 25 June 1999. Chesterman (2016), 205. 
84 Statement of Ms. Rice (USA), UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 12, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011.  
85 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 24, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011.  
86 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 28, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
87 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 22, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
88 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 15, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
89 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 20-21, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
90 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 28-29, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
91 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 27, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
92 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 18-20, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
93 Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992); Gabon (1988); and Nigeria (1988). See also correspondence with Deputy 
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, United Nations, New York, 25 May 2018, on file with author.  
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with those Council members that did indicate they would vote positively – Brazil,94 China,95 
India,96 Lebanon,97 the Russian Federation98 and South Africa99 – it was clear that Palestine 
might achieve a 9 to 15 majority in favour, but would never be able to overcome a US veto.  
 
 The pivotal US role in the Council (whether through exercise of political pressure or a 
threatened veto) highlights the specific hegemonic and neo-imperial power that was brought to 
bear in the Committee on Admission’s consideration of Palestine’s application under the Article 
4(1) criteria. The exercise of the Council’s powers to recommend membership of an applicant 
state under Article 4(2) is the site where the rule by law was maintained in this case. In the 
international law assessment of the Committee’s report below, special consideration will thus 
be given not only to comparing the Committee’s approach with UN admissions practice in 
general, but also with the ostensible long-standing support of the US government for the 
principle of the universality of UN membership,100 and the manifestations of that support in the 
admission of one other Member State with a special relevance to the case at hand, namely Israel 
in 1949.101 The research shows that the double standard evident in the strict approach to the 
Article 4(1) criteria taken by the Council on Palestine’s application, when compared with the 
liberal, flexible and permissive approach normally adopted in UN admissions practice, 
including in respect of Israel, is demonstrative of the pernicious and arbitrary nature of the neo-
imperial power that thematically underpins the ILS condition. In this case, it was the US’s 
exercise of that power that proved to be the proximate cause of Palestine’s failure to obtain 
admission to the UN, a result that ultimately embodies the persistence of its ILS condition in 
the system.   
 
  3.1 Conditions Extraneous to Article 4(1) Criteria 
 
  It is evident that one or more members of the Committee on Admission sought to impose 
conditions extraneous to the Article 4(1) criteria in their evaluation of Palestine’s application. 
Unsurprisingly, these were rooted in the UN’s long-established position making the end of 
Israel’s occupation of the OPT contingent on negotiation, covered in chapter 4. Thus, in its 
report a view was twice expressed that the Committee should take the “broader political 
                                                 
94 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 16, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011.  
95 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 16, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011.  
96 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 13, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
97 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 25, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
98 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 18, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
99 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 23, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
100 See text accompanying supra notes 17-18. 
101 After a failed December 1948 application, Israel was admitted in May 1949; A/RES/273(III), 11 May 1949. 
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context” into account in its assessment.102 Likewise, it was noted that “a two-State solution via 
a negotiated settlement remained the only option for a long-term sustainable peace and that 
final status issues had to be resolved through negotiations”.103 In a similar vein, it was stated 
that “the Committee’s work should not harm the prospects of the resumption of peace talks,” 
and “that the Palestinian application would not bring the parities closer to peace.”104 Doubtless, 
these were the views of the US, whose representative stated in the October 2011 Council debate 
on the question of Palestine that “we believe that Palestinian efforts to seek Member State status 
at the United Nations will not advance the peace process, but rather will complicate, delay and 
perhaps derail prospects for a negotiated settlement. Therefore, we have consistently opposed 
such unilateral initiatives.” 105  Joining the US in that debate, specifically in referencing 
negotiations as the only means to Palestinian statehood (and, perforce, UN membership), were 
Colombia,106 Germany,107 and Portugal.108   
 
  It is clear that the notion “broader political context” is so imprecise as to admit of no 
relevance to the Article 4(1) analysis. Furthermore, no one would argue that a willingness to 
engage in peaceful resolution of disputes is relevant to an assessment of the Article 4(1) 
criterion of being a “peace-loving” state (see below). Nevertheless, based on long-standing UN 
admissions practice there is no requirement that before an applicant state may acquire 
membership it must have successfully concluded a negotiated peace with belligerent or hostile 
states, as suggested by members of the Committee. Indeed, underscoring the capricious and 
arbitrary nature of the US position on Palestine’s application, Israel itself was admitted to 
membership in May 1949 with US support, yet had not concluded peace agreements with its 
neighbours, a fact readily acknowledged by the US at the time.109 As noted above, the same is 
true of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Congo, each of which were embroiled in armed conflict 
at the time they were admitted to membership.110 In none of those cases, did the fact of their 
not having concluded peace negotiations bar admission to the Organization. Moreover, the 
                                                 
102 Committee on Admission Report, paras. 4, 6. 
103 Id., para. 6.  
104 Id., para. 7. 
105 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 12, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011.  
106 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 28, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011 (“We understand and support the 
aspiration of the Palestinian people to have a State...”, but “negotiation is the only possible and robust path to 
achieve that objective”). 
107 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 15, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011 (“As a matter of course”, a Palestinian 
“State will become a Member of the United Nations. But…[t]here is no viable alternative to the resumption of 
negotiations. The two-State solution can be achieved only through a peace agreement”). 
108 UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 27, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011 (“[A]n independent and sovereign 
[Palestinian] State…can be achieved only with direct and meaningful negotiations with their Israeli neighbours”). 
109 UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., 207th Plen. Mtg., 11 May 1949 at 306-336. See also text accompanying infra notes 195-
198. 
110 See text accompanying supra notes 48-50, 67. 
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existence of statehood is conditioned upon the fulfillment of the four Montevideo requirements, 
not the conclusion of peace agreements with belligerent or hostile states, as suggested by 
Colombia, Germany and Portugal. Based on long-standing practice, it is therefore clear that 
both the “broader political context” and “successful negotiations” conditions run afoul of the 
exhaustive character of the Article 4(1) criteria as affirmed by the ICJ.111 Neither can they be 
regarded reasonably and in good faith as permissive political considerations of relevance to any 
of those criteria in light of UN admissions practice.112 In effect, these requirements constitute, 
in the words of the ICJ, “new” and “extraneous” conditions, improperly invoked to “prevent 
the admission of a State” which might otherwise qualify under Article 4(1).113   
 
 Some members of the Committee on Admission rejected the imposition of the “broader 
political context” and “successful negotiations” conditions. In this respect, Conditions of 
Admission was cited as affirming the exhaustive character of the Article 4(1) criteria.114 At any 
rate, it was stated, “Palestine’s application was neither detrimental to the political process nor 
an alternative to negotiations.”115 Were it otherwise, it was argued, “Palestinian statehood 
would be made dependent on the approval of Israel, which would grant the occupying Power a 
right of veto over the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people.”116 Of note, none of 
the final status issues to be negotiated between Israel and Palestine include the issue of the right 
of the Palestinian people to an independent state. 117  It was because of this that Palestine 
informed the Council that it did not see any contradiction between negotiations with Israel over 
the final status issues and Palestine’s application for membership. Rather, the two were 
“mutually reinforcing.”118  
 
 These principled objections notwithstanding, the imposition of factors extraneous to the 
Article 4(1) conditions by the US and some others contributed to frustrating the prospect of 
                                                 
111 Conditions of Admission, p. 62. 
112 Id., 62-63. 
113 Id., 63, 65. 
114 Committee on Admission Report, para. 5. 
115 Id., para 7. 
116 Id. This was the position taken by Lebanon, who’s ambassador articulated it in the public Security Council 
debate in October 2011; UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 25, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011.  
117 These are: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security and borders. Declaration of Principles, Art. V. The issue 
of water was subsequently added. Statement of Mr. Mansour (Palestine), UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 8, 
S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
118 Id., 6. The representative of Palestine also stated, id., 8, that: “While committed to the peace process, we must 
reiterate clearly that the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, freedom and independence is not up 
for negotiation, nor will it be the product of negotiations. It is an inalienable right and the sole domain of the 
Palestinian people. It has never been an issue for negotiations with Israel, nor will it ever be. Negotiations on the 
core issues and the expression of our self-determination should not be confused by Israel, or others, as one and the 
same, because they are not. Israel as the occupying Power, should not be allowed to continue obstructing and 
dictating the terms of our exercise of that inalienable right.” 
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Palestine’s admission, contrary to the overwhelmingly pro forma character of UN admissions 
practice. Interestingly, in the case of Israel’s application for membership, the US also cited 
extraneous factors. But then they were invoked to argue the case for admission, highlighting 
once again the arbitrary and capricious nature of its position on Palestine’s application. Thus, 
on 2 December 1948, Philip Jessup, then a US Ambassador-at-Large at the UN, informed the 
Security Council that “something more” than the Article 4(1) criteria was “being dealt with” in 
Israel’s case. In his view, the Council was “dealing here with the desire of a people who 
laboriously constructed a community, an authority and, finally a Government operating in an 
independent State, to see the State which they have thus arduously built take its place among 
the Members of the United Nations.”119 In offering US support for Israel’s application, Jessup 
failed to acknowledge that the community being “laboriously constructed” was, in real time, 
being forged through the mass expulsion of Palestine’s indigenous population and the 
expansion of the putative new state’s borders beyond those delimited by the General Assembly 
only months earlier.120  Though striking, this is unsurprising given the US shared the general 
Western desire to resolve Europe’s Jewish question following WWII. More important for our 
purposes, however, was the favourable outlook of his statement in general terms. For it provides 
a useful glimpse into the permissive disposition the US took in the assessment of Israel’s 
application on its merits under Article 4(1) in 1948, and the resulting double standard that 
emerges when compared with its unduly restrictive approach to Palestine’s application under 
the same Charter provision in 2011.  
 
  3.2 Statehood 
 
 It will be recalled that the first of the Article 4(1) conditions is that the applicant be a 
“state”. The flexibility shown in the general application of this criterion in UN practice has been 
wide. As noted above, the 1945 inclusion of Belorussia, India, the Philippines, and Ukraine as 
original Member States is testament to this.121 It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that the US 
view regarding Israel’s application for membership was equally broad. In the December 1948 
Council debate on Israel’s membership Jessup opined that “the term ‘State’, as used and applied 
                                                 
119 UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, at 13-14. As one of the US’s leading international jurists of 
his day, Jessup was given wide latitude by the US State Department to frame Washington’s arguments on Israel’s 
admission bid. Jessup (1974), 294. Jessup would later become a Judge on the ICJ, 1961-1970. 
120 By that time the majority of the 700-900,000 Palestine refugees were forcibly expelled by Zionist regular and 
irregular forces. See generally, Morris (2004). This was a matter that would have been well known to Jessup, as 
the issue was actively being discussed in the General Assembly which, only nine days after he delivered his 
comment before the Security Council on Israel’s admission to the UN, would pass its own resolution affirming, 
inter alia, the right of the refugees to return to their homes. See A/RES/194(III), 11 December 1948. See also the 
statement of the representative of Syria, at UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 384th Mtg., 15 December 1948, at 25. 
121 See supra note 10. 
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in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, may not be wholly identical with the term 
‘State’ as it is used and defined in classic textbooks of international law.”122 Although in that 
case the US would nevertheless apply a close approximation of the classic Montevideo 
definition, its disposition was clearly to do so in a less vigorous and flexible manner than even 
that would require.123  
 
 The four qualifications under the Montevideo formula are a permanent population, a 
defined territory, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.124 In the 
Committee on Admission’s report concerning Palestine’s application for membership, its 
consideration of the requirement of a permanent population was not a matter of disagreement.125 
The OPT has a population of some 4.5 million people,126 and that is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement. As noted, a very wide appreciation has been given in UN admissions practice to 
the notion of a permanent population, including as to its homogeneity (not required), its 
longevity of tenure (no minimum), and its number (no minimum).127 So flexible is the practice, 
that even where a putative state’s population is undergoing violent dislocation or separation of 
ethnic groups from one another through war, that has still not been enough to cast doubt on the 
existence of a population permanent enough to satisfy this requirement. The admissions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina128 and Croatia129 are useful examples of this. In addition, the case of 
Israel stands out,130 highlighted by the flexibility shown by the US in arguing for its admission 
in 1948/49.  
 
 At that time, in recounting “the traditional definition of a State in international law” 
before the Council, Jessup asserted that the existence of “a people”, in contrast to “a permanent 
population,” was the relevant qualification.131 But as an expression of prevailing treaty and 
customary international law in 1948, Montevideo referred to “a permanent population”, not a 
“people”.132 Given the favourable American disposition towards Israel’s admission, this was 
possibly done because the Jewish Agency’s case for the existence of the State of Israel was 
based, in part, on the fact that it represented itself as the state of the Jewish people as a whole, 
                                                 
122 UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, at 10. 
123 Wählisch (2012), 241. 
124 Montevideo Convention, art. 1. 
125 Committee on Admission Report, para. 10. 
126 PCBS Report. 
127 See text accompanying supra notes 40-41. 
128 A/RES/46/237, 22 May 1992. 
129 A/RES/46/238, 22 May 1992. 
130 See supra note 120 along with accompanying text. 
131 UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, at 10. 
132 Montevideo Convention, art. 1. 
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rather than of the whole of Palestine’s population, whose indigenous majority was Arab. This 
may explain Jessup’s curious assertion – uttered when the expulsion of Arabs of Palestine hit 
its peak – that “[n]obody questions the fact that the State of Israel has a people. It is an extremely 
homogenous people, a people full of loyalty and enthusiastic devotion to the State of Israel.”133 
It is telling that in his discussion of the requirements of statehood in his own 1949 treatise on 
international law Jessup himself referred to “a population” rather than a “people”, in deference 
to the Montevideo standard.134 Be that as it may, these American interventions before the 
Council helped contribute to a very liberal understanding of this branch of the Montevideo 
qualifications in favour of Israel, not only highlighting the malleability of the Article 4(1) 
requirements, but also emphasizing the capriciousness of the American position on Palestine in 
2011.  
 
 In the consideration of Palestine’s application for membership, the Committee on 
Admission’s assessment of the second requirement of a defined territory was a matter of 
disagreement. Those who were in favour of admission correctly “stressed that the lack of 
precisely settled borders was not an obstacle to statehood.”135 This had been affirmed by the 
ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf, and was a long-established feature of the international law 
governing statehood.136 Nevertheless, certain members of the Council impugned Palestine’s 
satisfaction of this qualification by questioning its control over its territory. In support of this 
contention, both the de facto control of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the Israeli occupation of 
the OPT were raised. 137  While these factors might have some connection to the third 
Montevideo qualification of government (see below), they have no relevance to the ground of 
a defined territory. To contemplate this line of challenge, is to confuse two branches of the test 
for statehood.  
                                                 
133 UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, at 11. Jessup’s position did not go unchallenged. In response 
to the US position that Israel had a permanent population, the Syrian representative pressed him: “[W]here are the 
people? Half the people of the territory which they [i.e. the Zionists] occupy have been expelled and dispersed 
throughout the country. They are now homeless, starving and dying. These are the people of the territory which 
they are occupying…How can he [i.e. Jessup] say that [t]his people [i.e. those of Israel] are peace-loving and are 
complying with the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter?” See UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 
1948, at 19. 
134 Jessup (1949), 46. Jessup asserted that his reference in the Council to “a people” was affirmed by “all the great 
writers”. See UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, at 10. However, a review of the leading publicists 
of his day reveals that only one author used the term, qualifying it as “an aggregate of individuals…who live 
together as a community.” See Oppenheim (1937), 112. Given the mass expulsion being experienced by the 
indigenous population of Palestine at the time, it would be hard to suggest that Palestine’s “people” were then 
living “together as a community.” For other writers, see Westlake (1904), 44, and Hall (1924), 17, both of which 
refer to “a community…permanently established for a political end”. Although Lauterpacht edited the 5th through 
7th editions of Oppenheim, id., his own text referred to “a permanent population”. Lauterpacht (1970), 316. 
135 Committee on Admission Report, para. 10. See text accompanying supra notes 44-46. 
136 North Sea Continental Shelf, p. 32. 
137 Committee on Admission Report, para. 11. 
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 The borders of what is today the OPT were originally set by UN mediated armistice 
negotiations in 1949138 and, since the PLO’s recognition of Israel in 1988, have been accepted 
as delimiting the territorial unit within which the Palestinian people are entitled to exercise their 
right to self-determination.139 Although these borders still need to be finalized through some 
form of peace agreement, the fact that they are unsettled does not render them insufficiently 
clear under the Montevideo test. That there has been a quarrel between Palestine’s two main 
political parties (Fatah and Hamas) that has manifested in a partially separate administration of 
the Gaza Strip from the West Bank bears no logical impact on the existence of the OPT as a 
defined territory, as such. Nor does the fact of Israel being in foreign military occupation of the 
OPT detract from the sufficiently defined nature of Palestine’s territorial sphere. While there 
have been cases where the qualification of a defined territory has been questioned on the basis 
of competing territorial claims, such claims have not disrupted the historically liberal 
construction given to this ground in practice, as demonstrated by the admission of Kuwait and 
Mauritania to membership in the UN.140 At any rate, there is no other state that currently lays a 
legitimate claim to the OPT as its sovereign territory.141 As discussed in chapter 4, Israel is 
legally debarred from asserting its sovereignty over the OPT in any form given its status as an 
occupying Power.142 Likewise, the only other state that has ever laid claim (and only then, to a 
portion) of the OPT, namely Jordan, has since 1988 relinquished such claim in favour of the 
Palestinian people.143 Nor does the fact that the territory of Palestine is physically discontiguous 
(i.e. between the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) frustrate this branch 
of the Montevideo test.144 There are a large number of UN Member States that share that 
characteristic, 145  most prominent among which is the US. In short, given the permissible 
construction afforded in practice to the defined territory requirement, the narrow position of 
some members of the Committee on Admission concerning the status of the OPT in this regard 
is demonstrative of legal authority under Article 4(2) of the Charter being utilized for 
hegemonic purposes over a subaltern group. 
  
                                                 
138 1949 Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement; 1949 Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement.  
139 A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988. 
140 See text accompanying supra note 46.  
141 Quigley (2010), 210. 
142 This view was also affirmed by some members of the Committee on Admission; Committee on Admission 
Report, para. 11. 
143 King Hussein Address (1988).  
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 This is underscored by examining the double standard applied in the Security Council’s 
treatment of the defined territory criterion in Israel’s application for membership, paying 
particular note of the US position taken at the time. The application was submitted during the 
course of the 1948 war, during which time the territory originally allotted to the putative Jewish 
State in General Assembly resolution 181(II) was being considerably expanded through 
ongoing military and paramilitary operations. As a result, objections were raised by Syria in the 
Council that the territory of Israel “has no boundaries” and therefore could not satisfy this 
branch of Montevideo.146 Speaking on behalf of the US, Jessup reminded the Council that 
“[o]ne does not find in the general classic treatment of this subject any insistence that the 
territory of a State must be exactly fixed by definite frontiers”.147 He further noted that “many 
States have begun their existence with their frontiers unsettled,” and tellingly cited the 
expansion of the “indeterminate” US frontier into “land [that] had not even been explored.”148 
He concluded that “the concept of territory does not necessarily include precise delimitation of 
the boundaries of that territory.”149 This position influenced other members of the Council,150 
ultimately paving the way for Israel’s admission. In her examination of the issue, Higgins 
opined that “Israel’s admission is the best example of the statehood criterion of ‘defined 
territory’” because it reveals that “this criterion has never been interpreted very strictly.”151 In 
her view, “given its customary liberal interpretation” in UN admissions practice, it was 
“properly applied” in Israel’s case.152 Considering the permissive state of the law, it is hard to 
argue that Palestine would not objectively meet the threshold under this branch of the 
Montevideo test. Yet that was the effect of the position put forward by some members of the 
Committee on Admission under US pressure. 
 
 On the third requirement for statehood under Montevideo, there was also a difference of 
opinion within the Committee on Admission as to whether Palestine possessed an effective and 
independent government. Those who argued for admission pointed to reports of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination 
of the International Assistance to Palestinians, all of which “had concluded that Palestine’s 
                                                 
146 UN SCOR, 3rd Yr., 383rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, at 19. 
147 Id., 11. 
148 Id. Tellingly, of course, because he failed to even consider the claims of Native Americans in his assessment.  
149 Id. 
150 For example, even though the Zionists were expanding their control over a greater portion of Palestine than had 
been allotted the Jewish State under the partition resolution, the Soviet Union took the view that Israel’s territory 
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governmental functions were now sufficient for the functioning of a State.”153 The Quartet 
endorsed, largely EU-funded, state-building effort that evolved during the Oslo period built 
upon governmental institutions and legal structures inherited from the Ottoman, British, and 
Jordanian periods of control.154 Despite being under foreign military occupation, Palestine 
formally boasts a constitutional parliamentary democratic system, with executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of government.155 Its ministries serve across areas A and B of the OPT, 
and cover education, finance, foreign affairs, health, interior, justice, labour, planning, and 
social affairs, among other portfolios.156 Its civil service now numbers in the tens of thousands, 
and includes security and police services.157  
 
 All of this notwithstanding, some members of the Committee on Admission argued that 
Palestine failed the effective and independent governmental control test because since the 2007 
split between Fatah and Hamas the latter has been “in control of 40 percent of the population 
of Palestine” (i.e. Gaza). As such, it was argued that Palestine “could not be considered to have 
effective government control over the claimed territory.”158 In addition, it was asserted that the 
Israeli occupation “was a factor in preventing the Palestinian government from exercising full 
control over its territory.”159 When measured against the broad and permissive UN admissions 
practice, these claims are revealed as both unduly narrow and, at times, confused.   
 
 To begin with, a split in government does not negate the existence of the effective 
government criteria under the Montevideo test. As noted above, when the Republic of the 
Congo was admitted to membership in 1960, the fact that it was embroiled in a civil war causing 
its central government to be divided between two factions and prompting the deployment by 
the Security Council of armed forces was not dispositive. Indeed, although this split made it 
impossible for the Assembly to identify which among the warring factions should be allocated 
a delegation’s seat in the UN, the Organization still approved admission to membership.160 
Palestine’s treatment by the Committee on Admission stands in stark contrast to this liberal, 
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flexible and permissive application of the test. In Palestine’s case, with the exception of a five-
day period of armed street clashes in Gaza in 2007, the division between Fatah and Hamas has 
never descended to anything approximating civil war, remaining largely a matter of internal 
domestic legitimacy and function. As noted by Quigley, “the fact that the administrative 
authority became split created practical difficulties” in the Gaza Strip, such as payment of civil 
service salaries, but such difficulties are “not relevant to the governance criterion for 
statehood.”161 While the split has “raised questions about the legitimacy of the governing 
institutions under domestic Palestine law”, domestic legitimacy of government has no bearing 
on the existence of statehood.162 It is to be recalled that, despite these events, the PLO (led by 
the West Bank-based Fatah party) has continued to represent Palestine internationally, 
including at the UN, and Hamas has effectively regarded itself as falling under it for that 
purpose.163  
 
 The assertion that the split between Fatah and Hamas deprives Palestine of a sufficient 
level of effective and independent governmental control over the OPT suffers from another 
defect. It confuses the distinct issues of the recognition of states with recognition of 
governments under international law.164 As noted by Jasmine Moussa, “[i]t is not uncommon 
for a State to lack control over a particular part of its territory. This does not mean that its 
statehood can be denied” on the basis that the putative governing authorities in that territory are 
not internationally recognized.165 This was an issue that arose in the Council debates concerning 
Israel’s admission in 1949. Only in that case, the US made sure the Council did not let the 
confusion get in the way of admission. At the time, Syria attempted to vitiate US recognition 
of Israel in May 1948 by arguing that that recognition was limited to Israel’s provisional 
government as a de facto authority, rather than Israel as a de jure state.166 In response, Jessup 
clarified that the Syrian objection suffered from “some confusion…between recognition of the 
state of Israel and recognition of the provisional government of Israel.” 167  The two were 
distinct. Jessup affirmed that in entertaining Israel’s application for membership, it was the 
former that the Security Council was concerned with, and it was to that end that the US’s act of 
recognition of the State of Israel was to be understood. 168  Once again, the difference in 
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treatment between Israel and Palestine is notable for highlighting the pivotal role of neo-
imperial power in the maintenance of the ILS condition. 
 
 As to the claim that Israel’s occupation of the OPT rendered it impossible to conclude 
that Palestine possessed a level of effective and independent governmental control sufficient 
under the test, it is well to recall the many cases of states who were admitted to, or formed the 
original membership of, the UN while lacking independent government.169 Unlike these cases, 
however, what renders Palestine’s case even more clear-cut is the fact that the impediment to 
the full exercise of independence is the result of an occupation regime that, under international 
law, cannot override the sovereign right of the people to exercise self-determination in the 
territory in question. As opposed to temporarily administering the territory in the best interests 
of this people in accordance with its obligations under international law, the occupying power 
has systematically sought to permanently frustrate that people’s right to self-determination 
through, inter alia, the unlawful de jure and de facto annexation of the territory and the transfer 
of its own civilian population into it. Given the liberal and permissive interpretation afforded 
the Montevideo qualifications in UN admissions practice, it would be unjust to frustrate 
Palestine’s admission by suggesting that it has not attained a sufficient level of independent and 
effective governmental control over its own territory owing to the bad faith of the occupying 
power. As pointed out by the Lebanese delegate to the Council, to do so would be to furnish 
the occupying power with the authority to deny the realization of Palestine statehood ad 
infinitum, including the right of its people to self-determination.170 In addition, as demonstrated 
by the contemporary histories of Denmark, France and Kuwait the mere fact of occupation does 
not negate the existence of the state subject to it. Notably, this was the view taken by the US 
when it supported occupied Austria’s application for membership in 1947, once again 
highlighting an arbitrary double-standard at work.171 While Crawford has argued that such 
cases are distinct from Palestine, because they involve states that “were once incontestably 
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established as such”,172 Quigley rightly points out that because no other state can legitimately 
lay claim to the OPT “there is no reason in principle why a [Palestine] state cannot be brought 
into being under such circumstances.”173  
 
 Finally, with respect to the fourth requirement for statehood under the Montevideo 
formula, the Committee on Admission differed as to whether Palestine possessed the capacity 
to conduct foreign relations. In particular, questions were raised by some members regarding 
the capacity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to engage in relations with other States, “since 
under the Oslo Accords the Palestinian Authority could not engage in foreign relations.”174 The 
trouble with this view, however, is that it runs contrary to the liberal, flexible and permissive 
interpretation given to this branch of the Montevideo test in UN admissions practice, and is 
only partially accurate on fact. As demonstrated with the cases of Belorussia, Ukraine, Monaco, 
the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, to name only a few, satisfaction 
of this criteria has not been compromised even where a state’s foreign relations are wholly or 
partially ceded to another state.175 Unlike these cases, however, Palestine has never ceded its 
foreign relations capacity to another state. Rather, that capacity has always been performed by 
the PLO on behalf of the Palestinian people, as affirmed by decades of UN practice going back 
to 1974.176 Indeed, it was the act of the PLO entering into the Oslo accords with Israel under 
US auspices that created the PA in the first place.177 While it is true that Oslo stated that the PA 
did not have “powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations”, it also expressly 
provided that those powers would be conducted by the PLO on the PA’s behalf – a fact not 
mentioned in the Committee on Admission’s report.178 It is to be recalled that since 1988, the 
designation “Palestine” has been used in place of the PLO at the UN. It is therefore clear that 
Palestine has demonstrated a capacity to enter into foreign relations through the PLO, which 
has included a robust diplomatic and treaty practice both at the UN and with the state of Israel 
itself. 
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 The issue of capacity to enter into foreign relations brings us back to the hybridity of the 
declaratory and constitutive theories of statehood, the lynchpin of which is to be found in the 
act of recognition. As noted by Higgins, UN practice “undeniably reveals that most Member 
States have considered the issue of recognition as relevant” in the Montevideo analysis, in so 
far as “it is evidence of the international status of an applicant” for membership.179 Thus, those 
members of the Committee on Admission that favoured Palestine’s application pointed to 
Palestine’s membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the 
Group of 77 (G77) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) as evidence of its capacity in this regard. Most significantly, they noted that “over 
130 States had recognized Palestine as an independent sovereign State.” 180  As noted by 
Quigley, this level of recognition has given rise to Palestine’s very rich treaty and 
diplomatic/consular relations practice, the latter of which “perform the tasks that are typical of 
diplomatic missions, maintaining political contact with host states”.181 Based on the wide ambit 
afforded the foreign relations capacity branch of the Montevideo test in UN admissions 
practice, it is hard to suggest that Palestine does not meet the required threshold.  
 
 The unduly narrow approach adopted by the Committee on Admission in its assessment 
of this requirement in Palestine’s application is once again underscored by the inconsistent 
position of the US concerning Israel’s application in 1948/49. In urging the Council to take a 
liberal approach then, Jessup noted that “we already have, among the Members of the United 
Nations, some political entities which do not possess full sovereign freedom to form their own 
international policy.”182 Even more to the point, he noted “that neither at San Francisco nor 
subsequently has the United Nations considered that complete freedom to frame and manage 
one’s own foreign policy was an essential requisite of United Nations membership.”183 In view 
of the US position then, and its subsequent vindication in wider UN practice, the fact that 
Palestine’s case failed to garner the full support of the Committee on Admission on this ground 
makes little sense. There can be no other way to view it than as an abuse of the Council’s power 
under Article 4(2) of the Charter by the US in exercise of its own neo-imperial interest.  
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  3.3 Peace-Loving 
 
 The second of the Article 4(1) criteria is that the applicant be “peace-loving”. Some 
members of the Committee on Admission questioned Palestine’s peace-loving character, citing 
Hamas’s refusal “to renounce terrorism and violence” and its alleged “aim of destroying 
Israel.”184 While it is true that since its founding in 1988 Hamas has engaged in low intensity 
armed operations in defence of the Palestinian people living under prolonged military 
occupation, it is also true that the movement has often transgressed the laws of war while doing 
so in ways typical of the modus operandi of non-state actors engaged in asymmetrical 
conflict. 185  This has not stopped Israel from negotiating agreements with the movement, 
including those establishing truces and prisoner exchanges.186 Based on relevant international 
law and practice, none of these facts seem to be reason enough to disqualify Palestine’s 
character as a peace-loving state.  
 
 As with the statehood criterion, the flexibility shown in the general application of this 
condition has been very wide in UN admissions practice. Thus, as noted, the fact that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Congo, and Croatia were actively engaged in high-intensity conventional 
armed conflict with their neighbours when they applied for membership was not regarded by 
the UN as enough to disqualify them from being characterized as peace-loving for the purposes 
of being admitted under Article 4(1) of the Charter. At the same time, the internationally 
recognized representatives of the Palestinian people and the state of Palestine, namely the PLO, 
have demonstrated both in word and deed, a commitment to resolving Palestine’s dispute with 
Israel through pacific means. Rooted in the PLO’s recognition of Israel and the two-state 
formula in 1988, this commitment is manifest in almost three decades of engagement in 
negotiations to that end. This position was unequivocally reiterated both in Palestine’s 
application for membership, as well as in the October 2011 Council debate. 187  It was 
additionally demonstrated through Palestine’s extensive resort to multilateralism, including 
diplomatic and legal mechanisms of dispute resolution at the UN, as evident in its active support 
and reliance on the ICJ in 2004. 188  Thus, those members of the Committee in favour of 
Palestine’s membership expressed the view that Palestine was peace-loving “in view of its 
commitment to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-
                                                 
184 Committee on Admission Report, para. 16.  
185 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza, September 2009. 
186 At the time of Palestine’s application for membership, Israel had just negotiated an exchange of prisoners with 
Hamas. Statement of Mr. Ahamed (India), UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6636th Mtg. at 14, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
187 Application of Palestine for UN Membership. Statement of Mr. Mansour (Palestine), UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 
6636th Mtg. at 7, S/PV.6636, 24 October 2011. 
188 Wall. 
Chapter 5 – The State of Palestine at the UN 
 186
Palestinian conflict.”189 For them, “Palestine’s fulfillment of this criterion was also evident in 
its commitment to resuming negotiations on all final status issues on the basis of the 
internationally endorsed terms of reference, relevant United Nations resolutions, the Madrid 
principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map.”190 The representative of Brazil 
perhaps put it best when she proclaimed during the October 2011 Security Council debate that 
“[t]he ultimate demonstration that Palestine is a peace-loving State is precisely the decision to 
turn to international law and to the United Nations to realize its legitimate right to self-
determination.”191 In her view,  “[i]nternational recognition of the Palestinian State and its 
admission in the United Nations as a full Member can help reduce the asymmetry that at present 
characterizes relations between the parties.”192  
 
 It is important to reiterate that UN practice does not require an applicant for admission 
who may be engaged in negotiations at the time of application to have successfully concluded 
peace agreements before admission takes place. Being engaged in negotiations has been 
deemed to be enough to satisfy the peace-loving criterion. Importantly, this has been a position 
long-held by the US itself. Thus, when Austria was being considered for membership when it 
was under quadripartite Allied occupation in 1947, the US took the position that the absence of 
a peace treaty with the occupying powers (owing to what it viewed was Soviet intransigence) 
did not disqualify it from membership.193 This led the US to tellingly proclaim that the people 
of Austria should not be penalized through the denial of UN membership owing to the 
negotiating position of “one great Power.” 194  Furthermore, when Israel’s admission was 
approved in May 1949, the US took the view that the mere promise of peace, as offered by 
Israel, was enough for it to pass the threshold of being regarded by the Organization as peace-
loving. Thus, in arguing that Israeli admission should be approved by the General Assembly, 
the US representative proclaimed that “[a] solid foundation for peace and stability in Palestine 
had been laid by the armistice agreements concluded between Israel and most of the Arab States 
[i.e. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon]”, and that an armistice agreement with Syria was “still in the 
process of negotiation.”195 In his view, it was enough to “hope” that an agreement would be 
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concluded in the near future, thereby “inaugurating an era of peace and stability.”196 Notably, 
the requirement of reaching any sort of peace with the Palestinian people was overlooked by 
the US at the time.197 In addition, armistice agreements are not peace agreements; it would be 
decades before Israel would make peace with its Arab neighbours, and only two of them at 
that.198 Finally, it bears recalling that at the time Israel’s application for admission was being 
discussed and approved by the UN in 1948/49, Zionist and then Israeli forces were engaged in 
the systematic expulsion of the indigenous population from the country. As discussed in greater 
depth below, these were matters that were well understood by Member States at the UN. 
Nevertheless, none of this was enough to taint Israel’s character as a peace-loving state.  
 
 Given the pivotal role played by the US in frustrating Palestine’s application for 
membership in 2011, the relevance of the above is not insignificant. The capricious and 
arbitrary nature of the US position on Palestine’s peace-loving character is exposed by the fact 
that far from being a passive observer of the near 30-year Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the 
Americans have been the principal sponsor of it in both bilateral, multilateral and proximity 
formats. The US therefore has intimate first-hand knowledge of Palestine’s commitment to 
pacifically resolve the conflict on the basis of relevant international law as outlined in the 
relevant UN resolutions and decisions. The fact that a final peace has yet to be concluded on 
this basis should not, as a matter of law and practice, including as affirmed by US practice itself, 
detract from a determination that Palestine is sufficiently peace-loving to satisfy this article 4(1) 
criterion.  
 
 Owing to the highly permissive interpretation and application given to the peace-loving 
criterion in UN admissions practice, it is not surprising that both the Indian and South African 
representatives to the Council rejected conditioning Palestine’s membership in the UN upon 
the conclusion of a peace agreement with Israel, the former rightly indicating that to do so 
would be “legally untenable.”199 Nevertheless, because of the unduly narrow position adopted 
by some members of the Council, including the clearly hypocritical one adopted by the US, 
Palestine’s peace-loving character was sufficiently impugned to block membership.  
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  3.4 Acceptance, Ability and Willingness to Carry Out Charter Obligations  
 
 The third, fourth and fifth criteria for membership in the UN are that the applicant must 
accept the obligations contained in the Charter and be able and willing to carry them out. As 
noted, acceptance of an applicant’s Charter obligations is usually performed by a pro forma 
declaration, while ability and willingness criteria have never been defined by the UN in 
practice. In the absence of any substantive parameters, and motivated by the principle of 
universality of membership, these criteria have historically been given very broad application 
in UN admissions practice, if and when they have even been applied.200  
 
 Notwithstanding this wide latitude, some members of the Committee of Admission took 
the view that Palestine did not satisfy these conditions. In particular, it was argued that “the 
Charter required more than a verbal commitment by an applicant to carry out its Charter 
obligations”, and that “an applicant had to show a commitment to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and to refrain from the threat or the use of force in the conduct of its international 
relations.”201 In this respect, “it was stressed that Hamas had not accepted these obligations.”202 
In its application for membership, Palestine offered the standard pro forma declaration 
affirming, inter alia, that it accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and solemnly 
undertakes to fulfill them.203 It also affirmed its 30-year commitment to peacefully resolving 
its dispute with Israel through a negotiated resolution of all final status issues in line with the 
relevant UN resolutions and international law. That Hamas had engaged in low intensity armed 
resistance to Israel’s occupation of the OPT was not disputed. Yet, by comparison, its low 
intensity military actions could not approach the armed conflict accompanying the successful 
applications of other states, including Israel. It was because of these factors that other members 
of the Committee on Admission were satisfied that Palestine fulfilled these criteria.204 In this 
regard, they rightly pointed out that when the UN considered Israel’s application in 1948/49 it 
was “argued that Israel’s solemn pledge to carry out its obligations under the Charter was 
sufficient to meet this criterion.”205 
 
 To appreciate the extent of the double standard applied to Palestine by some members of 
the Committee on Admission, it is worth recalling the context in which the UN’s acceptance of 
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Israel’s solemn pledge was given and accepted as sufficient by the Organization. Israel’s 
application for membership was submitted in the fall of 1948, after the civil war phase of the 
conflict and during the first Arab-Israeli war which commenced on 15 May 1948. By the time 
the application came before the Security Council and General Assembly in December 1948 and 
May 1949, the vast majority of the roughly 700,000-900,000 Palestinian refugees had been 
forcibly exiled as a result of the actions of the Haganah and Zionist dissident groups Lehi and 
Irgun, amounting to roughly 75-90 percent of the Arab inhabitants of the country. 206  
Additionally, the head of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), Count 
Folke Bernadotte, had been assassinated by Lehi. Finally, during the war, Israel expanded its 
territory to control some 78 percent of mandatory Palestine, well beyond the terms of the 
partition resolution, including in violation of the corpus separatum and the occupation of West 
Jerusalem (see Map IV).207 In response, the General Assembly passed resolution 194(III) on 11 
December 1948, calling on Israel to repatriate the refugees “at the earliest practicable date” and 
affirming that Jerusalem “should be placed under effective United Nations control.”208 
 
 As a result of the foregoing, questions were raised during the debates on Israel’s 
admission as to whether it accepted its commitments under the UN Charter and was able and 
willing to abide by them. In a series of meetings of an Ad Hoc Political Committee of the 
General Assembly from 5-9 May 1949, Aubrey Eban, a representative of Israel, was given 
ample opportunity to clarify Israel’s position on the above, including whether it would abide 
by the terms of General Assembly resolutions 181(II) respecting partition, and 194(III) 
respecting the implementation of the right of the Palestine refugees to return and the need to 
place Jerusalem under UN control.209 Despite repeated opportunities, the most he was prepared 
to do was affirm his country’s willingness to negotiate. He was clear that at most Israel would 
be willing to hand over Jerusalem’s holy sites to some form of UN oversight with “integration” 
of the remainder of the city “into the life of the State of Israel.”210 Likewise, the refugee issue 
could only be resolved in the context of a final peace concluded with each of the Arab states, it 
being clear that “resettlement in neighbouring areas [e.g. outside of Israel] should be considered 
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as the main principle of solution.”211 Despite the fact that almost half of the refugees had been 
expelled prior to the intervention of any Arab army in Palestine, Eban relayed Israel’s view that 
the refugee problem was “a direct consequence of the war launched by the Arab States.”212 As 
to the Bernadotte assassination, Eban indicated that efforts to apprehend the suspects were 
unsuccessful owing to the fact that at the time of the assassination (September 1948) “the 
organization of the internal security in the State of Israel had been still in its initial stages” and 
the “police force had not yet achieved the necessary degree of internal stability and efficiency 
which would have enabled it to cope swiftly and effectively with that revolting crime.” 213 
Oddly, this admission failed to give rise to questions of not only whether Israel was able to 
abide by its obligations under the Charter, but also whether it actually exercised effective 
governmental control over its claimed territory.  
 
 Despite the objections of the Arab states, the Israeli position found support among its 
Western allies, led by the US. Thus, in the December 1948 Council debate, Jessup recalled that 
“in the terms of its application for membership” Israel had “indicated its acceptance” of the 
obligations contained in the Charter.214 He stated that there was “no reason” to “question the 
solemn assurance of Israel”, as per standard practice. 215  Likewise, he asserted that the 
“willingness of Israel to carry out these obligations is made clear in its letter of application for 
membership,” and that the US government was “satisfied with the ability of the State of Israel” 
to do so.216 Following Eban’s May 1949 testimony to the General Assembly regarding Israel’s 
acceptance of Assembly resolutions 181(II) and 194(III) on the issues of borders, Palestine 
refugee repatriation and Jerusalem, the US maintained this position, asserting that those issues 
could not properly factor into assessing Israel’s application under Article 4(1). According to 
the US representative, Warren Austin, the Assembly could not be understood as being “directly 
concerned with [the] definitive settlement of the questions of Jerusalem or of the Arab 
refugees,” despite the fact that these issues flowed directly from its own resolutions.217 Rather, 
those issues were a matter for the UNCCP to manage as part of the negotiations effort. “The 
point at issue,” according to him, was simply “whether the State of Israel was eligible for 
membership under Article 4 of the Charter.”218 On the basis of Israeli promises to engage in 
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peace negotiations, following the conclusion of three armistice agreements, he concluded Israel 
fully met the criteria.219 This very permissive position was adopted by a number of states from 
the western and European settler colonial block in the Assembly debate.220  
  
 None of this is to suggest that Israel’s application received special treatment on the 
acceptance, ability and willingness criteria in 1948/49. On the contrary, its treatment was in 
line with the liberal, flexible and permissive approach that would come to characterize UN 
admission practice in this area after 1955. Nevertheless, that Israel would have been deemed to 
have satisfied these criteria in the context of a civil and international armed conflict in which 
the indigenous population of Palestine had largely been expelled and the contours of its putative 
state considerably expanded to undefined frontiers, all while being saddled by the high profile 
political violence of its own dissident groups, renders it as good a case as any to demonstrate 
the level of permissiveness these criteria have been given in practice. 221 For Palestine, the 
lesson in this has been all too familiar. Although the UN record shows that its leadership has 
been committed to a peaceful resolution of its dispute with Israel under US auspices for the past 
30 years, and certain dissident elements in Hamas have not committed anywhere near the 
transgressions against peace as Israel and its dissident groups had when it was admitted to 
membership, this was not enough to pass the threshold.  
 
3.5 General Observations 
 
 On its face, membership in the UN is not absolute. Were it so, the Charter’s framers 
would not have set out the five conditions for membership codified in Article 4(1). 
Nevertheless, propelled by a desire to ensure the universality of the Organization, UN 
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admissions practice has historically adopted a liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of 
these conditions. This practice has been so liberal, that in many cases the Organization has not 
bothered to apply the conditions at all. This suggests that we now live in period where the 
unconditional universality of membership in the UN ostensibly prevails as a feature of the 
international rule of law. 
 
 An assessment of Palestine’s failed 2011 application for membership of the UN reveals 
a double standard in the application of the principle of the universality of membership and, by 
extension, the international rule of law. This double standard highlights how international law 
can be used to entrench and propagate the hegemonic-subaltern binary within it, this time 
thorough the exercise of the neo-imperial power of the US, resulting in the perpetuation of 
Palestine’s ILS condition. Based on the liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of the 
Article 4(1) criteria in UN practice, Palestine should have had no trouble qualifying for 
membership. It possesses the requisite elements for statehood under Montevideo and it can 
demonstrate that it is peace-loving and accepting of its obligations under the Charter, and is 
both able and willing to abide by them. Although its candidacy for membership may not have 
been perfect, based on the standards set by UN admissions practice, Palestine met all of these 
criteria to a qualitatively equal or greater degree than was the case on the admission of many 
other states members of the Organization, including Israel.  
 
 The research demonstrates that Palestine’s path to membership was frustrated by the 
imposition of conditions extraneous to the Article 4(1) criteria, along with the unduly narrow 
application of those criteria by certain members of the Committee on Admission. In particular, 
the role of the US as a permanent member of the Security Council proved to be pivotal. Because 
the Council is vested with the authority to recommend new members under Article 4(2) of the 
Charter, and because the US made it clear from the beginning that it would utilize its veto 
power to block Palestinian membership, the fate of the effort was doomed from the start. Some 
writers have suggested that Palestine’s case was therefore wholly political and did not turn on 
whether the Article 4(1) criteria were actually met.222 But this view is belied by the fact that the 
Article 4(1) criteria, or some semblance thereof, were not only brought to bear in the Committee 
on Admission’s consideration of Palestine’s application, but formed the very basis of it.  
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 The implications of this are clear. International law was utilized by the Council, under 
the weight of its preeminent hegemonic member, to impose a result in line with that member’s 
own interests. Palestine’s application was not assessed in accordance with the universal legal 
standard governing UN membership under the international rule of law. Rather its application 
for membership was denied through the capricious and arbitrary application of the relevant 
legal criteria, thereby allowing it to ironically take place behind a veil of legitimacy furnished 
by the terms of the Charter itself. Through a comparison of the liberal, flexible and permissive 
approach to UN admissions with the narrow, strict and at times confused approach adopted in 
Palestine’s case, this veil was effectively pierced. The consequence has been to uphold the 
international rule by law that Palestine has long been subjected to, and the perpetuation of its 
ILS condition in the UN system. 
 
 Viewed in historical context, Palestine’s 2011 application for UN membership can be 
understood as one of its more recent attempts to break free of the assigned and contingent 
disposition that underpins its overall ILS condition. Following decades of state-building, itself 
constructed upon the PLO’s acceptance of the inequities of prior UN action, one would have 
hoped that Palestine would be deemed to have satisfied enough of the requirements under 
international law as affirmed by the Organization to have finally been released from the cruel 
ordeal of its subaltern legal position in the system. Yet, just as those prior inequities were the 
product of a systematic failure to take the Palestinian people and their rights seriously, so too 
has been the inequity of its failed attempt to gain membership in the UN. This is nowhere more 
evident than in the stark comparison of the treatment of its application with that of Israel’s over 
six decades before it. In particular, the wholly inconsistent views taken by the US in respect of 
those two organically related cases underscores the cross-cutting theme of the neo-imperial 
power at the root of the ILS condition in the contemporary period, to say nothing of the 
systematic and structural hurdles Palestine will somehow have to surmount if liberation and 
freedom are to finally be realized. It is to the attempt to circumvent the inequities prevailing in 
the Security Council that we now turn, as represented in the upgrade of Palestine to non-
member observer state status by the General Assembly in 2012.   
 
4. Non-Member Observer State Status for Palestine 
 
 Having had its application for membership in the UN effectively blocked at the Security 
Council, Palestine remained undeterred in its quest to marshal the potential of international law 
and institutions in its favour. This came by way of its upgrade to non-member observer state 
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status through the passage of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012.223 
Although this status would not offer the same access and standing appertaining to full 
membership, it was viewed by the Palestinian leadership as the best option available given the 
diametrically opposed dynamics of a Council held hostage by the US on the one hand, and a 
Third World dominated Assembly on the other. Of note, the Assembly made a point of 
reaffirming the principle of universality of membership of the UN in resolution 67/19.224  
 
 Based on the UN record, the non-member observer state option seems to have been 
pushed by certain members of the Security Council, albeit rooted in realpolitik. In particular, 
France, which remained silent on the Article 4(1) criteria, noted that full membership “cannot 
be attained at once” owing to “the lack of trust between the main parties” and the surety of a 
US veto.225 It therefore suggested the “intermediate stage” of non-member observer state status 
building on prior gains of the PLO in the Organization.226 It will be recalled from chapter 4 that 
between the mid-1970’s and late 1990’s the Assembly facilitated the gradual provision to the 
PLO of a series of privileges, allowing it qualified access to the UN. This included the granting 
of observer status in the sessions and work of the Assembly in 1974, 227  the use of the 
designation “Palestine” following the state’s declaration of independence in 1988,228 and the 
right to participate in the general debate and to co-sponsor draft resolutions on Palestinian and 
Middle East issues in 1998.229 Palestine had thus become a prominent part of the development 
of observer status in the practice of the Secretary-General and the Assembly, and in this way 
helped advance the principle of universality within the Organization both for itself and as a 
pioneer for other subaltern groups.230 In the French view, non-member observer state status 
“would be an important step forward”, in that “[a]fter 60 years of immobility…we would be 
giving hope to the Palestinians by making progress towards final status.”231 
 
 Far from only maintaining “hope”, however, the Palestinian choice to seek non-member 
observer state status had an even more tangible purpose. It was an attempt to realize concrete 
benefits that attach to quasi-membership of the UN and, in this way, demonstrate the utility of 
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the counter-hegemonic use of international law aimed at mitigating Palestine’s ongoing ILS 
condition.  To see this, it is useful to return to the doctrinal theory concerning statehood – the 
essential prerequisite of UN membership – and to Crawford’s observation that its existence is 
a mixed question of law and fact.  
 
 The upgrade in Palestine’s status to non-member observer state had the effect of tilting 
the scales in this mixed question in favour of fact. Whereas the question as to whether Palestine 
constituted a state under the Montevideo test was widely debated prior to the upgrade, 232 
following the upgrade much of that debate has been rendered moot. This is because the upgrade 
enabled Palestine to engage in activity reserved only for states within international law and 
organization. Thus, following the upgrade the Secretary-General confirmed that Palestine “may 
participate fully and on an equal basis with other States in conferences that are open to members 
of specialized agencies or that are open to all states.”233 In accordance with the Secretary-
General’s practice as depositary of multilateral treaties, this right includes the ability to enter 
into multilateral treaties open only to states and members of specialized agencies.234 In point of 
fact, since 29 November 2012 Palestine has acceded to over 40 multilateral treaties, including 
the major international human rights,235 humanitarian law,236 and criminal law conventions,237 
as well as treaties of more general purpose.238 Likewise, Palestine has become a member of a 
number of international organizations, including INTERPOL and the International Criminal 
Court.239 Accordingly, as a result of the upgrade there is little doubt that the de jure state of 
Palestine exists, and that among the many benefits it enjoys is the ability to make claims under 
and contribute to the progressive development of international law. 240  That Palestine is 
currently under occupation, and subject to a regime of alien subjugation, domination, and 
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exploitation inimical to humankind including systematic racial discrimination, does not vitiate 
this legal reality. Nor does the fact that some states have yet to recognize Palestine, given that 
universal recognition has never been a condition precedent for the legal existence of a state, as 
evinced by the case of Israel.241  
 
 At the same time, symptomatic of the contingency of its Third World quasi-sovereignty, 
it obviously cannot be said that Palestine’s non-member observer state status provides it with 
the full range of rights and duties that appertain to membership in the UN. Palestine’s ability to 
engage in the Organization is still largely substantively and procedurally limited to matters 
relating to “Palestinian and Middle East issues”.242 Most importantly, as noted by the Secretary-
General, with one minor exception Palestine “does not enjoy the right to vote” within the UN, 
including in elections.” 243  Nor may it “submit its own candidacy for any election or 
appointment or submit the names of candidates for any election or appointment.”244 It is this 
sweeping disenfranchisement that underscores Palestine’s persisting ILS condition within the 
UN. Despite the gradual provision to Palestine of a series of privileges within the Organization 
culminating in its current non-member observer state status, the fact that it remains unable to 
exercise the franchise as a Member State owing to the exercise of neo-imperial power 
demonstrates the central importance of that power in the maintenance of ILS in the system. As 
such, the upgrade thus illustrates both the promise and the limits of international law for 
subaltern peoples. For while the existence of the de jure State of Palestine gives rise to a 
presumption that it satisfies the statehood criterion of the Article 4(1) criteria, getting over the 
Security Council’s current narrow and strict construction of the test for membership in the 
Organization cannot be assured given the hegemonic position of the US. This is despite Grant’s 
view that prevailing law and practice has created a presumption of admission to the UN if 
requested by a state.245 Palestine therefore remains caught in a seemingly permanent condition 
of contingency. No matter the gains made through its stubborn belief in international law and 
the world’s preeminent international institution, the operation of that very law and institution 
may potentially be utilized by neo-imperial power to perpetually keep it out.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
 The international vocation of the UN and its unique role as the guardian of international 
peace and security in the post-WWII era rests upon the principle of the universality of 
membership of the Organization. By definition, the purposes and principles of the UN cannot 
be fulfilled without as broad a membership as possible. With the exception of its first decade, 
UN admissions practice has accordingly been marked by a liberal, flexible and permissive 
interpretation of the admission criteria enumerated in Article 4(1) of the Charter. So open has 
the practice been, that the Article 4(1) criteria have been reduced to a mere procedural formality, 
leading to an unconditional universality of membership within the Organization as the defining 
feature of the international rule of law on UN membership.246 
  
 In contrast to this, a legal assessment of the Committee on Admission’s consideration of 
Palestine’s 2011 application for membership in the UN reveals that it was subjected to an 
unduly narrow, strict and erroneous application of the Article 4(1) criteria at odds with UN 
admissions practice. The fact that the Committee was able to undertake this substantively 
anomalous position under cover of a procedural authority expressly granted it by Article 4(2) 
lends the result of its deliberation problematic from a subaltern standpoint. Far from an example 
of the objective application of the international rule of law governing UN membership, the 
Committee’s refusal to recommend Palestine’s application can better be understood as an 
instance of the continued international rule by law. This, in turn, has led to the perpetuation of 
Palestine’s ILS condition in the system.  
 
 Based on the UN record, the role of the US as a hegemonic power on the Council was 
vital in this regard and is a good demonstration of the third theme informing the ILS condition, 
namely its dependence in the contemporary period on the exercise of neo-imperial power. This 
is demonstrated through a comparison of the inconsistent American approach concerning 
Israel’s admission with that concerning Palestine’s. It is the juxtaposition of a broad and 
forgiving interpretation of the Article 4(1) criteria in Israel’s case, with a strict, narrow and 
erroneous application of same in Palestine’s, that highlights how contemporary neo-imperial 
power uses law in capricious and arbitrary ways to perpetuate the ILS condition. In this case, 
but for the abuse – to quote Judge Alvarez – of the Council’s legal authority under Article 4(2) 
of the Charter under US pressure, Palestine may have been able to gain some ground in 
breaking free of its assigned and continuing subaltern position. 
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 Aside from the immediate goal of UN membership, it is possible to more broadly 
understand the rationale behind Palestine’s application for admission and, upon failing that, for 
non-member observer state status, as being rooted in the counter-hegemonic potential of 
international law and institutions. This effort represents the culmination of a prolonged struggle, 
dating from the decolonization era, to rely on these phenomena to realize Palestinian rights and 
territorial sovereignty. This struggle is itself founded upon a poignant acceptance of past 
inequities wrought through international law and institutions (e.g. League of Nations mandate; 
UN partition; UN managerial approach to the OPT), while accompanied by an evidently 
indelible belief in the centrality of those very laws and institutions in bringing overdue, if 
partial, relief. Common sense would dictate that the fact that Palestine’s international legal 
standing has suffered at the hands of the UN would render it the last place its people would turn 
for deliverance. Yet, that is precisely what has transpired. There is nothing in the Palestinian 
position, as articulated both in its application for membership and non-member observer state 
status, that is inconsistent with prevailing international law as affirmed by the UN. This counter-
intuitive reliance on international law and institutions by the subaltern class has been pivotal in 
assisting that class in resisting its disenfranchisement and ultimately cultivating a greater 
measure of international legal personality of its own. In this way, it has given rise to an 
additional, but related, paradox. Rather than regarding international law and institutions as 
forms of restraint on state sovereignty, Palestine has used these phenomena as the primary 
means through which such sovereignty may be asserted and attained.247 In this way, Palestine’s 
navigation of its ILS condition serves as a useful model for subaltern groups everywhere. 
 
 Along with the emancipatory goals of this course of action by the weak, there is a certain 
magnanimity too, which is of no small consequence for the UN and the international community 
at large. In chapter 4, we discussed the extent to which the occupying power’s actions in the 
OPT since the onset of the Oslo process have operated to consolidate, not relinquish, its control 
over the territory. Despite the UN record amply demonstrating this reality, the Organization 
and its members have uniformly continued to pay only lip service to the need for a two-state 
solution to the question of Palestine. Yet, as between the two parties, the hegemonic occupying 
power persists in a course of conduct objectively intended to frustrate this result, while the 
subaltern people subject to its control resist through recourse to international law and 
institutions. In this sense, Palestine’s application for admission to membership in the UN 
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represents an attempt – perhaps the last available – to preserve the two-state formula for peace, 
the ostensible policy goal of the international community as represented by the UN since 1947.  
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6 
 
Conclusion: Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity as a Long-Range 
Condition 
  
In The Politics of History Howard Zinn poignantly observed that “[w]hat one sees in the 
present may be attributable to a passing phenomenon”; but “if the same situation appears at 
various points in history, it becomes not a transitory event, but a long-range condition, not an 
aberration, but a structural deformity requiring serious attention.”1 From an examination of key 
legal texts and moments in the historical record, this research has attempted to demonstrate that 
Palestine and its people have suffered the effects of such a long-range condition and structural 
deformity through the management of their lingering question at the United Nations (UN). I 
have identified this condition as international legal subalternity (ILS).  
 
The principal attribute of the ILS condition is that those disenfranchised by it are 
continually presented with the promise of a more just and equitable future though the 
application of international law, bolstered by the unrivaled political legitimacy of the purveyor 
of that promise, the organized international community of states as represented at and by the 
UN. Yet despite the lengths to which such groups go in reliance on this promise, its realization 
is perpetually kept out of reach in one form or another through the actions of the very same 
international community of states which all too often either do not pay sufficient heed to the 
full array of international law’s precepts, abuse them or completely overlook them in practice.  
 
Building on the work of the TWAIL network of scholars, I have argued that the ILS 
condition is the result of a hegemonic/subaltern binary that characterizes the very nature of the 
international legal order. According to this epistemic, international law is at once the creation 
and tool of hegemonic power, the manifestation of which invariably produces and reproduces 
subaltern underclasses who have little or no say in the substantive formation or application of 
the law that purports to govern them. While the hegemonic side of the equation originally took 
a distinctly European imperial form between the seventeenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
since the end of World War II (WWII) it has taken on a multilateral guise in the form of the 
UN under the all-important influence of a handful of neo-imperial states, foremost the United 
States (US). At the same time, the subaltern underclasses have been drawn almost exclusively 
from among the non-European world, initially in the form of colonized, non-self-governing 
peoples, then shifting to the quasi-independent ‘post-colonial’ Third World, and lingering on 
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among a variety of other non-state actors who remain on the margins in the international system 
(e.g. UN trusteeships, indigenous peoples, refugees, etc.). It is the contingent and abridged 
nature of the rights and membership of subaltern classes in the international legal order that 
defines the ILS condition. Despite claims regarding the purported universality of modern 
international law and institutions and the access to justice they are meant to provide, those that 
suffer from the condition do not enjoy full and equal legal standing and membership in the 
system.   
 
What brings the ILS condition (and, by extension, the hegemonic/subaltern binary at its 
root) into sharp relief is the evident clash one is able to trace over time between the international 
rule of law with what I have called the international rule by law. At bottom, this is a clash 
between two ordering principles of international relations in the post-WWII era. On the one 
hand, the international rule of law is ostensibly based on the universal application of 
international law without regard to the power or station of those subject to it; received wisdom 
holds it out as the governing legal principle regulating international affairs. On the other hand, 
the international rule by law is rooted in a cynical use, abuse or selective application of 
international legal norms by hegemonic actors under a claim of democratic rights-based 
liberalism, but with the effect of perpetuating inequity between them and their subaltern 
opposites. By juxtaposing the international rule of law against the international rule by law, one 
is able to better understand the nature of the ILS condition as a fixed feature of today’s 
international legal order, despite the varied configurations it may assume.  
 
Tracing these configurations across time reveals at least three related and overlapping 
themes that cut across the ILS condition, touched upon above, giving it its essential content. 
First, ILS has its origins in the European imperial encounter with the non-European world 
during the age of empire and the resultant structural Eurocentricity of the modern international 
legal order. Marked by the so-called standard of civilization, international law in this period 
was understood by post-Westphalian states and jurists to be the sole preserve of its European 
and/or Christian participants with non-European Others relegated to law’s passive objects, 
giving international law its early rule by law character. Second, ILS has continued despite the 
ostensible creation of a liberal rights-based order in the post-WWII era founded upon the 
international rule of law as embodied in the UN and its Charter. Notwithstanding gains 
registered through the purported universalism of this new order, embodied primarily through 
the realization of Third World independence and membership in the UN, elements of the old 
rule by law order remained as evidenced in the qualitatively inferior legal rights and standing 
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these Third World/underdeveloped quasi-sovereigns actually came to possess relative to their 
European/developed world counterparts. Third, ILS has been allowed to persist in the post-
decolonization and Cold War eras through the diktat of neo-imperial power masked as 
democratic and rights-based liberalism. Notwithstanding the ostensible end to classic forms of 
European empire with the founding and growth of the UN, hegemonic states have served as the 
primary executors of ILS in their self-appointed roles as guardians of the purportedly liberal 
international legal order.  While the permanent five members of the UN Security Council have 
been key among such actors, the unparalleled leader among them remains the US.  
 
To complicate matters, the hegemonic/subaltern binary in the international legal order is 
not a one-way, linear relationship. On the contrary, its great paradox rests in the fact that there 
remains what TWAIL theorists have identified as a counter-hegemonic potential in modern 
international law and institutions, thorough which subaltern actors can challenge those very 
structures on their own terms. This typically involves subaltern criticism of prevailing law 
based upon a critical application of that law against evolving social mores and sensibilities, 
which in turn produce fresh claims of fairness and result in some form of progressive 
development of the law. Yet, despite the possibility of subaltern pushback, TWAIL theory 
appears to suffer from a blind spot in so far as it suggests that this countermove can be utilized 
to irrevocably dislodge the hegemonic/subaltern binary per se. Through the case of Palestine, 
this research has demonstrated that the binary is a structural component of the international 
legal order, and that the ILS condition it produces cannot be eradicated as such, but rather only 
mitigated. As international law and institutions are challenged by subaltern groups and new law 
is made, the interests served by that law produce either partially assuaged or wholly new 
subaltern classes who are eventually compelled to continue the cycle. As a result, the ILS 
condition may morph in respect of one or more subaltern group, or otherwise shift from one 
group to another, but it does not lend itself to being overcome once and for all.  
 
Returning to our case study, the ILS condition finds sustained expression in the UN’s 
prolonged management of the question of Palestine. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that 
presents the UN as offering the only normative basis of a just and lasting peace in 
Palestine/Israel, there has been a continuing though vacillating gulf between the requirements 
of international law and UN action that has helped frustrate, rather than facilitate, that lofty end. 
Given that one of the core purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security in 
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conformity with the principles of justice and international law,2 understanding why and how 
the UN has maintained Palestine’s ILS condition is important because it provides insight not 
only into why the conventional view is mistaken, but also how the UN might better perform its 
functions in line with its Charter. 
 
As set out in chapter 2, the origins of Palestine’s ILS condition are not to be found within 
the UN itself, but are rather located in the interwar period and the institutionalization of the 
international rule by law through the League of Nations. More specifically, Palestine’s ILS 
condition is rooted in British imperial secret treaty-making and diplomacy between 1915 and 
1947, which legally privileged the Zionist movement’s Jewish national home project over the 
previously assured political rights of the Palestinian Arab majority. As demonstrated through a 
brief survey of relevant documents culminating in the Mandate for Palestine, this resulted in 
the international legal disenfranchisement of the indigenous Palestinians in favour of a self-
declared European colonial settler movement. Unsurprisingly, the cross-cutting theme of the 
international legal order’s structural Eurocentricity was most pronounced during this period. 
Without it, the ILS condition would not have been so successfully codified into the prevailing 
international legal order through the mandate system. In a real sense, therefore, the international 
rule by law of this period was both a description of what was happening to the subaltern 
Palestinian people as well as a prognostication of what was to come. 
 
This was demonstrated in chapter 3, which established that despite the promise of a new 
liberal rights-based global order based on the international rule of law, the UN remained true 
to the international rule by law ordering framework it had inherited. This was established 
through a legal analysis of the General Assembly’s plan of partition for Palestine of November 
1947, and the resulting reification of Palestine’s ILS condition in the UN system. Although the 
Assembly possessed the procedural power under international law to issue the resolution, it 
lacked the substantive power to recommend partition in violation of the prevailing law and 
practice on self-determination of peoples in class A mandated territories. The sacred trust 
principles folded into the UN Charter via the League of Nations Covenant, coupled with the 
British satisfaction of its obligations vis á vis the Jewish national home, meant that only two 
courses of action were legally open to the Assembly at the time: immediate independence of 
the whole of Palestine in line with the wishes of its inhabitants or UN trusteeship. An 
examination of the UN record, in the form of the UN Special Committee on Palestine 
                                                 
2 UN Charter, art. 1(1). 
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(UNSCOP) public and private meetings and report as well as the Assembly debates that 
followed, demonstrates that partition was not based on these international legal considerations 
but was rather driven by hegemonic European states and their settler-colonial affiliates. Their 
goal was to rectify Europe’s centuries-old Jewish question in the wake of the Holocaust. The 
failure to take seriously the rights and interests of Palestine’s indigenous population was 
palpable, as the cross-cutting theme of the structural Eurocentricity of international law and 
institutions once again reared its head. A close reading of the UNSCOP records underscores 
this, as they reveal at least three factors that led the Assembly to disregard the liberal 
international legal order then said to govern in favour of overriding European interests: a bias 
in UNSCOP’s terms of reference, its failure to sufficiently engage the Arab Higher Committee 
and its contempt for principles of democratic governance. The cognitive dissonance displayed 
by UNSCOP as to the inevitability of violence befalling Palestine’s indigenous people 
following partition only exacerbated the practical consequences of these fateful actions. In 
reifying Palestine’s ILS condition in the UN system, the UN plan of partition imposed, in both 
normative and discursive legal terms, the two-state paradigm that would thereafter underpin the 
Organization’s position on the question of Palestine; a position that remains in place to this very 
day. In so doing, it permanently circumscribed the territorial extent to which the Palestinian 
people could thereafter legitimately claim any sovereign rights in their own land, having had 
most of it wrested from them by a European settler colonial movement with the imprimatur of 
the UN. Once again, but for the structural Eurocentricity of the international legal and 
institutional order inherited by the UN, it is questionable as to whether any of this would have 
unfolded the way it did.    
 
With the decolonization era, there was hope that the Eurocentricity of the UN would be 
vitiated by the rise of the Third World in the Organization, and in a manner that would mitigate 
the conditions that allowed for the reification of Palestine’s ILS in 1947. To this end, chapter 4 
demonstrated that the forces of global decolonization gave rise to a partial recognition of 
Palestinian legal subjectivity and rights in the UN, most importantly the right to self-
determination in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) as part of the two-state paradigm. 
This bolstered the conventional wisdom regarding the UN as the standard-bearer of the 
international rule of law. Yet a closer look at the humanitarian/managerial approach of the UN’s 
position on the OPT in the post-1967 era reveals how the second of the cross-cutting themes 
underpinning the ILS condition, viz. the structural limitations of Third World quasi-sovereignty, 
has ultimately allowed for the maintenance of Palestine’s ILS condition in the so-called post-
colonial era. Under this approach, the new-look UN has satisfied itself merely with addressing 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 206
a variety of discrete violations by Israel, the occupying power, of international humanitarian 
and human rights law in the OPT without definitively addressing the legality of the very regime 
giving rise to those violations themselves. Instead, the UN has insisted on negotiations as the 
only means through which the occupation can be brought to an end, despite the plethora of 
evidence in its own record to demonstrate that prevailing international law requires a far more 
robust and simpler response. Based on the UN record, Israel’s occupation has become illegal 
over time for its violation of a number of jus cogens norms, derogation from which is not 
permitted in international law. These are the inadmissibility of territorial conquest, respect for 
self-determination of peoples, and the prohibition against regimes of alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation, including racial discrimination. As such, Israel’s occupation of 
the OPT has in itself become an internationally wrongful act which, according to the law on 
state responsibility, cannot be terminated except through unilateral and forthwith withdrawal 
by the occupying power. By making withdrawal contingent on negotiation between an 
occupying power that the UN record itself demonstrates has been manifestly acting in bad faith 
for over fifty-years and an occupied population held captive by it, the Organization is not only 
violating prevailing international law on state responsibility, but it is also undermining its own 
stated goal of establishing peace between two sovereign states in the former mandate of 
Palestine. It has thereby made the realization of Palestinian rights repeatedly reaffirmed by it 
impossible to achieve. While it is possible for Palestine to have further recourse to the ICJ for 
an advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s continued presence in the OPT, the research 
suggests that such a move would at most only help mitigate its ILS condition, not fundamentally 
cure it. This has ultimately given the lie to the UN’s recognition and affirmation of Palestinian 
legal subjectivity and rights in the OPT post-1967 which, like the overall contingency of the 
Third World’s quasi-sovereignty, can only be regarded as nominal in nature and dependent on 
the exercise of hegemonic forces beyond Palestine’s control.  
 
 The issue of the extent to which post-Cold War hegemonic forces continue to shape 
Palestine’s ILS condition figured prominently in Chapter 5, which examined the State of 
Palestine’s 2011 application for membership in the UN. As the guardian of international peace 
and security in the contemporary era, the principle of the universality of membership of the 
Organization is the foundation upon which the UN’s success logically rests. For this reason, the 
international rule of law governing UN admission has long been marked by a liberal, flexible 
and permissive interpretation of the test for membership contained in Article 4(1) of the UN 
Charter. In contrast to this, a legal assessment of the UN Committee on Admission’s 
consideration of Palestine’s application for membership demonstrates that it was subjected to 
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an unduly narrow, strict and resultantly flawed application of the Article 4(1) criteria. An 
examination of the contemporaneous debates of the Council demonstrates that the main driver 
of this approach was the US, which used the legal authority vested in it as a permanent member 
of the Council to block membership for political reasons thinly veiled as sound legal ones. With 
no small measure of irony, this was highlighted through the juxtaposition of the broad and 
forgiving interpretation of the Article 4(1) criteria adopted by the US in respect of Israel’s 
admission in 1949 – itself a reflection of the approach that would eventually become the 
international standard – with its unduly strict and narrow application of the criteria in 
Palestine’s case in 2011. The resulting frustration of Palestine’s bid for membership offers a 
good demonstration of the third cross-cutting theme informing the ILS condition, namely its 
dependence in the contemporary period on the exercise of neo-imperial power masked as 
liberal, democratic and rights-based. In this case, any pretention that Palestine’s lack of success 
was based on an objective application of the international rule of law governing UN 
membership by the Council is undermined on two fronts. First, by the fact that it was patently 
contrary to the prevailing law and practice on UN admissions. Second, that despite this anomaly 
it was done under cover of a procedural authority expressly granted the Council under Article 
4(2) of the Charter. The result is to reveal this episode as yet another example of the 
international rule by law at work. While resort to the General Assembly in 2012 offered a 
counter-hegemonic course to Palestine that produced a variety of gains in the way of affirming 
its status as a state under international law, the fact that full membership in the preeminent 
international organization of states remains elusive reveals the limitations inherent in such an 
approach. To put it simply, despite some limited gains, Palestine’s ILS condition remains 
fundamentally in-tact through its continued disenfranchisement in the UN system. 
 
It is therefore evident that at the heart of the UN’s failure to help bring about a peaceful 
resolution of the question of Palestine in line with the international rule of law is its complicity 
in the reification, maintenance and perpetuation of Palestine’s ILS condition over time through 
the international rule by law. It is a common refrain of policymakers, pundits and academics 
alike to bemoan the seemingly endless cycle of violence and failed diplomatic initiatives that 
have characterized the UN’s prolonged management of the problem as resulting from a simple 
lack of political will or a crisis of impunity.3 To be sure, there is no doubt that these and other 
problems exist. Nevertheless, on their own they do not provide sufficient explanation for the 
situation as it continues to fester at the UN, now for the better part of a century. For that, this 
                                                 
3 See e.g., Statement of Mr. Bamya (Palestine), UN SCOR, 73rd Sess., 8262nd Mtg. at 95-96, S/PV.8262, 17 May 
2018. 
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research has argued that the UN’s failure to resolve the question of Palestine is principally a 
product of the long-range structural ILS condition that inheres in the international legal and 
institutional order itself. The operation of this order pits hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
uses of law against one another, with the ILS condition manifesting itself in various guises, 
always with the same disenfranchising result for those who suffer under it.  
 
For Palestine, this has meant having to run an endless gauntlet of shifting goalposts from 
one legal moment to the next in order to merely maintain the most basic claims of its people 
under international law. Between the League of Nations mandate system and UN partition, 
international law and institutions were initially utilized to undermine and reify their 
international legal standing and position. Despite accepting the inequitable result of these 
fateful events, subsequent attempts to rely on international law and organization to mitigate 
their impact have yet to fundamentally produce the promise of justice and equality they portend. 
And yet the counter-hegemonic struggle continues in line with the subaltern belief in the liberal 
rights-based global order. In a 17 May 2018 statement to an open meeting of the Security 
Council on the subject of “Upholding International Law within the Context of the Maintenance 
of International Peace and Security”, the State of Palestine affirmed that “[d]espite being the 
victims of double standards” at the UN “the Palestinian people have continued to place their 
faith in international law and have reaffirmed time and again their commitment to international 
law and to peaceful, legal and diplomatic means for achieving their inalienable rights.”4  
 
 It is unclear as to whether Palestine’s counter-hegemonic resort to international law 
through the UN will enable it to break free from its long-range ILS condition once and for all. 
To be sure, the number of areas in which that condition has manifested itself in the work of the 
UN are not limited to those covered by this research which, for reasons of economy, could not 
be treated here.5 With the very limited material resources available to Palestine to address its 
existential situation, it is likely that its leadership will continue to resort to the counter-
hegemonic use of international law and institutions as a tactical means to resist. Suffice to say, 
that as an archetypal embodiment of the ILS condition, it is clear that Palestine’s case is one 
with wider relevance both for other subaltern groups and for the UN as a whole. For the former, 
examining how Palestine has negotiated the hegemonic forces pitted against it across a variety 
                                                 
4 Id., 95. 
5  The complex issue of Palestine refugees is one such area. This includes protection gaps that arise under 
international law stemming from legalized double-standards and gender discrimination in refugee status 
determination under relevant international refugee law as administered by the UN Relief and Works Agency and 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. See generally Takkenberg (1998). I shall cover this in a future 
monograph emanating from this research. 
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of paradigmatic shifts in the global order offers a useful model to better understand, at a macro 
level, the politics, scope and limits of contemporary international law and organization. For the 
latter, appreciating the extent to which the UN Organization itself continues to be implicated in 
a paradoxical role of serving as venue, facilitator and/or progenitor of the ILS condition is vital. 
Given the inordinately long duration of the question of Palestine at the UN – a question about 
which the Organization holds itself out as possessing a permanent responsibility for until it is 
resolved in all of its aspects in accordance with international law – it is difficult to deny that its 
festering case remains a litmus test for the credibility of international law and the international 
system as a whole.6 
 
                                                 
6 Statement of Mr. Bamya (Palestine), UN SCOR, 73rd Sess., 8262nd Mtg. at 95-96, S/PV.8262, 17 May 2018 at 
96. 
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